

# The Princeton Theological Review

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OSWALD T. ALLIS

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# The Princeton Theological Review

APRIL 1927

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## ON THE HEBREW OF DANIEL

In his *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*,<sup>1</sup> Dr. Driver gives a list of twenty-five words and usages to show that the Hebrew of Daniel is "of the age subsequent to Nehemiah." As No. 16 in this list he cites the use of the verb 'āmadh "to stand up" and its derivatives and forms. The statement reads as follows:

עמד *to stand up* [is used by Daniel], where the earlier languages would use קום, viii. 22, 23, xi. 2-4, 20f., 31, xii. 1a, (probably also xii. 13), as Ezra ii. 63, Eccl. iv. 15 (contrast Ex. i. 8), 1 Chron. xx. 4 (contrast Ps. xxvii. 3): with על *against* viii. 25, xi. 14, as 1 Chron. xxi. 1, 2 Chron. xx. 23, xxvi. 18 (contrast Dt. xxii. 26): in the sense of *to be established* xi. 17b (contrast Is. vii. 7). Cf. Sir. xlvii. 1, 12.

No. 14 refers to the use of 'ōmedh, "place" or "standing." It reads thus:

(עמדי) על עמדי lit. *on my (thy) standing* viii. 18 (cf. vs. 17) x. 11, Neh. viii. 7, ix. 3, xiii. 11, 2 Chron. xxx. 16, xxxiv. 31, xxxv. 10.

No. 21 deals with the use of this verb in the Hiphil stem:

העמיד xi. 11, 13, 14, not literally *to station*, as in the earlier books, but in the weakened sense, *appoint, establish*: see p. 535, No. 4.

Turning to the treatment of Chronicles, referred to at the end of No. 21, we find this additional statement:

העמיד metaph. *to establish, appoint* (a weakened sense: in earlier books lit. *to station*): 1 [Chron.] vi. 16 [A.V. 31], xv. 16, 17, xvi. 17 (= Ps. cv. 10), xvii. 14, xxii. 2, 2 [Chron.] viii. 14, ix. 8, xi. 15, 22, xix. 5, 8, xx. 21, xxiv. 13 (cf. Ezr. ii. 68), xxv. 5, 14, xxx. 5, xxxi. 2, xxxiii. 8, [2 Ki. xlv. 2, xxxv. 2, Ezr. iii. 8, Neh. iv. 3, vi. 7, vii. 3, x. 33, xii. 31, xiii. 11, 30, Dan. xi. 11, 13, 14. Cf. Ps. cvii. 25 (Also 2 [Chron.] xxxiv. 32 used specially. In 2 [Chron.] xxiii. 10, 19, xxix. 25, xxxiii. 19, Ezr. iii. 10, Neh. iv. 7, xiii. 19 the lit. sense is more prominent: in Neh. iii. iff., vi. 1, vii. 1,

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 506f. This volume will be referred to by the familiar abbreviation LOT.

of setting up *doors*). An approximation to the weaker sense occurs in 1 Ki. xii. 32, xv. 4.

### ASSUMPTIONS

There are in these statements the following assumptions:

1. That in the use of the *Ḳal* or simple stem of *ʿāmadh* in the sense of "stand up" Daniel resembles the Hebrew of the age subsequent to Nehemiah.

2. That the literature before Nehemiah would have used *ḵûm* in this sense.

3. That his use of *ʿāmadh* with the preposition *ʿal* (against) shows an age subsequent to Nehemiah.

4. That in xi. 17b *ʿāmadh* is used in the sense of "to be established"; and that this sense belongs to the age subsequent to Nehemiah.

5. That *ʿōmedh* preceded by *ʿal* indicates a date subsequent to Nehemiah.<sup>2</sup>

6. That the use of the Hiphil (Causative) stem of *ʿāmadh* in the sense of "appoint" shows a date subsequent to Nehemiah.

7. That its use in the sense of "establish" shows the same late date.

### DISCUSSION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS

#### I. *General Remarks.*

1. It must be admitted that from the earliest times of Hebrew history and especially after the captivities of the eighth century when, scattered and intermingled as they were among the Arameans from Media to Elephantine, the Hebrews were continuously in contact and intercourse with Aramaic speaking people, there must inevitably have been more or less of a transfer of ideas and vocables from one language to the other. As early as the latter part of the sixth century B.C., the Jews of Elephantine had adopted Aramaic as their written language at least for literary, legal, and diplomatic documents. Their letters to the High Priest at Jerusalem, to Sanballat ('s sons) at Samaria, and to Bagoas the

<sup>2</sup> See Bevan, *Introduction*, p. 171.

Persian governor were all in Aramaic. The same is true of the letters and decrees of the book of Ezra and the endorsements on Babylonian documents of the fifth century. But, on the other hand, the prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi and the writers of Chronicles, Esther and of the larger part of Ezra and Nehemiah wrote in Hebrew. Ecclesiasticus, composed about 180 B.C., the Zadokite Fragments from about 40 A.D., and probably First Maccabees, the Book of Jubilees, and other works later than Ecclesiasticus were also written in Hebrew. This Hebrew, which can be judged only by Ecclesiasticus and the Zadokite Fragments, preserves all the marks of classical Hebrew, such as the Wau Converso-consecutive, and the Niphal and Hophal stems. It has scarcely a trace of Greek and Latin influence, and is almost absolutely free from Persian, Babylonian, and Aramaic ingredients. In short, the Aramaic and Hebrew documents of the Israelites which have been discovered since LOT was written demand a complete revision of the history of the Hebrew language as it was conceived by Gesenius, Ewald, Keil, Nöldeke, and by Dr. Driver himself. They were not to blame for their ignorance; but they were to blame for supposing that they could make up for the lack of evidence by conjecture and purely subjective considerations. In a later article, this subject will be thoroughly discussed. At present, let it suffice to affirm that the documentary evidence of the Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus and of the Zadokite Fragments is dead against the views expressed in LOT as to the history of the Hebrew language in the times *subsequent to Nehemiah*, and to challenge Dr. Driver's successors to controvert the affirmation, not by asseverations and opinions, but by *proofs*.

2. Not merely is the Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus and of the Zadokite Fragments against Dr. Driver's theory, but so also is that of the parts of the Old Testament which the radical critics date from the times subsequent to Nehemiah. It will not do for Dr. Driver and his fellow-critics and followers to cite certain peculiarities in which Chronicles, Ecclesiastes, Esther and Ezra-Nehemiah agree, as distinguishing charac-

teristics of the post-Nehemian literature. They must show, also, that these peculiarities characterize the rest of that considerable body of Hebrew literature which, without any external evidence, they assign to the second, third and fourth centuries B.C. It will be observed that Dr. Driver cites many examples of the use of *ʾāmadh* from Chronicles and Daniel but only two from the Psalms. One of these latter (cv. 10) is according to Dr. Driver the same in sense as 1 Chr. xvi. 17 and the other (cvii. 25) is used in a connection not paralleled in the Old Testament.<sup>3</sup>

3. Had Daniel and Chronicles used *ḵûm* in the sense of *ʾāmadh*, it might have been claimed as due to Aramaic influence; for עמד "to stand" is not found in Aramaic and *ḵûm* is commonly used in Aramaic as the equivalent of both the Hebrew verbs.<sup>4</sup> The tendency among Aramaic speaking Jews in writing Hebrew would therefore have been to substitute *ḵûm* for *ʾāmadh* and not *vice versa*.

4. Since Daniel was written under Babylonian influences we would expect to find in it traces of Babylonian usage. This influence was seen in *mānā*;<sup>5</sup> and it will be observed also in *ʾāmadh*, both in the verb and the noun. Thus *indu* (for *imdu*) means "place," and *emēdu* means "stand, place, erect, lay upon, approach, stand still, take, appoint, quit, arrive, settle, dedicate, offer, strengthen, arrange (for battle), to be."<sup>6</sup> The synonym *našāzu* means "stand, step, tread, take a stand, stand

<sup>3</sup> In the expression, "He commanded and *raised* the stormy wind."

<sup>4</sup> Onkelos nearly always translates *ʾāmadh* by *ḵûm* and never renders by *ʾāmadh*. Syriac and Palestinian Syriac use this root only in the sense of "baptize." Ethiopic, Palmyrene, Nabatean, Mandaean and the North Semitic Aramaic inscriptions do not have the root at all. Most of these languages and dialects have borrowed the word for "pillar" from the Hebrew, or Arabic. The verb is found, however, in Babylonian, Phœnician and Arabic in the same sense as in the Hebrew. In the Egypto-Aramaic in line 160 of the tale of Achikar, Cooke reads עמר where Sachau suggests שמר and Ungnad עמר. If Cooke is right, this would be the only occurrence of the word in the sense "to stand" in all the Aramaic dialects.

<sup>5</sup> See this REVIEW for October 1918, pp. 645-654.

<sup>6</sup> See definitions under *emēdu* in Muss-Arnolt's Assyrian Dictionary, p. 55.



firm, *remain*, establish oneself, rely (upon), be present as a witness, stand up, arise, disappear, make a stand, come (before), enter the service of, withdraw, oppose, assist, take possession of, rest (in), stand still, set up, erect, place, collect, settle.”<sup>7</sup>

Every sense in which ‘*āmādh* and *kûm* and their derivatives are used in Daniel will be found to be covered by the meanings of these two Babylonian verbs.<sup>8</sup>

## II. *Special Remarks on the Assumptions.*

### I. The Use of the *Qal* of ‘*Āmadh*.

(1) As examples of the use of ‘*āmādh* in the *Qal* stem in the meaning “stand up” as indicating the age subsequent to Nehemiah, Dr. Driver cites viii. 22 (*bis* ?), 23, xi. 2, 3, 4, 7, 20f [i.e. 21], 31, xii. 1a, and “probably also” xii. 12 (13); and compares its use in Ezra ii. 63, Eccl. iv. 15 (contrasted with Ex. i. 8), 1 Chr. xx. 4 (contrasted with Ps. xxvii. 3). That is, he finds this “late” sense in Daniel ten, eleven or twelve times; in Chronicles, Ecclesiastes and Ezra, once each; and not at all in this sense in Esther, P. or the Psalms. This is not convincing of late date since the concordance shows that ‘*āmādh* in the simple stem occurs in Daniel 40 times; in Chronicles, 41 times; in Ezra-Nehemiah, 17 times; in Ecclesiastes, 5 times; in Esther, 10 times; in P, 14 times; in Jonah once; and in the Psalms, 26 times,<sup>9</sup> 18 of which are in the last three books of the Psalter. All or part of these books the radical critics assert to have been written largely in Maccabean times and in the centuries immediately preceding.

(2.) Moreover, many of the examples given for the use of ‘*āmādh* in the sense of “an earlier *kûm*” cannot be shown to have that sense. Thus in Dan. xi. 7, 20, 21 the verb is followed by ‘*al kēn* “upon a base or place,” a phrase never used after *kûm* anywhere in the Old Testament Hebrew. Besides, “to stand upon a place” makes better sense than “to arise

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, p. 656.

<sup>8</sup> *Kûm* does not occur in Babylonian.

<sup>9</sup> Book I, 8 times; II, once; IV, 4 times; and V, 13 times.

upon a place." In viii. 22a, Eccl. iv. 15, 'āmadh is used before תחת a construction very rare with kûm (cf. Ex. x. 23, Josh. v. 7). In Dan. viii. 25, and 1 Chr. xx. 4 'āmadh is used with מלחמה "battle" in the sense of the Babylonian verb *emêdu* "to set in battle array," in which sense kûm is never used in Hebrew, early or late."<sup>10</sup> 'Amadh in the sense of "to be" explains Dan. xi. 2, 3, and viii. 22, 23, though the latter two may be explained by the analogy of the "ram" of viii. 3f which "stood up." In xi. 4, the sense is "when his kingdom shall have been established, it will be broken." In xi. 31, we read "his forces shall prevail and pollute the holy place."<sup>11</sup> Kûm is never used in this sense, but 'āmadh is so used in xi. 15, 25 and Ezek. xiii. 5. In xii. 1 we read: "At that time shall Michael, the great prince who stands by ('al)<sup>12</sup> the children of thy people prevail . . . and thy people shall be delivered." Kûm is used in this sense in Ps. xciv. 16 but with ה instead of 'al. This Psalm is assigned by Cheyne (?) and Reuss to the Maccabean period. Dr. Driver seems to put it among those that are late in the post-exilic period.<sup>13</sup> In xii. 13, Dr. Driver says that the earlier language would probably have used kûm. If, as the commentators interpret, this passage refers to the resurrection, this is the only place in Semitic literature where 'āmadh is used to denote the "rising" from the dead. If this is the earliest clear reference to the resurrection, it is better to suppose with Bevan that, when Daniel was written, a term to denote the idea had not yet been fixed upon. The word used in Aramaic is תחיותא or תחיתא, in Hebrew תחיה and in Syriac and Arabic ordinarily a derivative of kûm. It is obvious that no proof of date can be derived from this unique occurrence in Daniel.

<sup>10</sup> In xi. 17 'āmadh is a synonym of kûm and means she shall not "stand firm or establish herself" i.e. as we say, "make good." In Is. vii. 7, it is היה that is the synonym of 'āmadh and not kûm. The verse means: The evil counsel of Syria and Samaria shall not be confirmed and it shall not come to being.

<sup>11</sup> So substantially both Bevan and Prince.

<sup>12</sup> *Dienstbereit beisteht*, as in Zech. iv. 14.

<sup>13</sup> LOT, p. 375.



In the twenty-eight other places that Daniel uses *‘āmadh* in the *Ḳal* stem, Dr. Driver finds no indication of late date. In view of Daniel's fondness for this verb and of the many nuances that the verbs of "standing" have in languages (for example, *emēdu* and *nazāzu* in Assyrian), and in view of the fact that with the aid especially of the Assyrian we can find an appropriate meaning for almost, if not every, case where Daniel employs *‘āmadh*, it seems unjustifiable to assume that his use of it was determined by the period in which he lived rather than by his own discrimination. It is not for us to say what Daniel ought to have said nor in what language he should have said it. Of all Old Testament writers Daniel uses *‘āmadh* most frequently and in most diverse meanings, but this has no necessary connection with the time when he wrote, and it cannot be shown that it indicates that his book was written in the times subsequent to Nehemiah.

2. It is assumed that in the earlier literature (i.e., that before Nehemiah) *ḵûm* was used in the sense in which Daniel, Chronicles, Ecclesiastes, Ezra-Nehemiah, Esther, and the literature subsequent to Nehemiah use *‘āmadh*. We do not believe that this view harmonizes with the facts for the following reasons:

(1) Both verbs are used in all the periods of Hebrew literature whatever dates and arrangements be made for them. The following table will show this:

	PROVERBS & PSALMS &			
	HEXATEUCH	JUD-KGS	PROPHETS	LATE BOOKS
<i>‘Amadh</i>	84	93	106	114
<i>Ḳûm</i>	116	148	90	98
				DANIEL
				40
				1

(2) The only examples of this use in the earlier literature that Dr. Driver gives are to be found in Ex. i. 8, and Ps. xxvii. 3. In Ex. i. 8, it is said that a *new* king of Egypt "arose" who knew not Joseph.<sup>14</sup> The old dynasty of Hyksos kings who were friendly to Joseph and the Israelites had fallen, or passed away, and the Ramessids had arisen in their

<sup>14</sup> Dr. Driver assigns this verse to J which he says was written before 750 B.C. (LOT, 121).

place. The point emphasized is the change of conditions and the succession of dynasties, not the endurance and stability of the government. To express this change and succession, the latest literature of the Old Testament would also use *kûm*.<sup>15</sup> Daniel, however, is not speaking of the rising of new kings but of their stability. The kingdom of Persia *arose* under Cyrus, it *stood* in its might and continued in its power throughout the reigns of Cambyses, Darius and Xerxes. Rebellions occurred in Babylon, Media, Persia, Bactria, and Egypt, and many kings, such as Smerdis the Magian, and the two Babylonians who called themselves Nebuchadnezzar the son of Nabunaid, and the various claimants to the succession of Cyaxares, arose and fell; but the three kings of Persia stood victorious over all those who rose up against them. The distinction between "rising" and "standing" is brought out clearly in a number of passages. Thus in Job xxix. 8 the aged "arose and stood" (קמו עמדו); and in Est. viii. 4. Esther "arose and stood before the king." The two verbs are used also in Nah. i. 6.<sup>16</sup> Sometimes, also, one is said to "rise and sit" as in 1 Kgs. viii. 20; and scores of times, to "arise and go." In 1 Sa. xxiv. 20, it is said that the kingdom should "arise" (i.e. originate, or, attain its limits of greatness) through David. The surest cases in the early literature in which *kûm* may mean "stand up" are to be found in Psalm xxiv. 3,<sup>17</sup> and 2 Kings. xiii. 21 where the dead child revived by Elisha "rose up" upon his feet. Since the critics place Is. xxvii after the time of Nehemiah and possibly Psalm i also, they are foreclosed from citing Ps. i. 1 and Is. xxvii. 9 in favor of their contention. The other examples of the use of

<sup>15</sup> E.g. 2 Chr. vi. 10, "I am risen up in the room of David"; xiii. 6, Jeroboam "is risen up"; xxi. 4, Jehoram "was risen up to the kingdom."

<sup>16</sup> *Kûm* "to rise" is distinguished from other verbs of standing in Gen. xxxvii. 7 where Joseph's sheaf "arose and also stood" (התנצב); in Ps. xciv. 16, where we read: "Who will rise up for me against the evildoers? or Who will stand up (יתיצב) for me against the workers of iniquity?" So, also, in Ps. xx. 8: "we are risen and stand upright" (נתעורר).

<sup>17</sup> Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord and who shall arise (= stand) in His holy place?

*ḵûm* in the sense of "stand" are found in 1 Chr. xxviii. 2 and 2 Chr. xiii. 4, xx. 19,—all from a time subsequent to Nehemiah according to the opinion of the critics.<sup>18</sup> Thus not only did the early literature not often use *ḵûm* in the sense of "stand up," but the later literature did use it.

(3) In the sense of "stand against" Dr. Driver cites Dan. viii. 25, xi. 14, 1 Chr. xxi. 1, 2 Chr. xx. 23, xxvi. 18 as characteristic of the age subsequent to Nehemiah and contrasts the use of *ʾāmadh* in these places with the use of *ḵûm* in Deut. xxii. 26. In the four cases (Dan. viii. 25, xi. 14, 2 Chr. xx. 23, and xxvi. 18) where the sense is that of "arraying themselves for battle," the sense is one in which *ḵûm* is not used in Hebrew. In 1 Chr. xxi. 1, Satan is said to "stand up against" Israel. It is to be presumed that Satan "stood up" before Jehovah as he is represented in Job i. and ii. to have done. In Job, the verb הִתִּיצַב "to stand" is used, but the angels and priests who appear before the Lord are always represented as "standing," and *ʾāmadh* is the verb ordinarily used. Deut. xx. 26 where it speaks of a man "rising against" his neighbor and slaying him is not parallel; for *ʾāmadh*, if used here, might mean that the murderer stood in self-defense, whereas *ḵûm* indicates that the initiative was on the part of the slayer.

3. The third assumption that *ʾāmadh* is used with *ʾal* in the literature subsequent to Nehemiah where *ḵûm* would have been used before is false (1) because in the sense of "arraying for battle" *ʾāmadh* is used in the Babylonian literature.<sup>19</sup> Assuming that Daniel and Chronicles were written by Daniel and Ezra respectively, they would naturally employ the technical language of the Babylonians among whom they lived in describing the military manoeuvres of the armies of their times. This sense will account for Dan. viii. 25, xi. 14, and 2 Chr. xx. 23.

<sup>18</sup> 1 Chr. xxviii. 2 reads: "And David the king arose upon his feet"; 2 Chr. xiii. 5: "And Abijah stood up upon mount Zemaraim"; and xx. 19: "And the Levites stood up to praise."

<sup>19</sup> KB. II. 106, *puḥuršunu innindu* "their armies were arranged for battle."

(2) In 1 Chr. xxi. 1, Satan is said to have "stood up against" Israel, and enticed David to number the people. Since *kûm* is never used of the "standing" of angels, there seems no special reason why it should have been used here in Chronicles. In Nu. xxii. 22 the angel of the Lord "stood" (התיצב) and again in vs. 24 he "stood" (ויעמד). In Zech. iii. 5 and 1 Chr. xxi. 15 the angel of the Lord "stood" (*âmadh*). Satan, also, in Job i. 6 is said to have "stood" (התיצב) before God, and in Zech. iii. 1 and Ps. cix. 6 he is said to "stand" at the right hand, *âmadh* being used in both cases. Since, therefore, neither Satan, nor any other angel, is ever said in the Old Testament to "arise" (*kûm*), it is absurd to affirm that the use of *âmadh* by the writer of Chronicles rather than *kûm* when speaking of the "standing" of Satan is an indication of a date subsequent to the time of Nehemiah. Chronicles simply uses the verb in common use by all the Hebrew writers.

4. It is assumed that in Dan. xi. 17b *âmadh* is used in the sense "to be established" and that this sense indicates a date subsequent to Nehemiah. But

(1) It is not probable that *âmadh* in this place means "to be established." Hitzig and Bevan translate the clause: "it shall not avail"; and Prince, "she shall not avail," i.e. "will not side with her father." The Babylonian *nazâzu* suggests that it may mean "she shall not be trustworthy," or "she shall be unreliable."

(2) If the use of *âmadh* in the sense "to be established" were characteristic of the Hebrew subsequent to Nehemiah, it is unaccountable that Dr. Driver could find no other instance of its use in this sense. 1 Sa. xiii. 14 and xxiv. 20 where the kingdom is said to "arise" are the only possible passages elsewhere which would justify this sense for *kûm*. In both of these cases the sense of "rising" is more prominent than that of "standing"; for Saul's kingdom never "rose" to the full height of a realm extending from the Euphrates to the River of Egypt, and David's did.

(3) In xi. 17 the sense "to be established" is very

doubtful. Bevan and Prince render the verb by "avail." After the analogy of the Babylonian and of Dan. xii. 1, the sense of "assist" seems better, though the Babylonian would justify the meaning "rely upon" or "have confidence in." The translation would then be: "She shall not assist him and shall not be for him."

5. It is assumed that *'ōmedh* indicates a date subsequent to Nehemiah. The assumption is made simply because, outside of Jer. xviii. 20, the word happens to occur only in Chronicles, Nehemiah, and Daniel.<sup>20</sup> In all of these places except three it is preceded by the verb *'āmadh* followed by the preposition *'al*. In Neh. ix. 3, *ḵûm* is the verb used. In Dan. viii. 17 it is preceded by the preposition אצל "beside" used after the verb בוא "to come in." In Dan. xi. 1 it is the subject of the nominal sentence whose predicate consists of ל and the infinitive. The use of the noun in Jer. xviii. 20 is enough to overthrow the claim of post-Nehemiah origin and use.

From this induction of the evidence as to nouns denoting "place" in Hebrew the following conclusions are to be drawn:

(1) The Arabic and the Babylonian have each one or more words similar to *'āmadh* to denote "place." If Daniel and the writer of Chronicles were influenced by any other Semitic language in the use of it, that language must have been the Babylonian, inasmuch as Aramaic does not have the word in the sense "to stand." This would harmonize with the position of Daniel and Ezra at Babylon.

(2) No other writer, early or late, uses just the same words for "place" that Daniel does; and the same is true of Chronicles, Ezra-Nehemiah, and the Psalms.

(3) Especially noticeable is the fact that Daniel never uses *māḵôm*, whereas Chronicles uses it 29 times and Ezra-Nehemiah 11 times.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> 2 Chr. xxx. 16, xxxiv. 31, xxxv. 10, Neh. viii. 7, ix. 3, xiii. 11, Dan. viii. 17, 18, x. 11, xi. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Besides *māḵôm* is used in Gen. 47 times, Ex. 10, Lev. 24, Nu. 18, Deut. 33, Jos. 9, Jud. 14, Ruth 3, Sam. 36, Kings 29, Est. 3, Job 21, Pss. 8, Prov. 3, Ecc. 9, Is. 17, Jer. 46, Ezek. 15, Hos. 2, Joel 1, Am. 2, Mi. 1, Na. 2, Zeph. 2, Hag. 1, Zech. 1, Mal. 1.



(4) Daniel uses *kēn* four times; no other late document uses it in this sense.<sup>22</sup>

(5) To be noted, also, is the almost absolute absence of words for "place" in the so-called Maccabean and other psalms said by the critics to have been written subsequent to Nehemiah.<sup>23</sup>

Since Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles really "form a single continuous work,"<sup>24</sup> the argument of Dr. Driver amounts to this that the presence of *ōmedh* in this composite work and in Daniel indicates that they were composed in the time subsequent to Nehemiah. This is arguing in a circle with a vengeance: *ōmedh* is late because it is in these books; and these books are late because *ōmedh* is in them. It is arguing in another circle because it asserts that Daniel is late because it contains this word which is found in the late book of Chronicles, and that Chronicles is late because it contains this word which is found in the late book of Daniel. That *ōmedh* is found four times in Daniel and seven times in Ezra-Nehemiah-Chronicles may indicate that these documents are from the same period, but it does not in itself indicate whether that period was early or late. That it is not found in Ezekiel, Zechariah, and the other literature from 600 to 400 B.C. is offset by the fact that it does not appear in that mass of literature which the critics allege to have been written after 400 B.C.<sup>25</sup> Neither does this word occur in Ecclesiasticus, nor the Zadokite Fragments, nor in the Hebrew or Aramaic of the Targums and Talmud, nor in any of the

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<sup>22</sup> Besides תחת in the sense of "in the place of" is found in Jos. v. 7, Ex. x. 23, with קום, cf. Ps. xviii. 40; and with עמר in Lev. xiii. 23, 28, Ec. iv. 15, 1 Sam. xiv. 9.

<sup>23</sup> In the Psalms mentioned in LOT, p. 287f. as assigned by any critic to Maccabean times, the common words for "place" do not occur at all, מעונה alone is found in Ps. lxxvi. 5, which Reuss thought to be a song of triumph from the Maccabean period.

<sup>24</sup> LOT, p. 516.

<sup>25</sup> That is, most of the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, parts of the Hexateuch, of Proverbs, of Isaiah and of other prophets.

Aramaic dialects. The only approaches to the form and meaning are found in Babylonian and Arabic.<sup>26</sup>

6. It is assumed that the occurrence in Daniel and Ezra-Nehemiah-Chronicles of the Hiphil of *'āmadh* in the sense of "appoint" shows that they were written in the age subsequent to Nehemiah.

This is another example of the absurd logic of the radical critics. The use of the verb is late because it is found in these books, and these books are late because they contain the verb. Moreover, the citations of proofs of the usage of the Hiphil in the sense of "appoint" as showing that this usage arose subsequent to the time of Nehemiah furnish a brilliant example of the kind of evidence often furnished by the critics of the biblical writers. Think of presenting such evidence as the following in a court of law before a judge and jury with an ordinarily intelligent lawyer on the other side! Neh. iv. 3, vi. 7, vii. 3, xii. 31, xiii. 11, 30 are cited as having the Hiphil in the sense of "appoint."<sup>27</sup> The word in this sense is cited elsewhere as one of "a list of words and idioms" "sufficient to substantiate the statement" that Daniel was written in an age subsequent to Nehemiah."<sup>28</sup> Yet we are told that chapters iv, vi, vii, xii and xiii of Nehemiah are "excerpts" or "extracts" "to all appearance unaltered" from the memoirs of Nehemiah himself.<sup>29</sup> Consistency is a jewel to anyone but a critic.

Again, in Job xxxiv. 24 we have one of the best examples of the use of this verb in the sense of "appoint." The verse reads: "He shall break in pieces mighty men without number and set (i.e. appoint) others in their stead (תחתם). But Dr. Driver says that Job was written about 500 B.C.<sup>30</sup> If so, the word must have been used in this sense before the time of Nehemiah.

<sup>26</sup> The Babylonian *imdu* means "prop, post" and the Arabic *'imād*, *'amud* and *'umdat* mean "support, base, prop."

<sup>27</sup> LOT, p. 535.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* pp. 506f.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* pp. 550f.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* p. 432.

Again Dr. Driver cites 2 Chr. xi. 15 and xxxv. 2 as examples of the late use and says that 1 Kings xii. 32 is merely "an approximation to the weaker sense." 1 Kings xii. 32 says that Jeroboam "appointed" in Bethel the priests. 2 Chr. xi. 15 says the same thing. 2 Chr. xxxv. 2, says that Josiah "appointed" the priests, over their charges. All three passages use the Hiphil of *'āmadh*. None but a critic could see any difference in the use of the verb in the three places. Moreover, in Judges xx. 28 (cf. Ps. cvi.) it is said that Phinehas the priest "stood" (Kāl of *'āmadh*) before Jehovah. He was "caused to stand" and he "stood." In Deut. xvii. 12, the priest is said to "stand" to minister before the Lord.

Again Dr. Driver cites 2 Chr. xix. 8 and Ezra iii. 8 and 1 Chr. xv. 16, 17 as showing the late and weaker (?) sense. They read as follows. In 2 Chr. xix. 8, Jehoshaphat is said to have "set" of the Levites in Jerusalem. In Ezra iii. 8, Zerubbabel and others "appointed" the Levites, etc. In 1 Chr. xv. 16, the chief of the Levites are ordered by David to "appoint" their brethren, etc.; in vs. 17, the Levites are said to have "appointed" Heman and others. In Num. viii. 13 Moses is ordered to "set" (cause to stand) the Levites before Aaron. In Neh. xiii. 11 (which is from the Memoirs of Nehemiah) Nehemiah says that he "set" them upon their place. In Deut. xviii. 7, the Levites are said to "stand" before the Lord. In 2 Chr. xxxi. 2, Hezekiah "appointed" (caused to stand) the courses of the priests and Levites according to their service. Since Deuteronomy and Numbers use the Kāl of the verb in speaking of the duties of the Levites and the Memoirs of Nehemiah the Hiphil, how does it show a date later than the age of Nehemiah for Chronicles to use it?

The porters or gatekeepers, also, were ministers or servants who "stood" during their service and hence would naturally be "caused to stand." Thus in Neh. xii. 25 (in the Memoirs) the porters are said to keep the ward of the threshold; in 2 Chr. viii. 14 they, along with the priests and Levites, are said to have been "appointed" (caused to stand); and in 2 Chr. xxiii. 19, Jehoiada set gatekeepers "at the gates

of the house of the Lord that none which was unclean in anything should enter in." Besides, in 1 Chr. ix. 22 the four chief porters at least are said expressly to have been Levites.

What is true of the porters is true also of the singers. In 1 Chr. xv. 16 David is said to have ordered the Levites to "appoint" (cause to stand) their brethren to be singers. In 2 Chr. vi. 12 the Levites who were the singers are referred to. In 2 Chr. xxxv. 15 they were "in their place" (על-מַעֲמָדָם). In 2 Chr. xx. 21, Jehoshaphat "set" them in their place to praise the Lord as they went out before the army. In 1 Chr. vi. 16-18, we read: "These are they whom David appointed (Hiphil) over the service of song in the house of the Lord and they were ministering before the dwelling place of the tabernacle of the congregation with singing and then waited on their office.<sup>31</sup> And these are they that "waited" (הַעֲמִידִים): Heman the singer, etc." Since these singers "stood" in their service, why should they not have been "caused to stand"?

Since the use of the Hiphil to denote the appointment of prophets is found only in Neh. vi. 7 which Dr. Driver considers to be a part of the genuine Memoirs of Nehemiah,<sup>32</sup> it is the business of Dr. Driver's followers to show how it could have been used by Nehemiah himself and still be an indication of the usage of an age subsequent to Nehemiah.

In 2 Chr. xix. 5 Jehoshaphat is said to have "appointed" (caused to stand) judges in the land. In the 8th verse, it is said, that he "appointed" (caused to stand) some of the Levites as judges in Jerusalem. The most obvious conclusion from verse 8 would be that other Levites had been appointed in the land. This conclusion is supported by 1 Chr. xxiii. 2-4, where it is said that among the 38,000 Levites that were numbered by David "6000 were officers and judges." The only other references to the making or appointing of judges are in Deut. xvi. 18 where it is said "judges and officers shalt thou make," where *nāthan* is used; and 1 Sa. viii. 1 where Samuel made his sons judges, and 2 Sa. viii. 4 where Ab-

<sup>31</sup> וַיַּעֲמֵדוּ עַל עִבְדֹתָם.

<sup>32</sup> LOT, p. 542.

salom says, "Oh that I were made judge," where *sîm* is used. That *nāthan* and *sîm* in the sense of "appoint" were not unused by the writers of Daniel and Chronicles is evident from 1 Chr. xii. 18 and 2 Chr. xxxii. 6 and Neh. ix. 17 where captains are "appointed" (*nāthan*), 1 Chr. xvi. 4 and vi. 48 where Levites are "appointed" (*nāthan*) 2 Chr. ix. 8 and Neh. xiii. 26 where a king is said to be "appointed" (*nāthan*). That *sîm* in the sense of "appoint" was not unused in the books assigned by the critics to the age subsequent to Nehemiah is shown by Ps. cv. 21 "he *made* him lord of"; 1 Chr. xi. 25 "and David *set* him over his guard," 1 Chr. xxvi. 10 "his father *made* him chief"; 2 Chr. xxiii. 18, "Jehoiada *appointed*"; 2 Chr. xxxiii. 14 "and *put* captains"; Est. viii. 2 "and Esther *set* Mordecai over the house," and by the fact that in the Aramaic of Ezra vi. 14 Sheshbazzar is said to have been "made" governor. This fact, that other verbs were used in the later literature as well as in the earlier to denote the idea of "appointing" would indicate to a student of language that the words were synonymous but not homologous. The most important words that are translated by "appoint" in the English versions may be clearly distinguished in a sentence like the following: "God commanded (צוה) Moses to give (נתן) the Levites to Aaron to stand (עמד) before him and he set (שם) some of them up as judges and gave others the oversight (פקד) of the offerings and assigned (מנה) them special food, services," etc.

Lastly, in 2 Chr. xxv. 5 we are told that Amaziah "made" (*he'emidh*) the men of Judah captains, etc. This is the only place in the Old Testament where this verb is used in connection with the appointment of captains. *Nāthan* and *sîm* are the usual verbs to denote this not merely in the early literature but in that which the critics place in the age subsequent to Nehemiah, e.g., *sîm* in Ps. cv. 21, 1 Chr. xi. 25, xxvi. 10, 2 Chr. xxxiii. 14, Est. viii. 2, and *nāthan* in Neh. ix. 37 (of kings), 2 Chr. ix. 8 and Neh. xiii. 26 (of a king), 1 Chr. xii. 18, 2 Chr. xxxii. 6, and Neh. ix. 17 (of a captain, or



prince). It is worthy of note, also, that the Babylonian uses *emēdu* in the sense of "appoint."

In 1 Chr. xxii. 2, Solomon is said to have "appointed" (caused to stand) *masons* to hew the stones for the temple. In 2 Chr. ii. 18 (17) he is said to have "set them" (עשה being used). No indications of date can be found here, since no other mention of the "setting" or "appointing" of hewers is mentioned in the Old Testament.

In Neh. x. 33 the children of Israel are said to have "laid" (*he'emīdh*) commandments upon themselves. With this may be compared the Babylonian (?) phrase: "upon the sinner lay (*emid*) his sin."<sup>33</sup> The use by Nehemiah may show Babylonian influence, much as we might expect; but, it does not indicate a date after Nehemiah.

In 2 Chr. xxxiii. 8 we read that God said to David and Solomon that he would not remove the foot of Israel from the ground which he had "appointed" to their fathers. This probably refers to 2 Sam. vii. 10 where God says to David: "I will appoint (*sīm*) a place (*mākôm*) for my people Israel." The verb and noun both differ in the two places as words do differ so frequently between the early books (Samuel-Kings) and Chronicles. But these differences, while they do point to different authors and might indicate different times of composition, do not determine anything about the length of the period existing between the times of their composition. If the books of Samuel were "as a whole pre-Deuteronomic and hardly later than 700 B.C.,"<sup>34</sup> how can such a variation of expression as that found in this instance go to prove that Chronicles must have been written at about 300 B.C.<sup>35</sup> rather than about 400 or 450 B.C.?<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Bel ĥite emid ĥitašu*, Muss-Arnolt, *Dictionary*, p. 56a.

<sup>34</sup> LOT, p. 183.

<sup>35</sup> LOT, p. 535.

<sup>36</sup> If the original documents from which both Samuel and Chronicles were ultimately derived were written in some system of signs like the cuneiform, such a difference might have arisen in the same age; for the sign for "appoint" may have been read either *sīm* or *āmadh* and the sign for the noun by either *adhama* or *mākôm*.

7. It is assumed that the use of the Hiphil of *'āmadh* in the sense of "establish" is an indication of the age subsequent to Nehemiah. The passages cited by Dr. Driver in which it has this sense are 1 Chr. xvi. 17, xvii. 14, 2 Chr. ix. 8, xxiv. 13, xxv. 14, and xxx. 5 and he compares Ezra ii. 68 and Ps. cv. 10 (= 1 Chr. xvi. 17).

It is admitted that the Chronicler uses this verb in this sense more frequently than the earlier writers, but this does not tend to prove that his book was composed subsequently to the time of Nehemiah. In 2 Chr. xxiv. 13 it is said that they "set" (Hiphil) the house of God upon its base (*math-kunto*) and strengthened it (*'immēš*). In Ezra ii. 68 some of the fathers are said to have offered freely for the house of God to "set it up" (cause it to stand) in its place (*'al m<sup>o</sup>kono*).<sup>37</sup> Perhaps *kûn* might have been used in one or both of these cases. The Chronicler, however, probably knew a distinction between the two words; for he uses *kûn* of houses in 1 Chr. xvii. 24. In 2 Chr. xxv. 14 Amaziah "sets up" the Edomite gods and bows down before them. No other Hebrew verb would express the idea as well as *he'emîdh*.<sup>38</sup> So in Prov. xxix. 4 the earth or land is made to "stand"; in Ps. xxx. 7, it is the mountains; in 1 Kings xv. 4, Jerusalem; in 2 Chr. ix. 8, Israel. The usage of 1 Chr. xvii. 14 where it says of Solomon that he will "settle" him in his house forever, is exactly paralleled in the Babylonian by *ina bîti luzziz*, "I will rest in the house" and *kirib êkalliya ulzizšunuti* "I settled them in the midst of my palace." In 1 Chr. xvi. 17 where the covenant is said to be "established" and in 2 Chr. xxx. 5 where the same is said of the word (or decree), the idea of endurance or fixedness probably dictated the choice of *he'emîdh* instead of *hēḳîm*. Since the date of Ps. cv. has not been fixed, we cannot tell whether it copied vs. 10 from 1 Chr. xvi. 17 or *vice versa*; or whether both copied from a common original.

<sup>37</sup> In Assyrian the same verb is used for the standing of walls, as in the phrase *la innendu igarušu* "its walls stood not."

<sup>38</sup> Compare the Assyrio-Babylonian *ušaziz šalam šarrutiya*, "I erected the image of my royalty."

As to Ps. cxlviii. 6 the verb is used in the sense of the Assyrio-Babylonian *emid* "to be." Heavens, angels, sun, and all things visible were "caused to stand" (or "be") at the command of God; therefore, should we praise him.<sup>39</sup> This use may show Babylonian influence, but it does not determine as to whether the date of the Psalm was before or after Nehemiah.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The noun '*ōmed* "place" occurs only in Chronicles (3 times), Ezra (3 or 4 times), and Nehemiah (3 times). It occurs in Neh. xiii. 11 which, according to Dr. Driver's division of Nehemiah, is ascribed to the Memoirs of Nehemiah himself. What is there, then, in this word that indicates a date *subsequent to Nehemiah*? Besides, it is noteworthy that it does not occur in Esther, Ecclesiastes, P, nor in any of the parts of Proverbs, nor in any of the Psalms, not even in those which the critics assign to the Maccabean times. But this use is found in the Assyrian *emdu*.

2. '*Āmad* occurs in only eighteen Psalms, in seven of them two times in each. Of these, Cheyne assigns only xxxiii, cxxxv and cxlvii to Maccabean times and Reuss only lxxvi and cii. The word does not occur in any of the psalms which Driver says that "very many commentators—including even Delitzsch and Perowne—admit (on historical grounds) to belong to this period"<sup>40</sup> i.e., in Pss. xlv, lxxiv, lxxix; nor in any of those which Robertson Smith "places in the early years of the Maccabean sovereignty,"<sup>41</sup> i.e., Ps. cxiii-cxviii, cxlix. In not one of these eighteen Psalms is the verb used in the sense of "stand up." Besides, no two of these great critics agree as to the date of a single psalm. Even Dr. Driver seems to have been unable to make up his mind as to the date of any one of them!

3. '*Āmad* occurs ten times in Esther; in iv. 14 in the sense of "stand up" and in iii. 4 in the sense of "be established." But since both senses are found besides only in Daniel and

<sup>39</sup> Compare also the use of *innindu* in the Creation Tablets, I. 1. 21.

<sup>40</sup> LOT, 387.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.*, 389.

Chronicles, why could not all three have been written between 400 and 540 B.C. as well as between 164 and 300 B.C.?

4. *ʿĀmad* is found five times in Ecclesiastes, i.e., i. 4, ii. 9, iv. 12, 15 and viii. 3. In iv. 12 and 15 alone can it mean "stand up" and in both cases it is followed by a preposition not found with this verb in Esther or Daniel.<sup>42</sup> There is nothing in all this to show that any one of the words is later than Nehemiah.

5. *ʿĀmad* occurs twenty-five times in P, never in the sense "stand up" or be "established," but always meaning to "present" or "cause to stand."

6. The Hiphil or causative stem, is found in six of the Psalms, to wit: xviii. 34 (= 2 Sa. xxii. 34), xxx. 7 (8), xxxi. 9, cv. 10 (= 1 Chr. xvi. 17), cvii. 25, cxlviii. 6. In Ps. cxlviii. 6, it is used in the sense "establish" as in 1 Kings xv. 4 and Prov. xxix. 4. Ps. cv. 10 is the same exactly as 1 Chr. xvi. 17. In the other four Psalms, we have the ordinary sense of "cause to stand." Of these six Psalms, Cheyne and Reuss put Ps. cxlviii alone in Maccabean times. Since there is no heading to either Ps. cv or cxlviii, nor any certainty as to when 1 Chr. xvi. 17 was written, no argument as to a date before or after Nehemiah can be based upon them.

7. The only place in Esther where the Hiphil could possibly have the meaning "appoint" is in iv. 5; but as the verb is followed by the word "before" (לפני), the common translation "cause to stand" brings the use into harmony with that which we find in Deut., Judges, Samuel, Kings, and in fact with the general usage throughout the whole Old Testament.

8. In Nehemiah the sense of "appoint" is found only in vi. 7, vii. 3 and xii. 35, of which all are assigned by Dr. Driver<sup>43</sup> to the Memoirs which he ascribes to Nehemiah himself. Surely, this use of the word by Nehemiah can not be brought forward as a proof that the employment of the word in the

<sup>42</sup> Chronicles uses it once (2 Chron. vi. 12) with *neghedh* the preposition found in Ecc. iv. 12.

<sup>43</sup> LOT, 542f.

Book of Daniel shows that Daniel was written *subsequent to the age of Nehemiah*. And yet, this is exactly what Dr. Driver does!<sup>44</sup>

9. The Hiphil in the sense of "appoint" is found in Job xxxiv. 24. Job, according to LOT, was most probably "written either during or shortly after the Babylonian captivity." If it used this verb, why may Daniel not have used it?

10. Prov. xxix. 4, in a section ascribed to Solomon, says that "the king by judgment *establishes* the kingdom." This testifies to this sense of the verb as being pre-exilic.

11. I Kings xv. 4 says that Jehovah gave David a lamp in Jerusalem to "set up" (להקים) his son after him and to "establish (להעמיד) Jerusalem." According to Wellhausen, and Kuenen, the compilation of the Book of Kings was completed substantially *before* the exile (c. 600 B.C.).<sup>45</sup>

12. In Ex. xv. 9 we read that God said to Pharaoh: "for this cause have I raised thee up" i.e. established or appointed thee as king. This passage is assigned by Dr. Driver to J.<sup>46</sup> According to Dr. Driver, critics "agree that neither [i.e. J or E] is later than c. 750 B.C."<sup>47</sup>

13. P never uses the Hiphil except in the sense of "present."

14. The only place in Ecclesiasticus where the Hiphil is used in the sense of "appoint," or "set over," is in x. 4.

15. The Hiphil is never used in the Zadokite Fragments.

16. The verb in any sense or form given by Dr. Driver does not appear in any Aramaic document of any age. In Syriac, it means "to baptize."

17. The verb in the senses of "appoint" and "establish" is not used with persons in the Hebrew of the Talmud.

18. The verb is not found in Ethiopic.

19. The verb and derivatives are found in Assyrian, Arabic and Phenician.

<sup>44</sup> Compare LOT, pp. 506f. with 535, 4.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*, p. 198.

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* pp. 24, 27.

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* p. 123.



20. In Assyrian the verb in its different forms is used in all the senses peculiar to Daniel and to Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah.

We conclude, therefore, that the uses of the verb and its derivative *'ōmed* as found in Daniel are found sporadically, also, in J, Kings, Job, Proverbs and the so-called Memoirs of Nehemiah. Since Daniel, Ezra and probably Nehemiah (Neh. xiii. 6) all lived and flourished in Babylon, it is probable that their more frequent use of the verb in these so-called "weaker" senses was influenced by the fact that the Babylonian language was so familiar to them. The writer of P never used the verb in these senses, and the writers of the Psalms but twice at most, because they lived and wrote at a time preceding the contact with these Babylonian influences.

On the other hand, we find that P and H and D and E, and 148 of the Psalms, and all of Judges, Samuel and Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Habakkuk, Nahum, Obadiah, Jonah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, and Canticles uniformly use the verb in its ordinary senses; that Isaiah and Proverbs and J and Kings and Job and Ecclesiasticus use the extraordinary senses but once for each; and that Daniel, Esther, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah are the only ones that use the verb frequently in these extraordinary nuances. When we find, further, that with the exception of Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, these five books, Daniel, Esther, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah, are the only ones that claim and are admitted by all to have been written after the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus and hence under Babylonian influences, we see how the writers of the five books may have preferred the use of *'āmadh* to that of *kûm*. Especially is this the case since the writers of these books were probably the only ones who were settled in Babylon and acquainted with its literature and language. Finally, we can understand how Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah and the writers of Esther and Chronicles have been influenced by the Babylonian, since the Babylonian had the verb *emēdu*; but we cannot see how Jewish writers can have been influenced by the Aramaic to use *'āmadh*

instead of an earlier *kûm*, inasmuch as no one of the Aramaic dialects ever used the word *‘āmadh* in any of the senses used anywhere in the ancient Hebrew.

What then must the verdict be? It can only be that the evidence given by Dr. Driver about the use of *‘āmadh* and *‘ōmedh* corroborates the *prima facie* evidence of the five books that they are substantially contemporaneous records written by men influenced by the Babylonian language rather than the Aramaic; that the books not so influenced by Babylonian were probably written at a time antedating Cyrus; and that there is not one item of evidence to be derived from the use of *‘āmadh* or *‘ōmedh* to show that the turning point of the Hebrew language was the age of Nehemiah or that the language of Daniel or Chronicles is “of the age *subsequent to Nehemiah*.”

*Princeton.*

R. D. WILSON.

## HEGELIANISM AND THEISM

Ever since speculation has asserted itself in religious reflection, various attempts have been made to find God in the ultimate nature of the universe. These attempts in most cases have had their rise not so much in the religious and moral need of man as in the demands of his rational reflection upon the nature of ultimate reality. This has been a quest for unity. Metaphysics seeks to discover a principle of interpretation in which all the sciences find their unity and by which the whole of reality is comprehended in its essential nature.

This does not imply that every metaphysician necessarily claims to have found one single principle from which the whole of reality is, according to him, properly understood and interpreted, but it does imply that all thinkers are moving in the direction of such a simplification of the mass of observed phenomena, and in this way respond to the desire, the deep-seated urge, for some kind of unity. This is true also of the scientist, who claims to have no interest in questions pertaining to ultimate reality. In his own limited sphere, in the classification of observed phenomena and the discovery of laws in accordance with which these phenomena occur, he is but following that same ineradicable urge of the human mind to reduce complexity to simplicity: to find some kind of unity amid the diversity of life's phenomena and experiences. The metaphysician, studying the science of sciences, has in many cases found a single principle from which, to his own satisfaction at least, he explains and interprets the whole of reality in its essential nature. In the case of those thinkers who have a religious as well as a metaphysical interest, this fundamental principle of unity has been identified (or, at least, most intimately associated) with the object of religious worship. Thus God becomes the First Cause, the World-Ground, the Principle of Unity, the Ultimate, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the One, and whatever other appellatives philosophers or mystics may have coined.

A consistent identification of God with ultimate reality

conceived in terms of unity is found in that group of thinkers who, tracing their spiritual ancestry to Spinoza and Hegel, interpret God in terms of a spiritual principle which lends unity to the universe. Though its influence is of late not increasing, this school, known as the Neo-Hegelian, has been for some decades, and in a way still is, the most influential school in Anglo-American religious philosophy. Here we meet with a complete reconciliation apparently of religion and metaphysics, the point of approach being the speculative. Not the description of religious states of mind, not an analysis of the needs of the religious consciousness, but an investigation into the nature of reality, is made the starting point and goal of these speculative endeavors. In this way of thinking the term God is used interchangeably with such expressions as "a spiritual principle," "Ultimate Reality," "a single, all-inclusive Experience," and, especially, "the Absolute."

Spinoza defined God as "a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality."<sup>1</sup> This undifferentiated, unitary Substance was Spinoza's object of worship as well as the Ultimate of his philosophical speculation. Few people, however, have found the reality which the object of worship requires in the God of this great thinker, decried as an atheist by some and hailed as "the God-intoxicated" by others. There is a sublimity and elevation in Spinoza's conception of God which is refreshing, especially in contrast with much of the popular "democratic" religious claptrap of our own day. One cannot but marvel at the blending of philosophical speculation and religious worship in his *amor Dei intellectualis*.<sup>2</sup>

But if Spinoza's Substance satisfies the speculative thinker in search of unity, as a conception of God it fails to satisfy the religious mind. The religious soul indeed seeks a God who

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<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, Pars I, Def. VI., "Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit."

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, Pars V, Prop. XV ff.

is most intimately bound up with reality. In a sense, the quest for unity is the quest of religion as well as of metaphysics. But the unity religion seeks is more than a mere unity of thought. It seeks for an explanation of reality that shall not suppress but do full justice to all that is highest and most worth while in human experience. It refuses to sacrifice the wealth and variety of the personal life to a logical abstraction, even if that be the idea of unity. It feels that man is not only a rational, but also a striving, desiring, feeling, willing,—a moral, being. It seeks in God a unity which shall not destroy the multiplicity of human existence. It feels almost instinctively that a blank identification of God with reality, even though spiritually interpreted as a unity, deprives the object, as well as the subject, of religious worship of that personal identity which alone makes fellowship possible.

The student of the history of modern religious thought knows that, despite the protestations of its adherents, the Hegelian tradition has been marked by such an emphasis upon the attainment of a unity of thought that the emotional and moral sides of personality have been unduly suppressed.<sup>3</sup> That all this has gone hand in hand with a certain abstractness which is disappointing not only to the philosopher but especially to the religious thinker, is a commonplace in recent religious discussion. The great popularity of those movements in current thought which professedly constitute a reaction against the extremes of an Absolute Monism, whether in the direction of a Pluralism, Voluntarism, or Moralism, may be viewed as so much proof for the contention that the monistic tradition failed to do justice to certain important aspects of human experience.

I readily grant that it will not do to condemn the Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian schools of thinking in one breath with the acosmism of Spinoza, even though it be true that he is the modern fountain-head of this tradition. Nevertheless, the line of thought represented by such men as Hegel, Strauss, Biedermann, Von Hartmann, and Dorner in Germany, and

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), *Hegelianism and Personality*.



men like Green, the Cairds, Bradley, and Bosanquet in Great Britain, despite the great services it has rendered to religious speculation, has laid itself open to essentially the same charge as above preferred against Spinoza. The latter's outspoken depreciation of the moral aspect of experience is reëchoed, if not duplicated, in the continuous efforts of Hegelians and Neo-Hegelians to reduce morality and religion alike to metaphysics. But religion is not to be exhausted in terms of philosophy. The religious man, to be sure, is seeking reality as well as the metaphysician, but he differs from the latter in that he seeks this reality not merely as a thinker but as a human being,—as a personality. Without for a moment contending that the intellectual motive, which is uppermost in the quest of the philosopher, is of minor importance for the religious thinker, it is true that the intellectual search is only part, not the whole, of his quest. In religion the relation between subject and object is a personal relation. Into it man enters not only as a rational, but no less as a moral being. The wealth of human experience as it is at its best is not to be sacrificed to a merely intellectual and abstract notion of unity, even if that notion be called the Absolute and be written with a capital A.

I shall not here undertake the arduous task of attempting to prove in detail that in Hegel's Absolute human experience in all its wealth and variety has been sacrificed to the notion of an abstract unity. I am aware of the fact that Hegel and many of his followers would repudiate such a charge. It was a great step in advance when Hegel defined reality not in terms of substance, as Spinoza had done, but in terms of the knowing subject. He claimed thus to have found a principle in which diversity is not destroyed but held in unity. Yet, despite this claim, there are the works of the Hegelians to prove that their constant aim seems to be to suppress, and even deny, the diversity and many-sidedness of human life in the interest of a conception of rational unity and non-contradiction. That the experience of the subject has not only an intellectual but also a moral side, one would not learn from

them. In their eagerness to establish the essential oneness of all reality, the relatedness of all experience, the perfection of the whole, they fail to recognize that the thinking subject is not merely a point in a universe of continuous spiritual reality, but that it has an identity of its own, a will, a moral life of its own—in short, that it is a person.

The conception of God advanced by the more consistent followers of Hegel is unquestionably weak on the personal side. Pure mind, pure thought, the Absolute Idea—some of the favorite Hegelian terms for the Divine Being—these do not yield a God with whom man can sustain personal relations. Without entering into the controversy as to the appropriateness of calling Hegel's God a personal being, one is safe in saying that his general influence has been in the direction of an absolutistic rather than personalistic interpretation of the universe. The Hegelians of the Left have understood Hegel's God as an Impersonal Absolute. Strauss contended that the Absolute is not to be conceived in personal terms.<sup>4</sup> Biedermann maintained a similar position.<sup>5</sup> Pfleiderer likewise denies personality to God, in the alleged interest of divine perfection.<sup>6</sup> When these thinkers, and Von Hartmann with them,<sup>7</sup> are prepared to admit that as an accommodation to religious feeling the term Personality of God might be used, the problem before us is not any nearer its solution, for in this way we have taken the first step on the road leading to an essential agnosticism. A "super-consciousness"—to use Von Hartmann's term—is but another version of Spencer's Unknowable as far as religious fellowship with such a being is concerned. It is only a less appropriate object of worship insofar as this being, supposed to possess super-consciousness,

<sup>4</sup> David Strauss, *Christliche Glaubenslehre* (1840), Vol. I, p. 502f.

<sup>5</sup> A. E. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1869), p. 557f.

<sup>6</sup> Otto Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 420.

<sup>7</sup> Eduard Von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten; Die Religion des Geistes*. Cf. also Arthur Drews, *Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Wesen des Absoluten und die Persönlichkeit Gottes*. 2 vols. 1893. For Hegel, see I, 229-281. For Von Hartmann, II, 557-617.

is the Unconscious. I presume the inconsistency of Von Hartmann is no greater than that displayed by Spencer when the latter enumerated various attributes for his Unknowable.

As for the Anglo-American Neo-Hegelians, Thomas Hill Green, the father of the school, conceives of God as an eternal consciousness which is the unity of the spiritual principle in man and that in nature. "There must be," says this distinguished thinker in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, "eternally such a subject which is all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming; in which the idea of the human spirit, or all that it has in itself to become, is completely realized." In another connection he insists that "our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of *personal* worth." And again, the following paragraph contains this unequivocal statement: "The spiritual progress of mankind is thus an unmeaning phrase unless it means a progress of *personal* character and *to* personal character—a progress of which feeling, thinking, and willing subjects are the agents and sustainers, and of which each step is a fuller realization of the capacities of such subjects."<sup>8</sup> One could scarcely wish for a more genuinely personal interpretation of reality than we seem to have in these statements. Whoever reads but these quotations from the *Prolegomena* would certainly be impressed by the author's insistence on human and divine personality. Yet, the careful reader of the *Prolegomena* knows that such statements are not to be found anywhere else in the volume. He, moreover, cannot fail to have discovered that the prevailing argument of the book is headed in the direction of an absolutistic conception of reality rather than a personal one.

It is somewhat surprising that this thinker, to whom the ethics of self-realization owes so much, should have devoted so little space in his classic exposition of the subject to the development of the doctrine of personality. Over against the Hedonist with his associationist psychology, Green continu-

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 197, 193, 195.

ally insists on the integrity of consciousness. Thought, according to him, is not an aggregate of mental states, but these apprehended by a self-distinguishing consciousness as a unity. The moral quest is not a striving to attain a sum of pleasures, but the realization of the self. Yet, as soon as one attempts to define this Greenian self, it seems to fade away into the endless universal system of thought relations. One cannot fail to get the impression as he reads the *Prolegomena*, that Green is evidently more interested in the spiritual unity of the whole of reality than in the distinctly personal existence either of man or of God. As it is, personality, whether human or divine, is not clearly set forth. One receives no answer to the question how the eternal spiritual principle is related to its temporal manifestation in a given animal organism. There are numberless passages in Green which might lead one to think that the author viewed the latter as but a mode of the former, and it must be confessed that these passages seem to be in fuller agreement with the prevailing point of view and spirit of the book than the two or three explicit statements cited above. I am inclined to think that Green's most fundamental doctrine of an infinite system of thought relations present to an eternal consciousness implies the pantheism which both Mr. Balfour and Professor Pringle-Pattison have charged against him, and that the passages quoted above from Book III, Chapter II, which seem so refreshing by reason of their outspokenness, are to be construed as attempts on the part of the author to offset in the mind of his readers the legitimate inferences from such a position.

Speaking of the great Greek moralists, James Seth has made the statement that their characteristic error seems to have been "the error of sacrificing the moral life, with all its concrete reality of living, throbbing, human sensibility, on the altar of intellect or cool philosophic reason."<sup>9</sup> This might perhaps be said with equal propriety of Green. Mr. Balfour has made the pertinent remark that Green's eternal con-

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<sup>9</sup> James Seth, *The Study of Ethical Principles*, 10th Ed., p. 198.

sciousness is but "the bare geometrical point through which must pass all the threads which make up the web of nature."<sup>10</sup> The deficiency of Green's conception of personality on the moral side was pointedly suggested by Professor Sidgwick when he declared that he could find no grounds in the argument of Book I of the *Prolegomena* for attributing to Green's spiritual principle any such characteristic as the term "holiness" expresses.<sup>11</sup> The "perfection of human life" in Green is a purely metaphysical, and in no sense a moral conception. It is not surprising that Green has difficulty in maintaining the distinction between the good and the bad will.

And this deficiency of Green is equally apparent in the more recent writers of this school. Whether it be Green's "all-inclusive system of relations," or Edward Caird's "principle of unity," or Bradley's "Absolute,"—all would seem equally deficient as objects of worship, however closely these may be identified with the ultimate nature of reality. Perhaps this is not primarily a charge against the metaphysics of the men here cited. Perhaps it is true that they are not especially interested in the idea of God. Perhaps their aim is only to find such an interpretation of reality as can stand the test of the criterion of non-contradiction. Then, if in their estimation the moral aspect of experience is not ultimate, they certainly are consistent in advancing the conception of reality which they do advance. Only, one might wish that the protagonists of this view would then frankly disavow any religious interest. These men ought in that case to express themselves unequivocally and say they do not mean God when they are speaking about their "Absolute." The reasoning of the Neo-Hegelians is characterized by considerable vagueness on this point. Many of them are deeply interested in the religious aspect of the metaphysical problem, but when it comes to a discussion of the matter, the mysteriousness of that word "Absolute," written with a capital letter, grows

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<sup>10</sup> *Mind*, Vol. IX (1884), p. 89.

<sup>11</sup> H. Sidgwick, *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green*, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau, p. 11.



upon the reader. Does it not seem that many of these thinkers attempt to claim for their Absolute whatever prestige the conception of God has in the thought of a religious man, and nothing beyond that? In somewhat the same fashion as the consistent Pragmatists, the attempt seems to be made to utilize all the prestige which the conception of God traditionally possesses in the interest of a view which apparently disengages the conception of all that ever gave it meaning. After one reads the repeated assurances of Mr. Bradley that truth and goodness are not part of reality; that the highest and really only value in life is the principle of non-contradiction; that, to use Mr. Bradley's own words, the Absolute is "not personal, not moral, nor beautiful or true"<sup>12</sup>—the conclusion that such an Absolute cannot be the object of religion, that such an Absolute is not God, is unescapable.

Now Mr. Bradley, at least, has explicitly stated that in his way of thinking the Absolute is not God, and he is hence not to be charged with the identification of God and an un-moral Absolute. To be sure, many have so interpreted his position in his *Appearance and Reality*,<sup>13</sup> and the extent to which he has laid himself open to this charge is not now for us to determine. Mr. Bradley has removed all possible misunderstanding on this point in his more recent book, *Essays on Truth and Reality*. In a chapter entitled "On God and the Absolute," he says: "The Absolute for me cannot be God, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will."<sup>14</sup> Here we surely cannot complain of the ambiguity of the author, but neither do we feel that we have come closer to a solution of our problem. Does it not appear that we are here led to the verge of the bog of Agnosticism?

Apparently we have in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* a restatement of the metaphysical problem. His avowed aim is not to present a solution, but honestly to face all the ele-

<sup>12</sup> F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 537.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Chapters XXV and XXVI.

<sup>14</sup> F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 428.

ments in the situation and to leave the solution, if attainable, to others. Mr. Bradley's attempt may perhaps not inaptly be characterized as a criticism after the Kantian fashion. Throughout his truly great metaphysical essay he insists on an impartial analysis of the central problem of metaphysics, repeatedly disavowing every attempt at a consistent solution. As such his work is to be viewed and, no doubt, to be appreciated. But it would seem that Mr. Bradley has with his Kantian attempt and discriminating criticism not failed to arrive at essentially the same Kantian Agnosticism. That the author himself would perhaps be the first to recognize this, does not affect our argument in any way. Despite his doctrine of degrees of reality, the world of appearance and that of reality are divorced in a way which appears too radical to allow of reconciliation. In the first book of the *Appearance and Reality* the finite world is condemned as unreal because of the contradictions it involves, and in the second the author finds reality in the Absolute or the Universe as a Whole, in which "all distinctions are fused," "all relations disappear," and all discord is said to be held in unity and harmony. But for this Absolute, truth, goodness, beauty, morality, and personality have no meaning. The Absolute is utterly unrelated, and "our experience, where relational, is not true."<sup>15</sup> In this way, Mr. Bradley does not hesitate to say that the unity of the various aspects of experience is "unknown"; that it is an experience "of which, as such, we have no direct knowledge"; and, again, that "in the end the whole diversity must be attributed as adjectives to a unity which is not known."<sup>16</sup>

That all this should have no bearing upon Mr. Bradley's conception of God is unthinkable. It is true that he repeatedly insists that metaphysics is a theoretical, and religion a practical, affair.<sup>17</sup> But it is equally true that Mr. Bradley cannot seriously believe that the two can be treated as non-communicating spheres. If it be accepted that God "has no meaning

<sup>15</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 34.

<sup>16</sup> Pp. 468-9.

<sup>17</sup> P. 439ff. Cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 428, 431, 449.

outside of the religious consciousness," which is "essentially practical"<sup>18</sup> that a personal God may be a conception relatively true;<sup>19</sup> but that "a personal God is not the ultimate truth about the Universe," and that He "in that ultimate truth would be included and superseded by something higher than personality";<sup>20</sup> and that, consequently, a personal God not being the ultimate truth,<sup>21</sup> the Absolute "is not God"<sup>22</sup>—if all this be accepted, the question inevitably presents itself, What is the relation of this object of religion to ultimate reality as defined by Mr. Bradley? Mr. Bradley may freely admit that on this subject he "never has much to say,"<sup>23</sup> but this does not make the question less pertinent. In fact, it becomes the more insistent in view of the author's brief but cogent argument against the conception of a limited God,<sup>24</sup> and particularly in the light of the author's striking and gratifying statement that "as religion develops, it is seen that the object of religion can in the end be nothing finite."<sup>25</sup> Is the inference not warranted, that, despite the author's insistence on the disparity between religion and metaphysics, in his own mind the Absolute has all the value which the conception of God has in the mind of most people? However this may be, whether Mr. Bradley consistently distinguishes between God as related and the Absolute as unrelated; or whether there are moments in which the Absolute is to Mr. Bradley all that God means to the religious mind; in either case, his conception of God fails to satisfy. In the former case we are face to face with the difficulties inherent in the position of Mr. Spencer; in the latter, all that has been said about the uselessness of the Absolute as the object of religious worship applies with equal force.

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<sup>18</sup> *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 428.

<sup>19</sup> Pp. 432, 449.

<sup>20</sup> P. 432.

<sup>21</sup> P. 436.

<sup>22</sup> P. 428.

<sup>23</sup> P. 428.

<sup>24</sup> P. 429f.

<sup>25</sup> P. 442, Note.

That in the estimation of at least some Hegelians, *viz.*, those to whom the principle of non-contradiction is not the only criterion of truth, such an Absolute approaches the state of uselessness for metaphysics as well as religion, McTaggart may teach us. In McTaggart we witness a reaction against the suppression of personality as unreal and transcended in the Absolute. He reasserts the reality of finite selves and uses the term "Absolute" only to indicate the "Society," or "College," of these finite selves. Here, it would seem, the essentially atheistic tendency of Absolute Monism comes clearly to view. When God is reduced to such an abstraction as a mere principle of logical unity, as is done by these Absolute Idealists, it is but one step to the position that such a God is superfluous. McTaggart takes this step. Starting with a greater appreciation for the reality of finite selves than most Hegelians are wont to evince, he insists that the Absolute has no reality apart from the society of these finite selves; that hence, to use his own words, "the Absolute is not God, and, in consequence, there is no God."<sup>26</sup> And he anticipates the objection that this might be called Atheism with the statement that "it is much more important to preserve a definite meaning for Theism than for Atheism, and this can only be done if Theism is uniformly used to include a belief in the personality of God," which—as is understood—the author himself rejects.

What emerges from our discussion is the inadequacy of any conception of God divorced from ultimate reality on the one hand, or identified with ultimate reality as an undifferentiated, merely logical, un-moral unity on the other.<sup>27</sup> There are two elements in the conception of God to whose interplay all discussion on the question is practically due, and whose proper correlation constitutes the essence of our task. These two elements are the metaphysical and the moral. In Plato's

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<sup>26</sup> J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 94.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of the standpoint of some who divorce their conception of God from ultimate reality, see the writer's article, "Finitistic and Pragmatistic Theology," in this REVIEW, July, 1924.

terms, it is the line of *φύσις* (including both metaphysics and physics) and the line of *ἦθος*; the aspect of "to be" and the one of "ought to be"; Kant's pure and his practical reason. Other lines of thought cross this one, but throughout the history of philosophy these two aspects of reality have, in a sense, formed the data and the starting-point of all speculation.

The metaphysician usually conceives of reality in terms of pure being. He is impressed by the world in its unitary, abiding, and permanent character. He is the man of ratiocination and his unity is a unity for thought. The moral aspect of experience is accordingly viewed either as unreal, or as not belonging to the ultimate nature, but merely to the temporal form, of reality. Although a philosophy of becoming and growth does not necessarily stress the moral aspect of experience, seeing that there have been such philosophies which did not transcend the level of material nature, it may safely be said that the moral aspect of experience has usually been linked up with a more or less growing, becoming, dynamic, and relative conception of life and reality. This same contrast we discover in current religious speculation. The Hegelian tradition in present-day thought represents the metaphysical, the absolute, the monistic line of thinking. Despite the fact that there is a very real evolutionary ingredient in Hegelianism, the point of view of growth, of development, of becoming, has not had a prominent place in this school of thought. The definition of history as the realization of the Idea has been preached with such an emphasis upon the Idea, that the conceptions of process and development have not received very great consideration. The deficiency of the consistently Hegelian conception of the world on its moral side is a commonplace in present-day thought. The moral aspect of experience, though not denied, is interpreted in terms of the metaphysical and thus denied reality after its own kind. The whole system tends toward a barren intellectualism, its unity being a unity for thought only, in which the moral aspect of life is suppressed.



The reaction against this system is now perhaps at its height. The pendulum has swung from being to becoming; from the one to the many; from the rational to the voluntaristic; from the speculative to the practical. That in its religious aspect this is a reaction in the avowed interest of the moral point of view is a matter of common knowledge. The fascination which pragmatic, voluntaristic, humanistic, and pluralistic points of view possess for the religious mind is especially to be sought in the moral sphere. The religious import of James's pluralistic universe, as the author himself has not been slow to point out, is found particularly in the explanation which it offers of the existence of evil, imperfection, and moral development in the universe. That the notion of a finite God, such as Mill and, of late, the novelist Wells advanced, has been developed from a moral rather than a metaphysical motive is equally apparent.

If it be granted that much of religious speculation since the days of Hegel has been characterized by a suppression of the moral aspect of experience, it is equally clear that the newer points of view, which in one form or another constitute a reaction against this Monistic Idealism, have been characterized in a greater or lesser degree by a disparagement of metaphysics, and hence of all questions pertaining to ultimate reality. The resulting conceptions of God, which in the minds of many are more or less sharply contrasted, are those defined in terms of metaphysics on the one hand, and of morality on the other. To the Neo-Hegelians God is Supreme Reality, the Absolute, the Unitary World-Ground. To the Pragmatists, of whatever shade, He is Benevolent Purpose, the Highest Good, Supreme Value. But it is apparent that a conception of God divorced from ultimate reality cannot satisfy the religious mind, and equally that a God conceived purely in terms of logical unity cannot be the object of religion. One feels inclined to subscribe to the statement of Bradley that "to make the moral point of view absolute" virtually means that

one has "broken with every considerable religion";<sup>28</sup> but one feels no less confident in declaring that a barren Absolute, which is "not personal, nor moral, nor beautiful or true"<sup>29</sup> is not God. The God of the New Testament, the God whom Christ revealed to man, the God of Christian Theism, is Infinite Personality.

*Grand Rapids, Mich.*

CLARENCE BOUMA.

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<sup>28</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 500. Cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 441-2.

<sup>29</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 537.

## THE DAVIDIC DYNASTY\*

That sense of solidarity which all families have to some degree is nowhere else so strong as in families which possess hereditary sovereignty. In them from generation to generation runs the current of a common heritage, a common pride, a common interest. They are bound together into a unity which is symbolized by their family name, or by their geographical designation, or by their patronymic—the name of their real or fancied founder. So we speak of the House of Stuart, the House of Savoy, the Merovingians, the Achæmenidae.

The House of David is such a unit. To call this unit a *house* is peculiarly agreeable with the Semitic manner of speech and with the social organization of the Hebrew people. The largest unit in Israel was of course the *tribe*—one of those twelve groups which traced their descent from the twelve sons of Jacob. Next in order of size came the unit called in Hebrew by terms for which our English Version has no more satisfactory rendering than *family*, but which correspond more nearly to *clan* or *sept*. Finally there was the *house*, or, more fully and properly, *father's house* or *household*. The lines between these various sorts of units were not hard and fast, but were drawn according as social and genealogical circumstances indicated. Some *families* held together and others dissolved. Some *houses* died out, while others increased to a great size because for many generations all who were sprung from some eminent man continued to call themselves, individually his *sons*, collectively his *house*.

It is only natural that such cohesion and expansion should be notably true of the house of so eminent a person as David. David's house is first referred to, by anticipation—that is, before it began to exist—when Jonathan in his covenant of

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\* The substance of this article was delivered in Miller Chapel, October 10, 1921, as the first of five lectures on "The House of David," constituting the Stone Lectures for the year 1921-2.

friendship with David expressly extended it to include their respective *houses*.<sup>1</sup> And a thousand years later we find it still a living phrase, when we read from the careful pen of Luke that for the enrollment under Augustus Joseph of Nazareth betook himself to Bethlehem "because he was of the house and family of David."<sup>2</sup> All through the millennium that intervened, so far as we have documents preserved to us, this House of David is spoken of and addressed as a real unit and entity in Israel.

David himself was of course reckoned as belonging to the *house* of Jesse, his father. And for one reason or another this old designation was occasionally revived in later times as a name for the descendants of David, though we find it used only in figurative form.<sup>3</sup>

David alludes to the *family* to which he belongs, and when his absence from the royal table occasions remark, Jonathan tells Saul that David's family have a sacrifice at Bethlehem to which he has been summoned to meet with his "brethren."<sup>4</sup> It is possible that this entire family, out of which, though comparatively small,<sup>5</sup> sprang the ruling dynasty of Israel, came in time to call itself the House of David, although many of its ancestors were only cousins or more distant kinsmen of the famous king.

Had the House of David no other claim to fame than that Jesus Christ belonged to it, this alone would render it interesting and important, not only to every Christian but to every student of history. For, blazoned on the front page of the Gospel of Matthew—the first verse of the first chapter of the New Testament—is Christ's lineage from King David: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David."<sup>6</sup> Then when we turn from the first of the Gospels to the first

<sup>1</sup> 1 Sam. xx. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Luke ii. 4.

<sup>3</sup> See Is. xi. 1, 10, Rom. xv. 12.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Sam. xx. 6, 29.

<sup>5</sup> Mic. v. 2, where "thousands" should be rendered "families" as in the margin, and as in Judg. vi. 15, an instructive parallel.

<sup>6</sup> Matt. i. 1.

of the Epistles, we discover that Romans—that orderly doctrinal and practical exposition of the Christian religion—begins with the declaration that the personal Subject of Paul's system was One “born of the seed of David according to the flesh.”<sup>7</sup> And in the Book of Acts likewise, the first Christian sermon it records—that preached by Peter on the Day of Pentecost—declares the risen, saving Christ to be One whose recent triumph over death David had foreseen, when he believed God's promise that “of the fruit of his loins he would set one upon his throne.”<sup>8</sup>

Thus the Davidic origin of Jesus Christ is the starting-point alike of Gospels, Acts and Epistles. But it also remains the theme of the New Testament down to its close. In Paul's farewell word, when he is about to leave his leadership in the Church to others, he charges Timothy thus: “Remember Jesus Christ, risen from the dead, of the seed of David, according to my gospel.”<sup>9</sup> And the final message to the Church from the exalted Christ in John's Apocalypse seems consciously intended to link the end of the New Testament to its beginning, for we hear this Christ saying “I am the root and the offspring of David.”<sup>10</sup>

It is true, the House of David cannot be justly estimated in history otherwise than as a unit. Its goal and culmination in Christ ought to be borne in mind throughout its career from David onwards. Nevertheless, apart from the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, it has a history of its own which is worthy of all attention. And for purposes of study it is convenient to analyze its history into successive phases. Each of these phases has an importance and interest of its own.

For our major divisions of this long story we may draw the lines at the Exile and the Birth of Christ. From David to Jehoiachin is the dynastic phase: twenty-one kings reign in succession for about four and a half centuries. From Je-

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<sup>7</sup> Rom. i. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Acts ii. 30.

<sup>9</sup> 2 Tim. ii. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Rev. xxii. 16.



hoiachin's death till the birth of Jesus is the phase of obscurity: through more than five and a half centuries the members of the House of David, themselves in private and even humble station, wait for the fulfilment of God's promise, cherishing the assurance of an eternal and universal dominion for their house. And finally, with the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem, "the city of David," begins the third and final phase of the story, for as the New Testament points out, it is in Him that all the hopes of His fathers and the promises through the prophets are fulfilled.

Our acquaintance with these three phases of the history of the House of David is of course very unequal. The second of them is veiled for the most part in obscurity: save for Zerubbabel at the beginning and Joseph and Mary at the end, we have only a list of names. The first and third phases, on the other hand, lie in the full light of history. And as these correspond roughly to the Old Testament and the New Testament respectively, we may think of them as the Old Testament phase and the New Testament phase of the House of David. The historian's first concern therefore is naturally with the career of David's dynasty as it is told in the Old Testament books.

Of this dynastic phase the divisions may best be marked as follows: (1) a period of dominion over all Israel, lasting about 73 years;<sup>11</sup> (2) a period of dominion over the southern or minority group of tribes—consisting chiefly of Judah—lasting about three and a half centuries; and (3) a period of royal status without actual dominion, lasting a little over 25 years.<sup>12</sup> Inasmuch as the second of these periods is dis-

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<sup>11</sup> Or, if the accession of David be dated from his coronation at Hebron, 2 Sam. v. 3-5 (comp. 1 Kings ii. 11), this period will number 80 years, unless (1) either of these 40-year reigns, or both of them, be regarded as given in round numbers, or (2) the time between Solomon's coronation and David's death, 1 Kings i. 39, ii. 10, be reckoned at a year or more and be counted as a part of both reigns.

<sup>12</sup> How much more there is no means of determining. The 25 years are from 587 B.C., when Zedekiah lost his throne, till 562 B.C., when Evil-Merodach succeeded Nebuchadnezzar. The phrase "all the days of

proportionately long, it may conveniently be further subdivided into three sections: (a) from the revolt of Jeroboam to the assassination of Ahaziah by Jehu—about 88 years;<sup>13</sup> (b) from the death of Ahaziah to the fall of Samaria—120 years; and (c) from the fall of Samaria to the fall of Jerusalem—135 years.<sup>14</sup> Apart from the intrinsic importance of the events which mark the beginning and end of these subdivisions, there is an advantage in thus analyzing the course of Hebrew dynastic history arising from our certainty as to the dates of these particular events. By comparison of the Biblical data with extra-Biblical data chronology has been able to establish the year of these cardinal points in the story. There remains uncertainty only as to the beginning of the first sub-period and as to the relative adjustment of some of the reigns within the sub-period to which they respectively belong.

Viewed as an historical unit, the dynasty of David presents some remarkable features, which have hardly been sufficiently remarked by most historians. Comparison between such Biblical facts and facts of a similar sort which furnish the substance of "profane history" was long hindered by the prevailing distinction between "sacred" and "profane" historiography. For a variety of reasons the general historian of antiquity has often passed over the history of Judah with brief and rather casual notice. The Old Testament specialist, on the other hand, has paid too little attention to parallel phenomena in the careers of other states for purposes of comparison. Unfortunately recent efforts of historical criti-

his life," in which the antecedent of "his" is not clear, might mean a considerable period if the reference is to Jehoiachin's life, for he was barely 55 years of age at the time; if the reference is to the King of Babylon, on the other hand, the period must be short, as he was de-throned and killed after two years only. In any case it is hard to believe that the usurper did not reverse his predecessor's acts in this matter as well as in others, so that it remains unlikely that this last shadow of recognized Jewish kingship outlasted the year 560 B.C.

<sup>13</sup> The latter date must be 842 B.C., the former may be fixed only approximately at 930 or a year or two earlier.

<sup>14</sup> That is, from 722 to 587 B.C.

cism to remedy this error have led to the opposite extreme. In the name of scientific method it has not hesitated to alter or reject many of the Biblical data on which alone a sound comparison can be based, although the amazing progress of archaeology has of late tended to check this skeptical tendency and to rehabilitate the Old Testament as a source-book of ancient history. It is at the present time by no means a work of supererogation to devote to the dynasty of the Davidic kings such attention as we should give to the Stuarts, for example, or to the Bourbons, regarded simply as a series of sovereigns differing in certain definite ways from any other such series. And of course the most instructive comparison for these Davidides is afforded us within the Old Testament itself, by the character and career of those kings who were their contemporaries, the rulers of Northern Israel during two centuries of the time when David's line was ruling at Jerusalem.

In the first place, few historians seem to have remarked the fact that the descendants of David occupied the throne of Judah for a longer term than any other dynasty has uninterruptedly held any throne, ancient or modern, with few exceptions. While there is uncertainty as to the precise year when David became a king,<sup>15</sup> it was certainly much more than four centuries earlier than the date when Zedekiah, the last of his sons to reign in Jerusalem, abandoned his capital in flight from the army of Nebuchadnezzar. And if we include the lifetime of that unfortunate predecessor of Zedekiah, Jehoiachin, whom Nebuchadnezzar's successor publicly recognized as king of the Jews even while a captive at Babylon, we have a span of about four hundred and fifty years between David's coronation at Hebron and that ultimate date for recognized Jewish royalty with which the Second Book of Kings closes.

Now what other royal houses have reigned as long?<sup>16</sup> The

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<sup>15</sup> Not later than 1000 B.C., and probably ten or twelve years before the close of the eleventh century.

<sup>16</sup> The Far East has been disregarded in this comparison.

average term of an Egyptian dynasty was little more than a century. That of a Babylonian or Assyrian dynasty was often still less. In Israel, Judah's sister state, only two families succeeded in seating more than two of their members on the throne. These two were the houses of Omri and Jehu. But the Northern Kingdom was ruled less than a century and a half by these two houses taken together. It is notorious how brief has been the career of those dynasties which the world's greatest conquerors have set up—the Alexanders, the Caesars, and the Napoleons. And even among the houses which began more modestly and held longer the gains that came to them more gradually, where is there a record of persistence to equal that of David's house? Perhaps the Hapsburgs, whose fall was but yesterday? Hapsburgs were elected Emperors before there were kings of their line,<sup>17</sup> but this imperial crown did not remain theirs uninterruptedly, and when they fell they had been of regal rank less than four centuries. The Hohenzollerns of Prussia, who boasted of their ancient lineage, reached kingly grade only in 1701. The royal house of Italy did not become royal till 1713, and the Romanoffs obtained the crown but a century earlier. Among English dynasties the Plantagenets, with 331 years to their credit, were by far the most enduring. In France the Capetians lasted just ten years longer than the Plantagenets, while none of the other French houses reached even to three centuries.

With these comparisons in mind it is not too much to say of the dynasty of David that it would deserve eminence in history simply for its persistence, even if it had been otherwise undistinguished. But the same incomparable prestige which secured its long lease of continuous sovereignty gave it also a singularly undisputed sway. Save for the attempt by Athaliah—herself an alien, a daughter of Phoenician Jezebel—to exterminate every vestige of her own offspring,<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Rudolf of Hapsburg was a simple Count.

<sup>18</sup> 2 Kings viii. 18, 26; xi. 1.

so that she might hold the throne alone, there was never a move from within Judah to put an end to David's line. Even when foreign conquerors, like Necho and Nebuchadnezzar, found it expedient to make a change of rulers in Jerusalem, they simply substituted one scion of David's stock for another.<sup>19</sup> Whenever a king was violently removed by domestic conspiracy, it was his son, the heir-apparent, whom the people chose to succeed him.<sup>20</sup>

The only time when anyone seems seriously to have contemplated setting on the Jewish throne one who was not a Davidic prince, was the occasion when the confederate kings, Pekah of Israel and Rezin of Syria, in the days of Ahaz and Isaiah, planned to put a certain "Ben-Tabeel" in Ahaz' place.<sup>21</sup> "The son of Tabeel"—does it not seem probable that this person, not otherwise designated than thus by his father's name, is so termed ironically, because the one thing most astonishing and incredible to everyone's mind was that *the son* of anybody but David should even be proposed as king in Jerusalem?<sup>22</sup> This one futile challenge of David's permanent tenure, in the course of those long centuries, simply tends therefore to emphasize the unique quality of David's hold upon the throne through the house that sprang from him.

There were twenty-one kings in the long line. And it is hardly less remarkable that, with but a single exception, the crown passed from father to son, in regular order and seemingly without question as to preferences among the royal princes. The confused political conditions after the tragic death of Josiah are solely responsible for the successive elevation to the throne, first, of one of his sons, next, of a second son, then, of a grandson (son of the man he succeeded),

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<sup>19</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 34; xxiv. 17.

<sup>20</sup> 2 Kings xi. 12; xii. 20, 21; xiv. 21; xxi. 24; perhaps xxiv. 6 (see Jer. xxii. 19; xxxvi. 30).

<sup>21</sup> 2 Kings xvi. 5; Is. vii. 6.

<sup>22</sup> One feels the same irony in the expression "son of Jesse" so often used of David by Saul and others who had occasion to treat him as an upstart, e.g., 1 Sam. xx. 27, 30, 31; 2 Sam. xx. 1; and even 1 Kings xii. 16.



and finally, of a third son of Josiah.<sup>23</sup> All these four accessions occurred within twelve years, and the only two of them that represent a departure from the father-to-son principle were at the dictation of foreign conquerors.

A kindred fact in the history of the Davidic dynasty is the frequent—it is not too much to say, the habitual—association of the heir-apparent with the reigning king as his co-regent during his later years. Expressly stated in the historical texts in several cases, it has become known to us in other cases through the comparison of chronological data, and now and then it has served to explain things otherwise obscure or has fitted well with facts recently revealed by archaeology. There were in all twenty transfers of the sceptre from one hand to another. The circumstances attending the first of these transfers are better known than those of any later time.<sup>24</sup> Solomon was not merely publicly designated as David's successor, but actually anointed, proclaimed, and enthroned as King of Israel, at the command of his aged father at a time when he was enfeebled and incapacitated for royal duties. Although this coronation was brought about by the ambition of Adonijah and his party at court, nevertheless it actually set a precedent for the family and it need occasion no surprise to see how often it was followed later.

The Books of Kings as well as of Chronicles preserve the tradition of Asa's severe illness through some disease of the feet in his last years,<sup>25</sup> but only in the Greek text of Kings is found this synchronism: first year of Jehoshaphat equals eleventh of Omri, which proves that Jehoshaphat became co-regent with Asa his father during those years of his incapacitation.<sup>26</sup> Jehoshaphat's son Joram suffered from a loathsome sickness for the last two years of his reign,<sup>27</sup> and Ahaziah, the only son remaining alive to him after a disas-

<sup>23</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 30, 34; xxiv. 6, 17.

<sup>24</sup> 1 Kings i. 5-53.

<sup>25</sup> 1 Kings xv. 23; 2 Chr. xvi. 12.

<sup>26</sup> 1 Kings xvi. 28, 29.

<sup>27</sup> 2 Chr. xxi. 18, 19.

trous raid by Philistines and Arabians,<sup>28</sup> was associated in the sovereignty during at least a part of that time.<sup>29</sup> But even without the element of illness entering into the case, so far as we are informed, Joram himself had shared the throne with his father Jehoshaphat for five years.<sup>30</sup> So much for the first sub-period.

In the second sub-period, illness<sup>31</sup> accounts for the joint reign of Joash and Amaziah his son.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, it may have been the military disasters of Amaziah, and that domestic opposition which culminated in his flight to Lachish and assassination there, that occasioned the association of his son Uzziah (Azariah) with him.<sup>33</sup> But it is sickness again that explains the joint reign of Uzziah and Jotham.<sup>34</sup> Not only does all, or nearly all, of Jotham's sixteen-year reign belong within the term of Uzziah's fifty-two-year reign, but, on account of the absolute removal of the old leprous king from all exercise of sovereignty, Jotham himself apparently felt the need of introducing his son Ahaz to the kingship after the prevailing fashion. Thus Judah may actually have had three kings alive at the same time, father, son, and grandson. Some think that there is ground for the belief that Ahaz and Hezekiah also reigned jointly during a brief period before the death of Ahaz, though the figures connected with the ages and accessions of these two kings are not wholly reconcilable in the form in which they have been transmitted to us in the manuscripts.

During the third sub-period it does not appear that the same custom prevailed, although it should be observed that Manasseh is the only king thenceforward whose reign did

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<sup>28</sup> 2 Chr. xxi. 16, 17.

<sup>29</sup> 2 Kings ix. 29, compared with viii. 25.

<sup>30</sup> Evident from a comparison of 2 Kings viii. 16 with i. 17 and iii. 1. The peculiar language of viii. 16 should be noted also.

<sup>31</sup> 2 Chr. xxiv. 25.

<sup>32</sup> 2 Kings xiv. 1, compared with xii. 1 and xiii. 10.

<sup>33</sup> 2 Kings xiv. 19, which probably covers some time; comp. the peculiar expression "the king" in ver. 22.

<sup>34</sup> 2 Kings xv. 5.

not come to a violent, early and unexpected end.<sup>35</sup> Amon died by a conspiracy, at the age of twenty-four, after but two years' reign.<sup>36</sup> Josiah was killed in battle, still a comparatively young man.<sup>37</sup> Jehoahaz, Jehoiachin, and Zedekiah were all deposed and deported.<sup>38</sup> Jehoiakim's end is obscure, but he seems to have perished in some commotion and certainly untimely.<sup>39</sup> Not one of these kings lived to reach the age of forty. It is not surprising, therefore, that we read of no co-reigns in this sub-period.

Another significant fact seldom noted by historians is the care with which this royal house maintained the purity of its Jewish blood; and alongside of this should be mentioned the pains taken by the national recorders to emphasize that fact. The prophetic author of the Books of Kings reproaches Solomon for his marriages with foreign women, the princesses of neighboring courts.<sup>40</sup> Those reproaches take on new meaning when we observe that Solomon was the only king of all the Davidic line—so far as we know—who married outside of Israel. And Athaliah, daughter of Ahab, king of Israel, who became the wife of Joram and the mother of Ahaziah, kings of Judah, is apparently the sole exception, after Solomon's time, to the rule that the queen, the mother of future kings of David's line, must be, not merely a Hebrew woman, but a member of the tribe of Judah. The unhappy outcome of Joram's (or rather, his father Jehoshaphat's) experiment seems to have sufficed to impress for all time, even upon royal caprice and political match-making, the lesson of the Law's commands<sup>41</sup> and of the prophets' warnings. There were no more foreign marriages, even with Northern Israel. We are expressly told the names of the queen-mothers in each reign, with but two exceptions, viz.,

<sup>35</sup> 2 Kings xxi. 18.

<sup>36</sup> 2 Kings xxi. 19, 23.

<sup>37</sup> 2 Kings xxii. 1; xxiii. 29.

<sup>38</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 33, 34; xxiv. 15; xxv. 7.

<sup>39</sup> See Jer. xxii. 19; xxxvi. 30.

<sup>40</sup> 1 Kings xi. 1-11.

<sup>41</sup> Ex. xxxiv. 16; Deut. vii. 3.

Joram and Ahaz. Even when the name of her father and her native town is not given—and such omission is the exception—the queen's own name of itself testifies to her Hebrew origin.

In this matter we cannot but be impressed by the contrast between the kings of Judah and the kings of Israel. To be sure we do not know certainly that any of these latter contracted marriage alliances outside of Israel, save in the case of Ahab, who married Jezebel, daughter of Ethbaal, King of the Sidonians.<sup>42</sup> But the fact is, we do not know the identity of any other queens in Israel than Jezebel. It is surely no mere chance that this item of information, so conspicuous and regular in the record of each Davidic reign, is uniformly omitted in the record of the Northern kings.

Again, a variety of facts bears witness to the special care taken to perpetuate the line of David. The heroic defiance by Jehosheba of her murderous mother (step-mother?) Athaliah, in order to rescue one infant son of her brother Ahaziah that the line of David might not be totally exterminated, is one such fact.<sup>43</sup> With that infant Joash, sole survivor of his grandmother's massacre, the dynasty reached its narrowest escape from extinction. And the statement that "Jehoiada took for him (i.e., Joash) two wives"<sup>44</sup> suggests anxiety to replenish the seed of this menaced house as quickly as possible; and in fact, if the figures transmitted to us are correct, Amaziah, the son and successor of Joash, was born in the fourteenth or fifteenth year of Joash's age,—an extraordinary but not an unparalleled occurrence.

Another indication is the excessive grief of Hezekiah at his sickness.<sup>45</sup> Can it not be understood better—as also the prophetic message and sign connected with it—if we suppose that it was enhanced by the failure of royal issue up to that time, even though there were collateral branches of the

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<sup>42</sup> 1 Kings xvi. 31.

<sup>43</sup> 2 Kings xi. 2.

<sup>44</sup> 2 Chr. xxiv. 3.

<sup>45</sup> 2 Kings xx. 2, 3; Is. xxxviii. 2, 3.

Davidic house? Manasseh's birth seems to have been subsequent to Hezekiah's recovery from that sickness.<sup>46</sup>

A still later crisis in the dynasty seems to be sufficient to account for the mention of "wives" of King Jehoiachin when he was but eighteen years of age,<sup>47</sup> and Jeremiah speaks of his "seed" in a prophecy uttered at that time.<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, the cruel and barbarous custom, prevalent in some lands of antiquity, of killing off all the sons of the late king as soon as the new king has seized the power—or even before his accession, in order to assure but a single claimant—was never practised in Judah, so far as we know, save once. And this one exception, when Joram murdered all his brothers,<sup>49</sup> may doubtless be traced to the influence of Athaliah, his alien queen—the very one who as queen-mother was later to exterminate all Joram's offspring in order to maintain her own regency.<sup>50</sup> The abhorrence with which this fratricide was regarded in the land is reflected in the narrative, in which those six younger brothers of Joram are named and are declared to have been "better men than the king."<sup>51</sup> The same horror shows itself in the allusions to that other barbarous custom which menaced the royal dynasty whenever it fell into Canaanitish idolatry—the custom of "making one's sons to pass through the fire." Of all the kings of David's line the only two who were guilty of this crime in the name of religion were Ahaz and Manasseh,<sup>52</sup> and these were just the two men most alien to the national spirit.

There now remains one more phenomenon exhibiting the uniqueness of this dynasty and deserving to be put beside the other considerations already noted. It is, the unchangeableness of the Davidic capital. As long as Jerusalem stood, so long it remained the seat of this line of kings.

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<sup>46</sup> 2 Kings xxi. 1, compared with xx. 6; see also Is. xxxviii. 19.

<sup>47</sup> 2 Kings xxiv. 15; comp. ver. 8.

<sup>48</sup> Jer. xxii. 28.

<sup>51</sup> 2 Chr. xxi. 13.

<sup>49</sup> 2 Chr. xxi. 4.

<sup>52</sup> 2 Kings xvi. 3; xxi. 6.

<sup>50</sup> 2 Kings xi. 1.



If Jerusalem had been notably associated with the nation's early history, or with the origin of this royal family, or with some outstanding victory by its founder over the nation's secular foes, then that circumstance would serve to place its choice on a par with the choice of other permanent royal residences. But Hebron, David's earliest capital, far excelled Jerusalem in sacred associations and traditions of the race. Bethlehem was the old home of David himself. Half a dozen other places were the scenes of as many battles where tribal or national independence had been won or held. Yet as soon as David was crowned king of all Israel, he deliberately set out to take for himself the citadel of the Jebusites, the old Canaanitish city of Jerusalem, and to make of it the political center of the united nation.<sup>53</sup> As long as the twelve tribes held together under him and his immediate successor, it was only natural that Jerusalem should continue to be the seat of king and court. But after the secession of the ten tribes under Jeroboam Jerusalem was too far to the north to remain the natural capital of the kingdom of Judah. Hebron, where David had first reigned as Judah's king, was a more central spot, and likewise safer. Jerusalem was recurrently exposed to assaults from the north, or actually fell before a northern invader, when a capital further south might have escaped.

Moreover, Jerusalem proved itself a weak spot to defend, at least after its choice as a capital and consequent growth had transformed it from a mere hill-top stronghold into a broad-lying aggregation of hills and vales, inadequately bound together by even the best-planned walls. It was meagrely supplied with water for a long siege, when the usual inhabitants must share their barely sufficient supply with the garrison and the refugees from the country about. We know that during the period of the monarchy it fell at least six times before a hostile army.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless

<sup>53</sup> 2 Sam. v. 6-9.

<sup>54</sup> 1 Kings xiv. 25; 2 Chr. xxi. 17; 2 Kings xiv. 13; xxiv. 1 (comp. 2 Chr. xxxvi. 6, 7 and Dan. i. 1, 2); ver. 10-16; xxv. 4-10.

not only was the royal residence never removed from Jerusalem to any other city throughout all those centuries of change, but there is not even a hint that any king so much as thought of making such a removal.<sup>55</sup> Just as the religious capital of the nation was fixed once for all at Jerusalem when David brought up the Ark thither and Solomon built and dedicated the Temple there, so the political capital for the dynasty of David was unalterably settled through the initiative of its founder, and, as we may see more and more clearly, by that religious basis which underlay the Davidic kingship. Here, on "Zion," alongside the House of Jehovah, must of necessity always stand the residence of Jehovah's representative, His "anointed," His vicegerent in Israel—the son of David.

Once more the contrast to this afforded by the Northern Kingdom is most instructive. Shechem in the territory of Joseph was the scene of the secession under Jeroboam the Ephraimite.<sup>56</sup> He seems to have strengthened its fortifications with a view to making it his capital.<sup>57</sup> Yet even before the death of Jeroboam Tirzah appears to be the royal residence, as it continues to be for a considerable time.<sup>58</sup> Omri, the founder of a new dynasty, selects a new site for his royal residence,<sup>59</sup> and the city of Samaria which he founds continues the official capital from that time till the fall of the Northern Kingdom. However, we can see that the position which Samaria occupied in the North was not the same as that of Jerusalem in the South, for even Ahab and Joram, the son and grandson of Samaria's founder, preferred to reside in Jezreel.<sup>60</sup>

Now that we have considered successively these various evidences of uniqueness in the career of Judah's sovereigns,

<sup>55</sup> Not even in 2 Kings xiv. 19.

<sup>56</sup> 1 Kings xii. 1; comp. xi. 26.

<sup>57</sup> 1 Kings xii. 25.

<sup>58</sup> 1 Kings xiv. 17; xv. 21, 33; xvi. 6, 8, 9, 15, 23. Perhaps Penuel also had a short career as the northern capital; see xii. 25.

<sup>59</sup> 1 Kings xvi. 24.

<sup>60</sup> 1 Kings xviii. 45; chap. xxi; 2 Kings viii. 29-x. 11.

we shall not be surprised to find that the dynasty of David enjoyed a prestige in the Northern Kingdom, which not only was entirely incommensurate with the size and resources of Judah, but which was unmatched by any like prestige of the kings of Israel among those who held to David's line. When Jeroboam first launched his successful revolt against Rehoboam, all his measures were of course taken with a view to diminishing the prestige of the son of Solomon among the northern tribes. He would, if he could, have erected a Chinese Wall along his southern border to keep his people from all contact with Jerusalem. That was the significance of the sanctuaries at Bethel and Dan, of the new non-Levitical priesthood, and of the new national feast in the eighth month.<sup>61</sup> That doubtless explains also the very early removal of the capital from Shechem to Tirzah, which, wherever it may have lain, was certainly farther north than Shechem.

All this was natural under the circumstances and proves little. Compared with the upstart Jeroboam<sup>62</sup> the House of David was already old and famous. But the matter of Davidic prestige was not so quickly settled. In the course of a few years we find Baasha—practically the successor of Jeroboam—already fortifying Ramah on his southern border; and we are told in the Book of Kings that he did this "that he might not suffer any one to go out or come in to Asa king of Judah,"<sup>63</sup> and in the Book of Chronicles, which contains the same phrase, we find in a different connection in the previous chapter this further remark which throws light on that motive: "For they fell to him (Asa) out of Israel in abundance, when they saw that Jehovah his God was with him."<sup>64</sup> In other words, precisely that was happening which Jeroboam had feared might happen and against which he had directed the whole policy of his reign.

With the coming of still another dynasty to the throne of

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<sup>61</sup> 1 Kings xii. 26-33.

<sup>62</sup> 1 Kings xi. 26; xiv. 7.

<sup>63</sup> 1 Kings xv. 17.

<sup>64</sup> 2 Chr. xv. 9; xvi. 1.

the North—that of Omri—a new policy towards Judah was inaugurated. And Asa's son, Jehoshaphat, was quite willing to benefit, as he supposed he would benefit, by this new and welcome peace-policy of his stronger neighbor. Ahab, son of Omri, already allied to the Phoenicians on his northern flank through his own marriage with Jezebel, princess of Sidon, was anxious to end the old hostility between Israel and Judah by a similar alliance with his neighbor on the south. He accordingly gave Athaliah, his daughter, in marriage to the heir-apparent of Judah, Joram, son of Jehoshaphat, and thenceforth we find the kings of the sister kingdoms associated in camp and palace<sup>65</sup> until Jehu arises, to wipe out the entire race of Jezebel, both the northern branch and the southern branch.

Thus another change of relations comes with the ascendancy of Jehu's house. At first this enmity of the North was without power to do Judah harm. But after Israel's status began to mend under King Jehoash, it was possible for him to assume a lofty tone of condescension toward Amaziah of Judah, and when Amaziah insisted on a trial of strength Jehoash inflicted on Judah the worst defeat that it ever experienced at the hands of its stronger sister-state. Jerusalem was taken, both the sacred and the royal treasures were plundered, and the north wall of the city was broken down. Nevertheless—and this fact is as significant as any in the whole list of these relations—Amaziah was suffered to continue his reign as before. It can hardly be supposed that Jehoash, flushed with victory over a particularly exasperating rival, would have permitted him to remain his nearest royal neighbor, if this Amaziah had been a king whose family enjoyed a lesser prestige than that of the house of David.<sup>66</sup> Evidently at that time it was outside the realm of practical politics to attempt to dethrone a son of David in Jerusalem.

However, what these kings of Israel at its best were not

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<sup>65</sup> 1 Kings xxii. 4, 44; 2 Kings iii. 7; viii. 18, 27; ix. 16; x. 13.

<sup>66</sup> 2 Kings xiv. 8-14.

rash enough to attempt, a mere upstart attempted half a century later, in the times of Israel's final anarchy. As we have already seen, "Ben-Tabeel" (whoever he was), Pekah's candidate for the Davidic throne in the place of Ahaz, never even saw the inside of Jerusalem. And it is highly significant that the loftiest promises to the house of David in all the course of Hebrew prophecy (namely, Isaiah chaps. 7, 8, and 9) are dated from precisely this time, when Pekah and Rezin were proposing to dethrone a descendant of David—even so faithless and worthless a representative of it as Ahaz—from the throne of his fathers.

Soon after the fall of Samaria Hezekiah extended to the remnant of Israel his summons to return to Jerusalem and Jehovah and observe the Passover in the Temple on the Hill of Zion. We are told that many from the northern tribes obeyed and attended.<sup>67</sup> Again a century later Josiah, apparently unopposed, reached out into this territory to the north with his reformation of worship, destroying the altar at Bethel and "all the houses of the high places that were in the cities of Samaria."<sup>68</sup> Such measures, feeble as they may appear, rest nevertheless upon a clear presupposition: they presuppose, not only in the Kings of Judah themselves, but also in the people of the North, a remarkable persistence of the theoretical Davidic sovereignty over Israel, to which we find the prophets of the North, Hosea and Amos, bearing their testimony in the eighth century.

What remains to be added, by way of conclusion, to this brief study of the career of David's line, is a general estimate of the policies adopted by these kings and of their skill in kingcraft. Such an estimate is not easy to reach, with the limited information now at our disposal. It is to be hoped that archaeology may yet add important contributions to the existing

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<sup>67</sup> 2 Chr. xxx. See also art. "An Undesigned Coincidence" in this REVIEW for April, 1905.

<sup>68</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 15-20.



data. When all the facts are not known, a reign which appears successful may in fact have been merely fortunate; and, conversely, an unfortunate reign may be quite unjustly attributed by us to the failure or folly of the king himself.

Three men of the Davidic house ruled over the entire twelve-tribe nation: David, Solomon, and Rehoboam—the last of these for but a short time. Of the other two, whereas Solomon enjoyed the greater prestige, wealth, fame, and dominion, David was a far greater master of men. His eminence was achieved in the face of every difficulty and maintained often against great odds. Solomon, on the other hand, born to the purple, enjoyed the good fortune of his father's great name, and profited alike by the failure of both Absalom and Sheba in their revolts, by a singularly favorable juncture in Asiatic politics, and by a regal state and magnificence still novel enough in Israel to be imposing. But Solomon left to his son a heritage of exasperation and revolt, due to heavy taxation, bureaucratic oppression, and tribal jealousy.

Thus while Rehoboam appears in a particularly foolish light in accepting the harsh counsels of the young courtiers rather than the mild counsels of his father's elder statesmen,<sup>69</sup> it is a question whether the schism between North and South could have been averted by even the wisest policy, or postponed for more than a short time. The differences between Judah and Joseph were too fundamental and of too long standing to be obliterated by the short-lived unity of the first two reigns. At any rate Rehoboam showed that he was sensible enough to face facts. As soon as his administrator of the royal *corvée* in the North was murdered, he accepted the revolt of the ten tribes as a *fait accompli*.<sup>70</sup>

Two theories of international alliance contended for adoption by the kings of the ancient East. One theory groups contiguous states, having identical interests and menaced by the same dangers, binding them together into a league at

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<sup>69</sup> 1 Kings xii. 1-15.

<sup>70</sup> 1 Kings xii. 18, 21-24; 2 Chr. xi. 1-4.

least for defense, if not for offense also. When a single state by means of its extraordinary resources or aggressiveness loomed on the political horizon as a world-power, other states, sensing a common danger, were drawn into such an alliance for their mutual protection. The other theory was what may be termed the alternating or concentric theory. The states lying next but one to any given state were by this geographical location likely to be regarded as its natural allies, just because the ring of states lying next to its own border constituted its natural enemies. Just as in a university each class considers the classes next above or next below it in academic standing its inevitable rivals, while the classes two years removed are deemed its allies, so kings who shared the enmity of a neighbor lying between them joined forces to hold him in check if he grew aggressive, or to divide his realm between them if he became too weak to defend his territory. It was of course his rôle to make common cause with the kings at the rear of his confederate neighbors. So in Central Europe since the post-war settlement, while there are various tendencies and groupings in the game of international politics, there has stood fixed thus far the so-called Little Entente, consisting of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania. Their territories join scarcely at all, but their common interest is thought to consist in keeping Hungary in check—that state which lies in the midst of them—and in jealously watching those states of an outer ring which by geographical location are Hungary's natural allies, such as Germany, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria.

Of these two theories it was the second that was adopted by Asa, Rehoboam's grandson. By means of a huge present from his own treasures and those of the Temple he bought the alliance of the King of Damascus, and thus forced Baasha of Israel to face north instead of south with his armies, to give over the building of Ramah as a great border-fortress, and to surrender a strip of Benjamite territory as far north as Geba and Mizpah which thereafter remained

Jewish land.<sup>71</sup> For the time, therefore, this policy proved effective.

Asa's son, Jehoshaphat, as we have already seen in another connection, reversed his father's policy. He contracted an alliance with Ahab of Israel, cementing it by the marriage of his son Joram with Athaliah. The ultimate meaning of this alliance was simply that more was to be gained by these two kings through acting in unison at the expense of their eastern neighbors, than either could gain at the other's expense. Moab and Syria were the immediately threatening forces on their flank, but Ammonites and Arabians also attempted to make common cause against Judah. Their confederacy proved short-lived, however, and Judah received no help from Israel in breaking the force of this menace in return for the help she had given Israel against both Syria and Moab. Moreover there were at least individuals and perhaps a party in Judah bold enough to speak out against this pro-Israel policy of their king, which successive prophetic spokesmen denounced publicly as "helping the wicked and loving them that hate Jehovah."<sup>72</sup> Even apart from its tragic consequences in the next two generations, Jehoshaphat's policy cannot be regarded as good for Judah.

With the change of dynasty in the North from the house of Omri to the house of Jehu there came of course an overturn of its policy towards the Southern Kingdom. No matter who was on the throne the rule worked: the weaker Israel was, the more likely to make friends with Judah, her normally weaker sister. But when Assyrian power, long quiescent in Western Asia, grew again in Syria's rear, and Israel, thus relieved of the perpetual Syrian menace, gradually recovered strength, Jehu's descendants, Jehoash, and still more Jeroboam II, completely overshadowed the Kings of Judah. We have seen, however, that it was Judah that actually forced the only war between them, while the attitude of

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<sup>71</sup> 1 Kings xv. 18-22.

<sup>72</sup> 2 Chr. xix. 2.

Jehoash toward the ambitious Amaziah was rather contemptuous than hostile. Amaziah was either very foolish or very unfortunate. At this distance and with our meagre light, he seems to us to have been foolish, with the folly bred of a moderate success which turned his head.<sup>73</sup>

Half a century later, when those ancient rivals, Damascus and Samaria, now ruled by Rezin and Pekah, men with more of ambition than of real power, joined forces to master Judah and unite her power to their own, King Ahaz of Judah, thinking more of the present crisis than of the future consequences, summoned the great Assyrian king to his aid.<sup>74</sup> Thus began that long series of reactions between Nineveh and Jerusalem, subsequently between Babylon and Jerusalem, which ended with the tragedy of 587 B.C. Ahaz indeed escaped at the price of tribute and obeisance. But in his son Hezekiah's reign the land of Judah lost over 200,000 of its inhabitants deported to Assyria, if we may take at their face value the boasts of Sennacherib's scribes.<sup>75</sup> The little country lost also much treasure and many fenced cities. But it saved its capital, its Temple, and its king, thanks to the strictly nationalistic attitude adopted at the advice of the prophet Isaiah. Judah even acquired a remarkable prestige through its deliverance from the very jaws of destruction by a mysterious blow to the Assyrian army.<sup>76</sup>

Alliances of what we have called the first type, between the powers, petty powers for the most part, which had in common the dread and hatred, first of Nineveh, later of Babylon, found at times a willing partner in the Judean King. Manasseh, successor to Hezekiah, appears twice in lists of kings who are compelled to pay tribute and do obeisance to the Assyrian Kings.<sup>77</sup> The pro-Egyptian party in Judah was probably at

<sup>73</sup> 2 Kings xiv. 7, 8, 11.

<sup>74</sup> 2 Kings xvi. 5-9.

<sup>75</sup> Abel und Winckler, *Keilschrifttexte*, p. 18, col. ii, 34ff.

<sup>76</sup> 2 Kings xix. 35; Is. xxxvii. 36. Comp. Herodotus, Book II, 141.

<sup>77</sup> Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, Eng. tr. Vol. II, pp. 40-43.

heart more anti-Assyrian than pro-Egyptian. Egypt had never proved more than a "broken reed" to those who leaned on her for support; yet seemingly Judah never learned her lesson, though she had over a century longer to learn it than Samaria had.

King Josiah, it is true, had that distrust of Egypt which most of his nation seemed unable to acquire. He felt that Judah had everything to gain and nothing to lose by attacking boldly the Pharaoh's (Necho's) army. Assyria was then moribund and Nabopolassar had not yet shown what Babylon was destined to become under his mighty son Nebuchadnezzar. Necho was on the way north to make good Egypt's claim to her share of Assyria's inheritance west of the Euphrates. If he could revive the Asiatic empire of a Thothmes or a Rameses, the days of Jerusalem's independence were unquestionably gone. But could not Necho be turned back at the very outset, by a determined flank attack from the central highlands, as he crossed the passes leading toward Syria? So Josiah asked himself and then put his own affirmative answer to the test of battle. When he fell at Megiddo, it was the weakness of the force at his disposal rather than the fault of his strategy or the error of his policy that was exposed.<sup>78</sup>

Of course Jehoiakim, who in spite of the fact that he was the eldest son of Josiah, owed his elevation to the throne to Pharaoh Necho, was and remained pro-Egyptian; the Jewish national leaders, supporters of Josiah's policy, had passed over Jehoiakim and given the crown to his younger half-brother Jehoahaz, doubtless because the sentiments of the heir-apparent were as well known to them as to Necho.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless it was poor political judgment, when Jehoiakim, spared once by Nebuchadnezzar in spite of his Egyptian leanings, turned against his new Babylonian suzerain the second time.<sup>80</sup> Zedekiah showed the same perfidy later

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<sup>78</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 29, 30.

<sup>79</sup> 2 Kings xxiii. 31, 34, 36.

<sup>80</sup> 2 Kings xxiv. 1, 7.



towards the same great king. That perfidy is too prominent a feature of the arraignment of Zedekiah by both Jeremiah and Ezekiel to need any further comment. The policy of this last king who sat on David's throne in Jerusalem was in fact as foolish as it was faithless, when he turned to Pharoah Hophra even after he had paid a personal visit to Babylon to reassure Nebuchadnezzar of his fidelity.<sup>81</sup>

In conclusion it is perhaps well to remind ourselves that this effort to interpret Jewish policies and parties from an international point of view can easily be overdone. Most of the momentous decisions were probably reached under strong compulsion of circumstances, and even when there was opportunity for a free choice of opposite policies, it is unlikely that anything beyond the immediate future was habitually considered in the royal council chamber. Hosea's apt illustration compared the decadent Northern Kingdom to a "silly dove without understanding,"<sup>82</sup> because it fluttered between Egypt and Assyria—now this way and now that. The prophets of Judah could reproach the sons of David with much the same fatuous temporizing through almost all the reigns that close the dynasty's career. "Pro-Egyptian" and "pro-Assyrian" or "pro-Babylonian" are expressions that should be used with caution when speaking of Jewish parties from Ahaz to Zedekiah. Jeremiah's experiences are illuminating, but they belong to the final catastrophe. The voluntary surrender of young Jehoiachin to the King of Babylon has been lauded as a self-sacrifice for the salvation of the nation and the besieged capital.<sup>83</sup> Jehoiachin has even been soberly proposed as the original of that portrait of the suffering "Servant of Jehovah" in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. But in fact it is quite impossible for us now to know what duress lies behind the simple words of the narrative: "and he went out unto the king of Babylon." Something determined

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<sup>81</sup> Jer. li. 59; Ezek. xvii. 13-21; 2 Kings xxiv. 20.

<sup>82</sup> Hos. vii. 11.

<sup>83</sup> 2 Kings xxiv. 12.

Nebuchadnezzar to spare the city of Jerusalem in 598 and to destroy it in 587, but it is too much to say that it was only because Jehoiachin surrendered in the former siege and Zedekiah fled in the latter.<sup>84</sup> Jehoiachin in any case deserves this negative praise, that during his long years as a prisoner in Babylon he must have done nothing to render the lot of his conquered people more hopeless, and the recognition that came to him finally from Nebuchadnezzar's successor<sup>85</sup> may have played a larger part than we are anywhere explicitly told, in binding the scattered, disheartened nation together and pointing their minds forward to a restoration.

*Princeton.*

JAMES OSCAR BOYD.

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<sup>84</sup> In spite of Jer. xxxviii. 17, 18.

<sup>85</sup> 2 Kings xxv. 27-30.

## THE PRESENT STATUS AND OUTLOOK OF PROTESTANTISM IN EUROPE

There can be no doubt of the fact that Europe is today nominally Christian. The inference might be drawn from this that the appeal in behalf of what is known as "Work in Europe" is invalid. If all that is meant is that the religious status of Europe is widely different from that of pagan lands, few would be disposed to deny that such is the case. It would be indeed an intrusion and a work of supererogation for American Protestants to undertake the task of establishing foreign missions in Europe as is done in heathen lands. Historic Churches of evangelical faith already hold, albeit they do not fully occupy, the field. These should be our accredited instruments for evangelizing Europe so far as we may have a part in the work. Methods rightly and necessarily employed in giving the Gospel to pagan lands would mean only duplication and rivalry if applied in Europe. Sympathy, cooperation and money are indeed recognized needs in all the Protestant Churches of the Continent; but America has never been asked to assume obligations belonging to and fully recognized by our Protestant brethren in Europe.

However, loyalty to the Gospel would be lacking should we assume that since Europe is dominantly Christian, we of the Western world, or in fact evangelical Christians anywhere, should remain passive and indifferent as to the problems confronting Christianity in Europe, so long as the fact remains that of the total population of Europe about 61% is Roman Catholic and only about 39% Protestant. Protestantism is contending against heavy odds. It is not denied that the Roman Catholic Church holds in common with the Protestant Churches many of the fundamental doctrines of historic Christianity. At the same time it is true that the conceptions of the Roman Church as to the nature and mission of the Christian Church, the Pauline doctrines of grace, the Holy Scriptures as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, civil and religious liberty, etc. are diametrically opposed to the mission and message of the Protestant Churches.

Hence so long as Europe is dominantly Roman Catholic in its type of Christianity, the mere fact that it is nominally Christian does not release us from the duty and privilege of reinforcing Protestantism in Europe at every possible point and in all possible ways.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to shed some light on the religious problems confronting our common Protestantism in Europe, and, if possible, stir us to the realization that the present is a day of crisis and opportunity in the unequal struggle that Protestantism is carrying on in Europe. Is it too much to hope that as America came to the rescue of the Allies in the psychological moment of direst need when the fate of Europe was hanging in the balance, so even now an inspiration shall come to the Protestants of America to cast the great weight of their prayers, cooperation and money on the side of those who are fighting this battle for us in the name of Christ?

#### THE PRESENT STATUS

The total population of Europe in 1920 was approximately 468,000,000. If the world's population is correctly estimated at 1,500,000,000, it appears that a little more than 30% of this total is found in Europe. For the purposes of this paper, European Russia (population, 125,000,000) is omitted from the list of countries considered; also the Balkan States, including Roumania, (39,585,000), aggregating a total subtraction of 164,585,000. There remains, therefore, in the countries of Europe now to be considered a population of approximately 303,500,000. Of this total 266,612,000 may be brought under the two categories, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Of the former, there are 163,254,000; of the latter, 103,358,000. The Roman Catholic percentage is, therefore, about 61%; the Protestant percentage, about 38¾%.

To set forth in detail the relative numerical proportions, North Ireland, Wales, Scotland and England are here listed as separate units. In the twenty-four countries included, ten have Roman Catholic majorities; fourteen, Protestant majorities.

## ROMAN CATHOLIC COUNTRIES

1. *The Irish Free State*. Total population, 3,000,000; of which 2,550,000 are Roman Catholics; 450,000 Protestants; or 85% and 15% respectively.

2. *Belgium*. Total population, 7,500,000; of which 7,350,000 are nominally Roman Catholics; 100,000 Protestants; or 98% Roman Catholics; 2% Protestants and others. Significant, however, is the record of votes cast at the last election in the Kingdom, which shows: Roman Catholics, 843,929; Liberals, 351,285; Socialists, 763,620; Communists, 29,369.

3. *France*. Total population, 39,000,000; of which the Roman Catholic Church claims 30,000,000; Protestants, 1,000,000; Jews and others, 8,000,000; or Roman Catholics, 77%; all others, 23%.

4. *Portugal*. Total population, 6,000,000; Roman Catholics, 4,500,000; Protestants, 10,000; Jews, Asiatics, Africans and others, 1,490,000; or, Roman Catholics, 75%; all others, 25%.

5. *Spain*. Total population, 21,000,000; of which Roman Catholics claim 14,700,000; Jews and others, 6,290,000; Protestants, 25,000; or, Roman Catholics, 70%; Protestants and all others, 30%.

6. *Italy*. Total population, 37,000,000; of which Roman Catholics claim 36,750,000; Protestants, 100,000; all others, 150,000; or, Roman Catholics, 98%; Protestants and all others, 2%.

7. *Austria*. Total population, 6,000,000; of which Roman Catholics claim 5,700,000; Protestants, 300,000; or, Roman Catholics, 95%; Protestants, 5%.

8. *Czechoslovakia*. Total population, 13,500,000; Roman Catholics, 9,500,000; Protestants, 2,000,000; National Czechoslovak Church, 1,000,000; Greek (Uniat) Church, 500,000; all others, 500,000; Roman Catholics, 70%; Protestants, 15%; all others, 15%.

9. *Hungary*. Total population, 7,500,000; Roman Catholics, 4,725,000; Protestants, 1,762,500; Greek Orthodox, 469,000; Jews and others, 543,500; or Roman Catholics,



63% ; Protestants, 27½% ; Greek Orthodox, 6¼% ; Jews and others, 3¼%.

10. *Poland*. Total population, 27,500,000 ; Roman Catholics, 17,600,000 ; Uniats, Greek Orthodox and others, 8,937,500 ; Protestants, 962,500 ; Roman Catholics, 64% ; Uniats, Greek Orthodox and others, 32½% ; Protestants, 3½%.

#### PROTESTANT COUNTRIES

1. *Northern Ireland, U.K.* Total population, 1,500,000 ; Protestants, 1,100,000 ; Roman Catholics, 400,000 ; Protestants, about 74% ; Roman Catholics, about 26%.

2. *Wales, U.K.* Total population, 2,200,000 ; Protestants, 1,800,000 ; Roman Catholics, 400,000 ; Protestants, about 80% ; Roman Catholics, about 20%.

3. *Scotland, U.K.* Total population, 5,000,000 ; Protestants, 4,000,000 ; Roman Catholics, 500,000 ; Jews and others, 500,000 ; Protestants, 80% ; Roman Catholic, 10% ; Jews and others, 10%.

4. *England*. Total population, 35,678,000 ; Protestants, 29,000,000 ; Roman Catholics, 5,000,000 ; Jews and others, 1,678,000 ; Protestants, 81¾% ; Roman Catholics, 14% ; others, 4¼%.

5. *Norway*. Total population, 2,720,000 ; Protestants, 2,638,000 ; Roman Catholics, 2,400 ; others 79,200 ; Protestants, 97% ; all others, 3%.

6. *Sweden*. Total population, 6,000,000 ; Protestants, 5,500,000 ; all others, 500,000 ; Protestants, 98% ; others, 2%.

7. *Denmark*. Total population, 3,265,000 ; Protestants, 3,232,350 ; all others, 32,650 ; Protestants, 99% ; others, 1%.

8. *Holland*. Total population, 7,000,000 ; Protestants, 3,850,000 ; Roman Catholics, 2,100,000 ; others, 1,050,000 ; Protestants, 55% ; Roman Catholics, 30% ; others, 15%.

9. *Esthonia*. Total population, 1,110,000 ; Protestants, 869,000 ; Roman Catholics, 2,000 ; Orthodox, 200,000 ; others, 39,000 ; Protestants, 78¼% ; Orthodox, 18¾% ; others, 3%.

10. *Latvia*. Total population, 1,845,000 ; Protestants, 1,-

073,000; Roman Catholics, 518,000; others, 254,000; Protestants, 58%; Roman Catholics, 28%; others, 14%.

11. *Lithuania*. Total population, 1,845,000; Protestants, 1,071,000; Roman Catholics, 500,000; others, 274,000; Protestants, 58%; Roman Catholics, 27%; others, 15%.

12. *Finland*. Total population, 3,365,000; Protestants, 3,300,000; others, 65,000; Protestants, 98%; others, 2%.

13. *Switzerland*. Total population, 3,815,370; Protestants, 2,250,000; Roman Catholics, 1,500,000; others, 65,370; Protestants, 59%; Roman Catholics, 40%; others, 1%.

14. *Germany*. Total population, 60,000,000; Protestants, 37,000,000; Roman Catholics, 22,000,000; others, 1,000,000; Protestants, 62%; Roman Catholics, 36 $\frac{3}{4}$ %; others, 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ %.

#### RELATIVE PROTESTANT GROWTH SINCE THE WORLD'S WAR

It cannot be denied that the Roman Catholic Church came through the War with less loss and more prestige than did the Protestant Churches. The reasons for this may be readily assessed.

First, Germany, being the leading Protestant country of Europe, her failure to win the War was interpreted as a defeat for Protestantism.

Secondly, the financial disorganization and distress attending and following the War bore more heavily in Central and Eastern Europe upon Protestant Churches than upon Roman Catholic.

Thirdly, the recovery of lost ground was more quickly effected in the Roman Catholic Church because of instant and lavish relief provided by the Vatican, chiefly from American sources.

Fourthly, in the political chaos resulting from the War the Roman Catholic Church was exploited as a stabilizing force. Historically antagonistic to communism and socialism, monarchical in spirit, it was appealed to for sympathy and aid in the struggle against the revolutionary psychology that prevailed in many parts of Europe. Patriotic leaders, even when

there was historically no sympathy with Romanism, found their prejudices softened or removed by the steadfast stand taken by the Roman Church against threatened anarchism. The claim of divine right which the Roman Church always urges offered anchorage to the States swept by political, social and economic upheaval.

Fifthly, the Vatican having official representatives in many of the chancelleries of Europe played cleverly and astutely the rôle of opportunist.

With all this to the credit side of the Roman Catholic Church, it is remarkable that the advantages accruing from the War have not resulted in a more marked growth in numbers or influence in that Church than appears from the facts.

For the century ending in 1910, Dr. Adolf Keller, of Zurich, has compiled figures with the utmost possible care. His authentic statistics reveal the fact that during this period the Roman Catholic Church suffered in Europe a net loss of 9% in membership, while in the same period the Protestant Church made a net gain of 9%. In other words, the Roman Catholic constituency in 1800 was 71% of the total population of Europe; but in 1910, it had fallen to 62%. On the contrary, the Protestant Church had advanced from 26% to 35½%.

It is moreover a more significant indication of the retarded advance of Rome, that in the last fifty years, it has increased but 30%, while Protestantism has advanced 54%. And since the War, figures show that conversions from Rome have greatly exceeded the reprisals by Rome from Protestantism. In a pastoral letter of the German Bishops in 1919, a note of alarm is sounded. The Bishops declare that in Germany alone the annual loss suffered by the Roman Church amounts to 75,000 members. It is established by carefully compiled figures (for declarations of change of religion must in all cases be registered) that of all the recruits to Protestantism in Germany, 60% are from Rome. These figures include, as Professor Schreider has shown, only such persons as have openly declared a change of faith, and are duly registered as

Protestants. In 1920, the number of conversions was more than 11,000. In 1922, there was a gain by conversions from the Roman Catholic Church of 10,176 souls, while in that year only 7,084 persons left the Protestant Churches, a net gain for Protestantism in Germany of 2,092 members.

Even greater losses are indicated in France. Although the Roman Catholic Church in its total figures for Europe includes 30,000,000 out of the 39,000,000 population of France, the fact is that not more than 10,000,000 people may be truly classed among the faithful. Nearly 12,000 Roman Catholic Churches in France are today without *curés*.

In Czechoslovakia, 1,100,000 persons have left the Roman Catholic Church since the War. Among these are not less than 1,000 priests.

While in other dominantly Roman Catholic countries the drift may not be so marked, there is everywhere manifest a growing trend away from Rome. Where Republicanism in form or spirit prevails, and National Schools are replacing the old order of Church education by priests and nuns, a wider vision results, and greater freedom of thought. The pendulum may have swung too far in the direction of free thought, there are always perils in that, yet no one can doubt that intellectual manumission has wrought to the prejudice of Roman Catholic influence. To those who have had a taste of political freedom—especially is this true of the young—the monarchism characteristic of Rome is decidedly uncongenial, and peoples who have come into a political autonomy are resenting the religious serfdom that Rome imposes. Moreover, the established policies in most European countries by which Church and State are separated, large landed estates expropriated, and consciousness developed of the political machinations of the Vatican—all have combined to counteract the progress of Roman Catholic propaganda.

In the face of facts like these, the Roman Catholic Church is employing all the arts of diplomacy in which it is a past master, to turn back the tide that has so strongly set in against that Church. The Vatican's *rapprochements* with the gov-

ernments of France, Italy, Germany and Poland, have been made closer, resulting in the removal of political misunderstandings that have, in some cases, threatened the status and safety of the Church. A vigorous missionary program has been set up and is unfolding in the countries of Central Europe. Money is poured in for reparation and extension of Roman institutions wherever the opportunity is most strategic. The Benedictine and Jesuit Orders, especially, have redoubled the impact of their propaganda. A Youth Movement has been started, designed to offset the drift of the young away from the Church. Liturgical forms are emphasized, and spectacular demonstrations, such as the recent Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, are utilized as a means of winning public attention. Efforts to bring back the masses, especially the hosts of unemployed in Europe, are taking form in house to house visitation in the ministration of charity. Emphasis is being laid on the doctrine of social solidarity over against what is represented as the individualistic philosophy of Protestantism. Rome thus represents herself as the divine instrument in synthesizing the discordant elements of human society and blending into unity the diverse and discordant forces in both Church and State. Ultramontanism is no longer urged, and the policy of the Church is changed and made subservient to the exigencies of the hour. Democratic ideals are espoused, at least so far as the accommodation of the Church to changes already in effect or appearing on the horizon of the European States, can make such to appear the case.

But let no one be deceived in supposing that the spirit of Rome, its bigotry and intolerance, its uncompromising adherence to the historic position of that Church, have given place to a regime more friendly to the spirit and progress of Protestantism. On the contrary, the Roman Catholic Church continues to emphasize the cleavage between itself and Protestantism with as much intensity and bitterness as ever before. The Catechism of Pope Pius X is a required textbook in all the confessional schools of the Roman Catholic Church



in Europe. Such words as these must be learned and recited by all Roman Catholic youth: "Protestantism, or the Reformed religion, as it was haughtily called by its founders, is the corollary of all heresies which have been before, after, or shall come to corrupt the mind" (Paragraph III, Article 129).

#### OPEN SALIENTS FOR PROTESTANT ADVANCE

In limiting mention to a selected few of the countries where there is a wide open door for the extension of evangelical religion, it is not to be implied that less emphasis would be given to fields such as Austria, Germany, Scandinavia and the Baltic States, did space allow an analogy of the religious situation presented by them. The countries mentioned are chosen almost at random, and may be considered as types of like conditions quite generally existing.

##### *France*

Unprecedented opportunities for evangelization among all classes of the French people are inviting the *Société Centrale Évangélique* to enter fields white to the harvest. This Society, which in the last seventy years has organized no less than one hundred and fourteen new and mostly self-supporting churches, under the wise and efficient direction of the new Superintendent, Pasteur Georges Benignus, has made rapid advance the past year. Seventy-five stations are supported entirely or in part by the Society. It has on its staff one hundred and fifteen pastors, besides home missionaries, evangelists, and colporteurs. Just now five new stations for evangelization have been opened, and four missions for Protestant immigrants. The post-War immigration to France created an acute problem. Of the three and one-half million of foreigners that have poured into France, the fact must be faced that the Reformed Church is responsible for 85,000 souls. The Church has accepted this challenge with surprising zeal and vigor. The great task of looking up these tens of thousands, grouping them into units, and organizing churches where the gospel is preached in many tongues is

both difficult and expensive. Some pastors from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland have been brought over to assist in the work, but many more are needed. This, a call which could not remain unheeded, has increased the budget of the *Société Centrale* by the amount of 212,000 francs for the present year.

The *Société des Missions Évangéliques* supports two hundred missionaries on the foreign field. Confronted with unlimited possibilities of development in occupied territory and unreached zones in French West Africa, the necessary increase in the budget is beyond the possibility of the present resources of the Reformed Church. Prior to the War the annual budget for foreign missions was about one million francs, raised wholly by the French churches. When France acquired in the Peace Treaty the German Colonies, it was necessary for this Society to take over the foreign mission work of the German Societies. This added to the budget the sum of 300,000 francs, or about 33% increase. This has involved a large deficit which the Reformed Church cannot liquidate without the help of Protestant friends on this side of the water.

The Fund for retired ministers, widows and orphans is now quite inadequate to meet the imperative needs of those formerly cared for by the French Church. The fall of the franc, which has so greatly reduced its buying power, renders pastors on meager salaries unable to accumulate any reserve for old age. With an average family of six persons, it is a cruelty to expect pastors to live in any comfort on a stipend of 13,000 francs, amounting to only about four hundred dollars.

The house in which John Calvin was born at Noyon was destroyed by German bombardment. The *Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* has acquired sufficient money, mainly by a loan, to buy the site in Noyon and begin the reconstruction of the house as an exact replica of the original dwelling. The new structure is designed to be a center and rallying point for French Protestants, and the

memories which gather about this spot will inspire the loyalty of Calvinistic groups throughout Europe. It must be remembered that it was John Calvin who, under God, gave robust faith and constructive democratic principles to Switzerland, Holland, Scotland and Italy. The first stone in the foundation in the new building will be laid July 10, 1927, the birthday of John Calvin. Two days prior to this event, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the *Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* will be celebrated in Paris. One hundred and twenty-two thousand francs have already been invested in buying the lot and clearing away the débris. Not less than three hundred thousand francs additional must be raised to carry the work to completion. Our Calvinist brethren in Europe are looking to America for substantial aid in raising this, for them, so large an amount of money.

### *Spain*

In 1868, Spain was first opened to the gospel. Small congregations from that time began to spring up, the result of good seed quietly sown during the years when Protestant work was prohibited by law, and Protestants forbidden to hold meetings for prayer or conference even in private homes. Bible Christians, confessors of the gospel, arose in many parts of the kingdom as soon as the act of toleration became effective. Evangelical churches of America, Germany and Great Britain, sent financial help and missionaries, and now about twenty-five thousand evangelical Christians are gathered into seventy churches and missions. There is still more or less petty persecution.

To pastor Fritz Fliedner is due in large measure the missionary achievements in Spain. There are four congregations of Protestants in Madrid and a college, costing about one hundred thousand dollars, occupies a commanding position at Calle Bravo Murillo. Over two hundred students, mostly Roman Catholics, are enrolled, and many of them become Protestants under the Christian influence of the college. The annual cost of maintenance is about three thousand dollars

above the fees paid by students. By the help of America, a debt of twenty thousand dollars was paid last year, and El Provenir College is now free of incumbrance. This Christian institution has inaugurated a new ideal in education, altogether unknown in the Spanish gymnasia and universities. It is now becoming a model for not a few educational institutions in Madrid and elsewhere. It is significant that there may be found in the *New York Times* as recently as April 28 of this year an announcement such as follows: "In honor of the celebration of the 25th year of his reign on May 17, King Alfonso proposes to establish a City University in Madrid similar to American institutions of higher learning. The architectural plan has been drawn up and many donations received, so it is believed that the ceremony of laying the corner stone will be made to coincide with the observance of the King's anniversary."

In Escorial there is a Protestant School, orphanage and hospital. The building, now occupied for these purposes, was formerly the convent whence Philip II directed the restoration of his beautiful palace and where, to his everlasting dishonor, he issued his orders to exterminate all "heretics." By God's wonderful providence, this building has now become a centre for the propagation of the faith which he sought to destroy. The emblem of the village of Escorial is the sun rising behind clouds, with the motto: "Post fata resurgo." This may be taken as the watchword of the entire Protestant Church in Spain, where more than ten thousand martyrs were burned at the stake, and where, during three hundred years, the Inquisition waged a merciless warfare against the spread of the Protestant faith. On that very soil the gospel is now bearing a rich harvest. The three noble sons of the sainted Fritz Fliedner, who first gave in modern times the gospel to Spain, now lead the work that fell from their father's hands.

No one who loves the cause of Christ can make the circuit of Toledo, Camufias, Besullo, Cujon, Grenada and the other eleven evangelical churches and centers adjoining, without

thanking God for the marvel which His grace hath wrought. A union theological seminary will be established in Madrid this autumn. The theological faculty will have on the teaching staff representatives of Irish Presbyterians, German, Scotch, Spanish and Portuguese. It is hoped that America may have some constructive part in the work.

### *Italy*

Space allows only brief reference to the Waldensian work. It is of interest to note that at the last meeting of the synod at Torre Pellice, September 5, 1926, a beautiful memorial to Henri Arnaud was unveiled. Arnaud was the leader of the "Glorious Return" of the Waldensees from Switzerland in 1689, whence they had fled after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, in 1685. These heroic pioneers in evangelical Christianity had hidden in caves and dens of the Swiss mountains that they might escape the annihilation decreed at the instigation of the Roman Church by the Duke of Savoy.

Four thousand people united in the exercises of the unveiling. The occasion was made more significant by the fact that a former mayor of Venice, a friend of Mussolini, gave the historic address. In closing he said: "In 1889, the good King gave personal endorsement to the erection of the Casa Valdese at the two hundredth anniversary of the return of the Waldensees to their native land, out of love, even unto great sacrifice. Benito Mussolini, the great Minister of our victorious King, told me recently that he knew that the Waldensees were Italians in race and heart, and that he had great admiration for their history on account of their tenacity and their sacrifices in behalf of their spiritual ideal."

### *Czechoslovakia*

Lucenec is famous as the seat of the Seminary of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Slovakia, the youngest theological faculty in that historic Church. This institution was opened in 1925, but without official approval of the Minister of Education and Cults. It has been allowed to function by sufferance rather than State sanction. Slovakia, being a



province of Czschoslovakia, formerly belonged to Hungary; the Magyars are in the majority. They have zealously retained their native tongue, traditional customs and Christian heritage. So far there has been attained but little assimilation to the Czech, though, upon the whole, they are loyal citizens of the Republic. Students in theology have formerly crossed the border, which is the Danube, into Hungary to attend the Seminaries at Budapest, Papa, Carospatak and Debrecen. The Czech Government has recently discouraged this practice, and it has become difficult, if not impossible, for students to obtain passports. Such a situation has developed the need for a seminary for Hungarian students in Slovakia. Lacking means to build, temporary dormitory room has been secured in the Y.M.C.A. buildings at Lucenec, modern and well appointed in all respects. The regulations of the Y.M.C.A. do not permit the use of the buildings for theological classes, and therefore the parish house connected with the Church, altogether inadequate, serves the purpose of classrooms. There are four professors and about thirty-five students.

The State has offered to establish a Theological Faculty at Bratislava, the former capital of Slovakia. This Faculty would be constituted jointly of Reformed and Lutheran professors. The Lutherans having their own seminary in Bratislava, decline to encourage the State institution; and the Reformed Church insists upon a seminary of its own in which the theology shall be Calvinistic pure and simple. Whether the Institution in Lucenec shall receive under the circumstances State sanction, and thus be allowed to go forward in its work, is as yet an unsettled question. A thorough study of the situation will satisfy the impartial observer, that it would be a mistaken policy on the part of the Czech Government, and a great damage to the cause of the Reformed Church, should this seminary be closed, and the proposal regarding Bratislava carried into effect.

The Reformed Church in Slovakia, including Hungarians in Trans-Carpathia, or Ruthenia, calls for the sympathy and

prayers of all who are zealous for the spread of the Reformed Faith. With a constituency of about a million souls, several hundred pastors, hundreds of schools and benevolent institutions, this Church constitutes a unit of the Reformed family that should hold a high place in our esteem and affection. Granting more or less irredentism, and the fact that resistance to all the efforts of the Czech Government to assimilate the Magyars has continued, it remains true that the Hungarian people in Slovakia have a noble history and heritage, and have been ever true to the faith which they and we hold in common; and they are now detached from the mother church across the Danube, and so deprived of the counsel and comfort that these Hungarian people have always received from Budapest. They are making a brave battle for life, and are above all praise in that under such difficulties they have not only survived the shock of a rude dislocation, but have even continued to strengthen their stakes and lengthen their cords. It may be truly said that their bonds have, under God, been the instrument of a new freedom in the development of life and witness. It cannot be doubted that never before was the spiritual work of the Church so active and intense, or all forms of church efficiency so widely and usefully employed.

Dr. Pokorny has a great church in Brno, Moravia. Combined with it are six other preaching stations. Seven services are held every week besides four Bible classes. Dr. Pokorny and his assistants teach forty-five hours every week in the National schools, a duty laid upon them by the Board of Education which requires religious education for all scholars of the Reformed Faith. Two new buildings for the parish have recently been erected at large expense for a people comparatively poor. A commodious chapel is now functioning in a new and growing part of the city, the congregation of which is made up entirely of former Roman Catholics. Dr. Pokorny is mentioned because he is a fair type of the pastors of the Czech-Brethren Church. These men are full of faith,

courage, zeal and endurance. One must stand in wonder and humility in the presence of such ministers of the gospel.

It is often asked whether the current of outflow from the Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia continues in such volume as in years immediately following the establishment of the Republic, and the revival of the influence and spirit of John Huss. The answer to this question is found in the fact that the only limit to the advance of the Czech-Brethren Church, and the National Church of Czechoslovakia, is in the inadequacy of men and money to meet the challenge of the present moment. The writer himself has a list of eleven new churches, costing from two hundred thousand to six hundred thousand kronen each, built within the last two years; three now in process of building, and three which have acquired lots and are raising money to erect houses of worship. The interesting fact connected with all these churches is that they are without a single exception constituted of former Roman Catholics.

The John Huss Theological Faculty at Prague has more students than all the nine Roman Catholic Seminaries combined. The Church of the Czech-Brethren has sixty per cent more members than it had four years ago. If advance is at all checked, it is only because ministers and churches are insufficient to meet an ever increasing demand. The congregation in Kamintz, Bohemia, is worshipping in a beer saloon. In Falkenan, the congregation holds an eighty year lease on a Roman Catholic Church, the property of the city, and by the city set over to the use of the Protestant Church.

The growth and power of the National Czecho-Slovak Church, numbering one million adherents, represents a significant movement in the direction of Protestantism. The increase last year in this Church was more than fifty thousand members. While this great organization is not altogether Protestant, its influence is strongly cast in the interests of evangelical simplicity in message and worship, and it may be truly regarded as an adjunct to the cause of Protestantism. It is endeavoring to bring the Bible to the people and thus

purify the Church of pagan accretions that have obscured and subverted apostolic Christianity. The theological students of this Church attend the John Huss Seminary in Prague, there being enrolled last year thirty of such students.

By a generous concession of the Czech Government, the Czech-Brethren Church has recently acquired at a nominal price the castle of Mysliborice. It is the purpose to develop this great building, to which are attached more than five hundred acres of productive farming land, into a center where will be gathered all the charitable and educational institutions of the Czech-Brethren Church that may be considered as missionary enterprises.

### *Poland*

The writer attended the Synod of the Reformed Church of Poland in Warsaw the 13th-15th of June, 1926. This Church is one of the oldest of the Reformed Faith. It was founded in the early days of the Reformation. It had from the beginning the Presbyterian system of government. After the downfall of Poland and its partition by the three neighboring powers, there was founded the United General Consistory of Warsaw including both the evangelical creeds, Lutheran and Reformed. In 1849, when the administration of these two creeds was separated, the Reformed Church adopted the Presbyterian system within the boundaries of the "Polish Congressional Kingdom" which was created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Circumscribed in its zone of activity, the Reformed Church has now only seven congregations, three of which date from the Reformation. Dr. Semadini is the Superintendent of this Church, and around him are joined a body of pastors and elders that give solidity to the organization and enjoy the love and confidence of the whole Church. The way is now open for establishing new congregations in other parts of Poland, for the Church is recognized or sanctioned by the Government, and there is no restriction any longer in the work of Church extension. But for this advance in the

line there is necessary financial assistance and, especially, a sufficient number of thoroughly trained ministers. There is no Reformed Seminary in Poland, and the few students that prepare for the work of recruiting the ranks of aged and incapacitated ministers, must be sent across the border to institutions in Germany or Switzerland.

The salary of pastors is pitifully inadequate. Several months' stipend is not sufficient to provide a suit of clothes, and ministers are usually forced to resort to teaching or manual labor to eke out a living for their families. It is easy to understand that young men are not abundant when the path that is laid before them is so thorny and tortuous; hence the difficulty of obtaining volunteers among the students of sufficient self-abnegation to face the contingencies involved.

Connected with the large church in Warsaw there is a Home for the Aged, an Orphanage, a Deaconess Training School, a small hospital and a Confessional School. It is pathetic, however, to observe that these properties are so dilapidated and their equipment so antiquated and inadequate that all these institutions while functioning are doing so under limitations discouraging and indeed lamentable.

The evangelical movement among the Ukrainians in Galicia, southeast Poland, is steadily gaining in momentum. While this is effecting the masses, and is indeed deep rooted in its inception and spirit, it must be confessed that many of those who would assume leadership, especially among the intelligensia, are influenced too much by nationalism and race politics. Sharing the psychology of all minorities in Poland, the Ukrainians consider that the Government is withholding from them a fair deal. Most of them being formerly citizens and abettors of the Ukrainian Republic, annihilated by the sweep of the Soviet hordes, they covet autonomy and resent their status as citizens of Poland. Naturally suspicious of all Government control as tyrannous and contrary to their inborn instincts as freemen, there has arisen and prevails more and more antagonism between these people and the local officials of the Polish Government. It has, therefore, been the



tendency of the leaders in the evangelical movement, recruited from the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches, to emphasize nationalism to a degree that has brought them under the suspicion of the Government. Notwithstanding, the movement marks a genuine spiritual revival, and there are in it possibilities of a great reformation. Among those who have come out from the Greek (Uniat) Church are some priests who have proven worthy of the full confidence of those who are concerned for the success of this evangelical work so full of potency and possibilities.

The Protestant remnant in Galicia is organized in the Church of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confession (called for convenience the A. and H. C. Church), which is a federation rather than a union of the Lutheran and Reformed contingents. This historic Church was formerly connected with the Church of Austria, a part of which monarchy Galicia was, before the War. The pastors all are Germans and the services of the churches are in that language. This is a handicap in the missionary program of the A. and H. C. Churches, so far as it concerns the Ukrainian people. Germans and Ukrainians are separated not only by the wide gulf of race, nationality and tongue, but also in their conceptions of religion. The new reformation has advanced along lines that are distinct from, and partly antagonistic to, the ritualism and formality that pervade, in some degree, the German churches. The Ukrainians demand a simple worship and a gospel unobscured by ceremonies which tend to diminish the emphasis which they put upon preaching. Hungry for the gospel message, they would give scant space in their church services for what their Lutheran brethren would call a "rich liturgy." Inasmuch as it has been necessary to subsume the Ukrainian work under the category of the A. and H. C. Church in order to secure for it governmental sanction, naturally enough some friction has developed in attempting to assimilate peoples and ideals so distinct and adverse. The problem arising, while in some cases acute and menacing, is in process of peaceable settlement in the spirit of mutual concessions.

While a numerical count is not possible in regard to this great Ukrainian revival, it is safe to say that it has reached more than a hundred thousand people and is spreading rapidly through all the towns and villages of Galicia.

It is significant and arresting in this evangelical movement that Ukrainians, formerly emigrants to America and Canada, and who have become citizens in these Protestant lands, and assimilated Western habits and ideals, have, in many cases, become voluntary missionaries when returning to their native land. Even in instances where the returned emigrants have not become in the truest or fullest sense Protestant Christians or identified with Christian Churches while in America, they have nevertheless thrown themselves into the new reformation in their native country, proving zealous in propagating at least the by-products of evangelical Christianity. And those who have done, and are now doing, more than any others to extend the knowledge of Jesus Christ in Galicia are returned emigrants, now ministers of the Gospel of salvation. Having shared in the direct and indirect blessings of evangelical Christianity while sojourners in America, experiencing the power of the Gospel to determine the policy and destiny of nations, they believe that it is only Christ who can redeem their race from ignorance, superstition and sin. All this more than justifies missionary effort in behalf of the foreign population of Christian countries; for it indicates in a concrete and impressive way the fact that in saving these "strangers within our gates" we are most effectively preparing the way for the redemption by the power of the Gospel of the lands from which they come.

An outstanding figure in the Evangelical Church of the A. and H. C. is Dr. Theodor Zöckler, without the mention of whom any consideration of the evangelical work in Galicia would be incomplete. Superintendent of the Church, a Lutheran by birth and training, he stands as a tower of strength in all that affects the welfare and extension of the pure Christian faith in the country of his adoption. The institutions of charity and education at the head of which he

stands are located in Stanislawow, though their influence extends over an area reaching even beyond the frontiers of Poland. For the aged, the sick, for orphans and other children deprived of home and shelter, for boys and girls needing rudimentary and vocational training to fit them for service in the state and church, these institutions are ministering in practical and diversified ways to a large and ever-increasing number of needy and dependent men, women and children. Much property has been acquired and many buildings, some of them modern and well-equipped, have been erected to provide a suitable plant for the diversified activities and ministries to which this philanthropic enterprise is consecrated. The modest fortune inherited by Mrs. Zöckler was devoted in its entirety to the work, and substantial help has been secured by the personal efforts of Dr. Zöckler both in Germany and Switzerland. It would be impossible to find on any missionary field a nobler example of consuming zeal and self-sacrificing abandonment to the service of the Christ who went about doing good, and in whose Name and spirit this work is projected and wrought.

Notwithstanding the heavy load of care and responsibility involved in the direction and operation of the Stanislawow Institutions, Dr. Zöckler finds time to release mind and heart for other matters connected with the great mission of the Church, the extension of the Gospel to parts and people where Christ is not known as Saviour of the lost. The evangelical movement among the Ukrainians has greatly stirred the heart of Dr. Zöckler, and his wise leadership has been the means under God, of safeguarding the work from the peril of fanaticism from which some other similar spiritual awakenings have suffered much loss.

#### THE CENTRAL BUREAU

The appeal for help which came from Europe immediately following the War found a ready response in America. The call for relief for suffering humanity the world over strikes ever a responsive chord in the hearts of Americans. And,

therefore, opened by the story of distress borne by the winds from across the seas, streams from many sources, ever increasing in volume, poured forth in unbroken currents until the crisis was past. These bountiful benefactions were inspired by humanitarian motives, and were not designed primarily for the relief of Christian people or churches. It is true that the Roman Catholic Church rose to the occasion so far as its own Church in Europe was concerned. Timely and generous assistance was hastened in a moment recognized as critical for the Roman Catholic Church. The Lutherans of America followed the good example, and about three million dollars were sent across the ocean to relieve the extremity of their brethren in Europe. It is also true that the effort was not lacking to arouse Christians of the Reformed faith to a sense of the urgent and immediate needs of their brethren on the Continent. These efforts were not entirely in vain, for considerable response came and some Reformed Churches were saved from extinction and many starving fellow-Christians fed and clothed. But all this was spasmodic, uncertain, inadequate. In some cases where the appeal was more vocal than in others, there was overlapping, while in others, perhaps really more needy and poignant, the cry was unheard or unheeded. There soon came the conviction to those most familiar with the situation that in order to stimulate and properly co-ordinate the relief that the Reformed Churches in America should and could give to the suffering Churches of the same faith and order in Europe, there must be established somewhere on the Continent a Central Bureau through which all gifts might be cleared.

In August of 1922, representatives of thirty-seven church units, in twenty-one countries of Europe met in Copenhagen to counsel concerning the best methods of bringing relief to the Protestant Churches on the Continent. There resulted the organization of a Central Bureau with headquarters at Zurich, and Dr. Keller, for many years pastor of St. Peter's, the largest Reformed Church of Zurich, was unanimously chosen as General Secretary.

The Bureau is governed by an Executive Committee of seventeen members representing contributing rather than receiving countries. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the British Isles and America have representatives.

Since its coming into being the Central Bureau has raised and distributed through its treasury about \$619,000, and has stimulated even larger gifts which have not been cleared through the Bureau. The number of Protestants aided has reached the total of about fifty millions, for there are that number of members in the Churches that have shared in relief. Certain of our American Churches, such as the Lutherans, Methodists and Baptists have raised their own relief funds, sending them directly through their own European bodies. The Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., McAll Mission, Waldensian Aid Society, Student Friendship Fund, etc., have sent to Europe from 1922 to 1926 about five million dollars. But nevertheless the other American Churches surely could and ought to make a far better record than has yet been made. The Reformed and Presbyterian Churches still have time to redeem themselves. The necessity for relief still exists, and for even more assistance of the Reformed Churches in carrying through their constructive programs.

*Princeton.*

SYLVESTER WOODBRIDGE BEACH.



## THE BLESSING OF ABRAHAM

The exceptions to the general rules which figure more or less prominently in every adequate grammar are often a great stumbling block to the student of language. He resents them because they seem to contradict and invalidate rules which it has perhaps cost him considerable effort to master; he would gladly be rid of them if he could. This feeling is especially strong with the beginner whose time is so largely taken up with rules; and unfortunately it is not offset by that knowledge of the importance which may and often does attach to the exceptional usage, that can in the nature of the case only be expected of one who has already acquired some familiarity with the language.

A good illustration of this is found in the use of the Hithpael stem in Hebrew. Whether this stem is always or only usually *reflexive*, whether it may or may not be *passive*, will probably seem to the student who is beginning the study of Hebrew a matter of minor importance, and the more simply the rule of the Hithpael is stated and the fewer the exceptions given, the better will he be pleased. Consequently, when Professor McFadyen in his revised edition of Davidson's *Hebrew Grammar* omits the statement of the latter regarding the possibility of a passive use of this stem, and when in his *Key* he makes the sweeping statement that the Hithpael "can only be reflexive," the student, if he knew of the omission, would be disposed to be grateful to Dr. McFadyen for sparing him the necessity of bothering with what would seem to be a doubtful or negligible exception to the general rule.<sup>1</sup> But if the student were told that it is upon the validity of this seemingly unimportant exception to the general rule that the historic interpretation of the Blessing of Abraham depends and that Dr. McFadyen in his *Key* to the Grammar cuts the evangelical heart out of that glorious promise, he would, if seriously minded, feel quite differently with regard to this

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<sup>1</sup> It may be noted, however, that Dr. McFadyen in the case of this stem distinguishes three kinds of reflexive, as well as a reciprocal. So the rule is not very simple after all.

matter. The question of the possible meanings of the Hithpael would cease to belong to the dry bones of Hebrew grammar and become a live issue of no small moment to Christian faith.

The example to which we refer is the following. In the Revised editions of Davidson's *Grammar*,<sup>2</sup> Dr. McFadyen has omitted the statement found in earlier editions: "The syllable *hith* is a stronger reflexive prefix than *hin*, and the Hithpa'el less commonly has the passive sense,"<sup>3</sup> etc., and in his rewriting of the section he makes no reference to a possible passive use of this verb form. Elsewhere, in the lesson on the "Ayin Guttural Verbs," he has added to the Hebrew sentences, which are to be translated into English, the greater part of Gen. xii. 2, 3.<sup>4</sup> This passage is rendered in the *Key*<sup>5</sup> as follows: "And I will bless thee and make thy name great, and I will bless those that bless thee, and by thee shall all the families of the earth bless themselves." Here the verb which Dr. McFadyen renders "bless themselves" is in the *Niphal* stem. Since it is generally recognized that this stem while originally reflexive in meaning is frequently used in a passive sense, the rendering given seems to require some explanation, especially since "be blessed" is the generally accepted rendering. So Dr. McFadyen adds the following note:

The use of the Hithpa'el (which can only be reflexive) in the very similar sentences, Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 4 וְהִתְבָּרַכְוּ, strongly suggests that the *Niphal* here (Gen. xii. 3), which might theoretically have a passive meaning—"in thee *shall* all the families of the earth *be blessed*"—should rather be taken reflexively (§ 25. 3. i); and the meaning really is that other nations in invoking blessings on themselves will use such words as "God make thee like Abram" (see Skinner's *Genesis*, p. 244); T. H. Robinson (*Genesis in Colloquial English*, p. 17), well brings out the

<sup>2</sup> *An Introductory Hebrew Grammar*. By the late A. B. Davidson. Revised throughout by John Edgar McFadyen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Nineteenth edition (1914). P. 93.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 18th edition (1907), p. 68, rem. b.

<sup>4</sup> 19th ed., p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Key to the Exercises in the late Professor A. B. Davidson's Revised Introductory Hebrew Grammar with Explanatory Notes*. By John Edgar McFadyen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1924, p. 77, note 15. For a review of this book, cf. this REVIEW for January 1927, pp. 141ff.

meaning by "all the nations of the world shall regard you as a type of the prosperous man."

This interpretation, as the form of statement clearly implies, is not of course original with Dr. McFadyen. It was advocated forty years ago by Briggs who then described it as "the view of most recent interpreters." His statement reads in part as follows:

The verb gives the chief difficulty. The Hithpael of the second passage [xxii. 18] must be taken as reflexive. This favours the view that the Niphal of the same verb, in the first passage [xii. 3], should be reflexive also. The Niphal may be passive, but the passive meaning should never be adopted unless there is evidence against the usual reflexive meaning of the form. We do not hesitate, therefore, to adopt the view of most recent interpreters, DeWette, Gesenius, Ewald, Knobel, Delitzsch, Dillmann, *et al.*, that the form is reflexive, and we render "bless themselves with thee."<sup>6</sup>

This interpretation is given by Adeney in the *Hastings Dictionary* without mentioning the usually accepted rendering "be blessed"; and the meaning of the passage when thus interpreted is explained as follows:

A man who is exceptionally blessed is taken as the model and type of blessing, and is then said to be "a blessing" (Gen. xii. 2); and others are said to bless themselves by him, in the sense that they appeal to the blessing he has received as a specimen of what they desire for themselves, *e.g.*, "The nations shall bless themselves in him"—*i.e.*, by Him, by reference to His blessing (Jer. iv. 2).<sup>7</sup>

Now, despite the positiveness with which this view is often stated, it is to be observed that this rendering "bless themselves" instead of "be blessed" is a comparatively new one. Briggs made no effort to claim for it any authority more ancient than that of "most recent interpreters."<sup>8</sup> The common

<sup>6</sup> Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*, p. 90, note.

<sup>7</sup> *Hastings Dictionary* I, p. 307a. On the other hand in the art. "Abraham," Ryle gives the passive rendering "be blessed" (p. 15b).

<sup>8</sup> "Recent" is, however, to be broadly construed. Thus, Joh. Simonis in his *Lexicon* (1771) gives only the reflexive meaning for the Hithpael of "bless"; but does not cite either of the Genesis passages. Eichorn in his edition of Simonis (1793) makes no change in this regard. Winer in his revision of Simonis-Eichorn (1828) gives two uses of the Hithpael and renders Gen. xxii. 18 by "fortunatus, beatus est."

rendering, "be blessed,"<sup>9</sup> has, as we shall presently see, the support of the ancient versions; and was apparently generally held until about the beginning of the nineteenth century. The question then arises, Why is the new interpretation so generally preferred by "modern" scholars? It will not suffice to say that the reason is purely linguistic, the use of the Hithpael as reflexive. For it is significant that the passage which Dr. McFadyen quotes uses the Niphal which could unquestionably be passive;<sup>10</sup> and Dr. McFadyen would hardly introduce the passage Gen. xii. 2, 3 into a grammar for beginners and use it as an opportunity to state and defend this modern interpretation of the Blessing, if no particular interest or importance attached to the new rendering. It is true that A. B. Davidson assures us regarding Gen. xii. 3 that "the sense is little altered if for 'be blessed' we render 'bless themselves,' *i.e.* wish for themselves the same blessings as Abraham and his seed are seen to enjoy."<sup>11</sup> But in saying this Davidson failed we believe to appreciate the real difference between these renderings. We agree with Dr. McFadyen that the difference is important; and we feel obliged to reject the new rendering for the very reasons which would we think dispose him to favor it.

There are two characteristics of the new rendering which should be carefully noted. The first is that it tends to empty the prophecy of its predictive significance; it ceases to be in the same sense and degree a *promise* to the nations. The most that it then says is that by Abraham or his seed the nations shall *seek* a blessing; they will use his name as a formula expressive of their desires. But whether their desire will be granted or not,—as to that there is no answer given. The granting of their desire can only be said to be implied. Furthermore Davidson has this to say in the comment upon this passage from which we have just quoted:

<sup>9</sup> It is found, for example, in the AV, the text of the ERV and ARV, the Donay version, and the German of Luther.

<sup>10</sup> Driver, *Hebrew Syntax*,<sup>3</sup> p. 125, renders it by the passive in xii. 3, xviii. 18.

<sup>11</sup> Article "Eschatology" in *Hastings Dictionary*, Vol. I, p. 735.

Equally universalistic, though more definite in regard to the means of its accomplishment, is the promise given to Abraham, "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xii. 3). Such a promise could not soon be fulfilled, and there might be room for conjecture even as to the manner of fulfilment; yet the patriarch, knowing wherein his own blessedness lay, in his knowledge of God and fellowship with Him, would surmise that through his seed this true knowledge of God would reach all peoples. The sense is little altered if for "be blessed" we render "bless themselves," *i.e.* wish for themselves the same blessings as Abraham and his seed are seen to enjoy (cf. Num. xxiii. 10).

It would seem, then, that Davidson regarded the blessing of the nations as little if anything more than a corollary to the blessing promised to the patriarch himself, an inference drawn by Abraham. In fact he uses even weaker language. He speaks of it as a "surmise" on the part of Abraham, rather than as a promise of Almighty God. Such being the case we need not wonder that he considered it immaterial which way the verse was rendered. But we do not realize the extent to which the new interpretation can empty this passage of its rich evangelical contents until we place Robinson's rendering which, Dr. McFadyen assures us, "well brings out the meaning," along side of the familiar rendering of the AV.

## ROBINSON'S VERSION

All the nations of the world shall regard you as a type of the prosperous man.

## AUTHORIZED VERSION

And in thee shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.

While not all the critics would empty this promise so completely of its precious and familiar meaning, the tendency of this interpretation is clearly in this direction.

The second characteristic of this rendering is that it brings the Old Testament form of the Blessing into conflict with the New Testament citation and interpretation. The promise is twice referred to in the New Testament (Acts iii. 25, Gal. iii. 8) and in both places the form of the verb is the same as in the LXX, namely passive. The claim of the critics that the passive rendering is incorrect, becomes, thus, an imputation upon the correctness of the use made of the Blessing by the New Testament writers.

It is obvious, we think, that these two characteristics are



calculated to commend the new rendering to the "higher critics," especially to those whose views are pronouncedly naturalistic. It minimizes or denies the predictive element in prophecy. This they approve because the supernatural as present in miracle and prophecy constitutes a "difficulty" which they are constantly endeavoring to escape. It rejects or ignores the authority of the New Testament by adopting a rendering different from the one which it accepts and expounds. This they approve because they hold that the use made of the Old Testament in the New was at times very inaccurate and unscientific, what Dr. Moffatt would call "allegorical." And much "allegorizing" of the New Testament conception of the Old Testament is necessary, if the critics are to avoid the frank admission that their view of the Old Testament differs radically from that set forth in the New Testament. Now it is just because this interpretation of the Blessing involves such serious consequences for Christian faith that we are concerned to know whether the philological evidence which Dr. McFadyen cites in its support is valid and conclusive. We shall now proceed to give our reasons for believing that it is not, but that modern scientific philological research supports the familiar rendering of the Authorized Version.

Dr. McFadyen's comment tells us that, like Briggs, he bases his rendering "bless themselves" upon two grounds. The first of these is that this passage should be interpreted in the light of the parallel passages (Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 4) where the *Hithpael* is used, the assumption being that in all of these passages the meaning would probably be the same. As to this it may be remarked that, while we should be disposed to regard such an argument as a valid one, it is rather surprising to find it employed by Dr. McFadyen and other of the critics. Reading Dr. McFadyen's statement the reader might infer that he regards all of these passages as belonging to the same document and therefore as consistent one with the other. But while it is true that all five passages are roughly assigned to J (*e.g.*, Driver), Dr. McFadyen is of course aware that Driver regarded the two *Hithpael* passages (xxii. 18, xxvi. 4) as

“expanded or recast by the compiler”;<sup>12</sup> and leading critics assign nearly all of the relevant passages to the JE redactor. Thus Briggs remarks in comparing xii. 3 (a Niphal passage) and xxii. 18 (a Hithpael passage): “The latter passage is clearer and later, and should be regarded as an interpretation of the former by the Redactor, who had the advantage of both the prophetic and theocratic narrators in his final representation.”<sup>13</sup> Then Briggs goes on to assert, as we have seen, that the Hithpael “must be taken as reflexive” and that the Niphal “should be reflexive also.” We have here an interesting illustration of the inconsistency of the critics. Usually they would argue that the fact that one passage uses the Niphal and another the Hithpael indicates a “difference” in meaning and consequently points to diversity of authorship.<sup>14</sup> But here while accounting for the difference of phraseology as due to the redactor they are disposed to insist on rendering the verbs alike and to treat the Niphal which could easily be passive as a reflexive on the ground that the Hithpael must be reflexive.

Now we are not disposed to quarrel with Dr. McFadyen for occasionally adopting the much decried “harmonistic” method of the conservative Old Testament scholar, much as we feel that the ‘higher critics’ as a class have deprived themselves of any right to appeal to it. But it may be well to notice that this is not as Dr. McFadyen’s statement would seem to imply a case of interpreting *one* Niphal in the light of *two* Hithpael. For the Niphal form of the verb is also used in Gen. xviii. 18 and xxviii. 14, both of which are strictly parallel to Gen. xii. 3 and both of which are likewise assigned to J or the JE redactor by the critics. But it is a case of interpreting three Niphals in the light of two Hithpael. This naturally raises the question, Why not reverse the process and interpret the two Hithpael in terms of the three Niphals?

<sup>12</sup> LOT, p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 89 note.

<sup>14</sup> Thus Professor Nourse of Hartford Seminary tells us: “It may be more correct, especially in regard to J, to think of a ‘school’ rather than an individual writer” (*A New Dictionary*, p. 349a).

The main reason that Dr. McFadyen gives for interpreting Gen. xii. 3 in the light of Gen. xxii. 18 and xxvi. 4 is stated to be that these latter passages use the Hithpael "which can only be reflexive,"<sup>15</sup> instead of the Niphal which "might theoretically have a passive meaning." This it will be observed rests the whole case for this interpretation ultimately on the assumption that the Hithpael can only be reflexive. We say assumption, although Dr. McFadyen states it as a fact, because the claim that the Hithpael is *only* reflexive is a comparatively recent one and is by no means universally accepted by Semitic scholars. It is interesting to recall that Gesenius who has been called "the father of Modern Hebrew Lexicography" held the view that the *Hithpael* was "originally a passive of the Piel,"<sup>16</sup> And the most recent editions of Gesenius' Grammar, those by Kautzsch, still recognize that this stem may be used as a passive. We shall make no attempt to give an exhaustive survey of scholarly opinion upon this point. But we note that this view was shared by Freitag, Fuerst, Nägelsbach, Ewald, W. H. Green, W. R. Harper, Preiswerk, A. B. Davidson, B. Davidson; and that it is still held today by E. König, Steuernagel, Brockelmann, Butin, D. T. Evans, R. D. Wilson. The question is a somewhat intricate one because it involves the problem of the relation between the reflexive stems and the passive voice in Hebrew; and this question can

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<sup>15</sup> It might be questioned whether Dr. McFadyen is here referring to the use of the Hithpael in general or only to its use in the verb "to bless." That the former in the case would seem to follow from the fact that in the *Grammar*, he mentions the *reciprocal* use of the Hithpael, despite the fact that this use is quite rare, even rarer than the passive, so rare as not to be even mentioned by Davidson.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. his *Lehrgebaude* (1817) also the 1828 and 1834 editions of his *Grammatik*. As a reason for this explanation of the Hithpael, Gesenius appealed to the use of the Vth Stem in Arabic. He mentioned that a few grammarians deny that the passive sense was original. But apparently he was not aware that the usage itself was disputed. It may be noted that Johannes Jahn had shortly before (1809) expressed a similar view. On the other hand it should not be overlooked that while in 1817 Gesenius gave Gen. xxii. 18 and xxvi. 4 as his first examples of the passive use of the Hithpael, in his *Lexicon* (1833) he treated these forms of "bless" as reflexive.

only be adequately considered in the light of the usage of the cognate languages. We shall, therefore, consider (1) the forms and usage of the passives and reflexives in the Semitic languages in general;<sup>17</sup> (2) their use in the Hebrew of the Old Testament; (3) the usage in the case of the verb "bless" in the Old Testament; and (4) the New Testament citations.

## I. THE PASSIVES AND REFLEXIVES IN SEMITICS

It is to be noted at the outset that in the Semitic languages the use of the passive is in general decidedly limited. This is due to two things: to a marked preference for the active voice, and especially to a tendency to avoid the use of the passive where the agent is to be named. This latter rule is carefully observed in the Classical Arabic in which "if the agent is to be named, the active voice must be used."<sup>18</sup> The Arab can say "X killed" (*katala*)<sup>19</sup> or "X was killed" (*kutila*). But he would not say "X was killed by Y." For this the proper form of expression would be "Y killed X." What is true of the Arabic is also true in general of the other Semitic languages.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For the Semitic languages in general the comparative grammars of Wright (1890), Zimmern (1898) and Brockelmann (Vol. 1. 1908) are of great value. A more recent work is that of O'Leary (1923). The four great representatives of the Semitic languages are: Arabic, Hebrew and Aramaic for the West Semitic, Assyrio-Babylonian for the East Semitic.

<sup>18</sup> Wright, *Arabic Grammar* II, 269 D. Wright tells us further that "The passive is especially used in four cases; namely (a) when God, or some higher being, is indicated as the author of the act; (b) when the author is unknown, or at least not known for certain; (c) when the speaker or writer does not wish to name him; (d) when the attention of the hearer or reader is directed more to the person affected by the act (patiens, the patient), than to the doer of it (agens, the agent)" (*Id.* I. 50 A).

<sup>19</sup> We shall use the letters *kil* to designate the trilateral root since the verb *kāṭal* (הָטַל) is so familiar to students of Hebrew, despite the fact that most of the names of the verbal stems are derived from a different verb (פָּעַל, hence, e.g., Hiph'il or Hif'il). The first two letters are emphatic consonants in Hebrew and are usually written *k* and *t*. But since we are only using the verb as a paradigm and since in Arabic the second letter is written with *t* and not *t*, we shall omit these diacritical marks and simply write the letters *k*, *t*, *l*. When the *t* is aspirated it is written *th*.

<sup>20</sup> Taking the Code of Hammurabi as an example for the Assyrio-Babylonian the passive form of expression occurs fairly often, but it is

They show a preference, sometimes a very marked preference for the active voice, especially when the agent is to be mentioned. It is to be observed, therefore, that this tendency to restrict the passive to cases where the agent is not named tends to obliterate to some extent the difference between reflexive and passive. Strictly speaking the distinction between these two verb forms is that in the former the subject is brought into the state or condition expressed by the verb through his own agency, in the latter by the agency of another. Thus between such sentences as "X killed himself" (i.e., "*was killed by himself*") and "X was killed by Y," the difference is perfectly clear. In the latter sentence the mention of the second party as agent proves the verb to be passive. But when the name of the agent is omitted the expression is much less clear. "X was killed" (by some party unknown, or not to be mentioned) might suggest at least the possibility that the party unknown, unmentioned and perhaps unmentionable was really the man himself. In other words the omission of the name of the agent with the passive makes the distinction between it and the reflexive less apparent; and if the meaning of either were broadened out, it might in many cases cover both ideas. Wright calls this wider use of the reflexive the "effective." He tells us that "It differs from the passive in this—that the *passive* indicates that a person is the object of, or experiences the effect of the action of *another*; whereas the *effective* implies that an act is done to a person, or a state produced in him, whether it be

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much less frequent than the active and is practically never found with the mention of the agent. In the expression "by the temple of his city he shall be redeemed" (*ina bīt ili ališu ippaṭṭar*, § 32) the possibility of regarding the temple as the agent is established by the parallel phrase in the next section "the palace shall redeem him" (*ēkallum ipaṭṭaršu*) where the "palace" is used for the civil authority as distinguished from the temple authority just referred to. On the other hand the Syriac has departed rather far from the usage which is so strictly observed in the Arabic. Thus not merely is the passive participle Peal frequently used to express the perfect but according to Nöldeke "a favorite mode of employing this participle includes mention of the agent introduced by ܓ" (*Gram.* § 279).



caused by *another* or by *himself*.”<sup>21</sup> In other words the effective broadens out the reflexive to include the passive. With this in mind let us now examine the use of these verb forms in detail.

# 1. The Passive Voice.

## a. Its Form.

If we can judge from the *Arabic*, nearly all of the stems of the Semitic verb, both the primary and the secondary, originally distinguished the passive from the active by means of internal vowel changes: *e.g.*, in the case of the first or Simple stem the passive of *katala* (“he killed”) was *kutila* (“he was killed”).<sup>22</sup> In the Classical Arabic these “internal” passives are found for all but one of the ten ordinary stems.<sup>23</sup> In the *Aramaic* the passive is very largely restricted to the participles, and to the perfect of the Simple stem.<sup>24</sup> In the *Assyrian* there are no inner passives. But the permansive (a nominal form related to the West Semitic perfect) may be used as such.<sup>25</sup> In the *Hebrew* the passives of the Piel and Hiphil are still in use, as is also the passive participle of the Qal. But there are only sporadic examples of other passives.<sup>26</sup>

## b. Its Use.

The facts which have just been given regarding the occurrence of the strictly passive forms in the Semitic languages are significant. They show that only in the *Arabic* is the pas-

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.* I. 38.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Brockelmann, *Vergleichende Gram.* Vol. I pp. 537ff. for a general survey.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 49c.

<sup>24</sup> For the Aramaic in general see the synopsis of forms given by Dr. R. D. Wilson in “The Aramaic of Daniel” (*Biblical and Theological Studies* by the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary, 1912, p. 306); for the Syriac, cf. Nöldeke, *Syr. Gram.* p. 218; for Biblical Aramaic, cf. Strack, *Bibl. Aramäische Grammatik*, §§ 12b, 13d.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Delitzsch, *Assyr. Grammatik*,<sup>2</sup> § 117a.

<sup>26</sup> There are eight passives (Hothpaal) of the “t” reflexive (Deut. xxiv. 4, Lev. xiii. 55, 56, Isa. xxxiv. 6, Num. i. 47, ii. 33, xxvi. 62, 1 Kg. xx. 27) and perhaps two of the “n” reflexive (Isa. lix. 3, Lam. iv. 14). Cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch § 54 h.

sive voice extensively developed.<sup>27</sup> In the other principal languages it is restricted to a few forms or is wanting altogether. To what is this due? The explanation is apparently two-fold. It is partly due to the preference for the active voice to which reference has already been made. But it is more the result of a tendency, which as we shall see in a moment is more or less marked in all the Semitic languages, to express the passive by means of the reflexive stems.

## 2. The Reflexive Stems.

### a. Their Form.

The Semitic languages have two stems or conjugations which express the reflexive: the *t*-stems and the *n*-stems.

(1) In the *t*-stems a "t" is inserted either before or after the first radical or formative augment of the verb.<sup>28</sup>

The *Arabic* has four such stems: the VIIIth (*iktatala*), Vth (*takattala*), IXth (*istaktala*), VIth (*takâtala*), which are formed from the Simple (Qal), Intensive (Piel), Causative (Hiphil or Shaphel),<sup>29</sup> and Conative (Poel)<sup>30</sup> stems respectively. The *Aramaic* dialects have three such stems in

<sup>27</sup> Whether or to what extent this difference between Arabic and the other Semitic families as to the use of the inner passives is due to a development of this mode by the Arabs or to an early disuse of it by the others is not easy to decide.

<sup>28</sup> The position of the *t* varies in the different Semitic languages. In the Hebrew and Aramaic it precedes the first radical, except where metathesis results from the fact of that radical being a sibilant. For a general survey, cf. Brockelmann (*op. cit.*) pp. 528-535. In the Assyrian the "t" regularly follows the first radical, or the formative element (in the case of Shaphel and Niphal). In Arabic it precedes the first radical in the Vth and VIth stems, follows it in the VIIIth and follows the formative element in the Xth.

<sup>29</sup> The Arabic like the other West Semitic languages does not have a Shaphel, *i.e.*, it does not indicate the Causative by prefixing *sh* (*i.e.*, *s*), as is the case in Assyrio-Babylonian. It uses an ' (hemza); the Aramaic dialects have either ' or *h*; and the Hebrew has regularly *h*. But the fact that the Xth Stem in the Arabic, which is primarily a reflexive of the Causative has the form *istaktala*, seems to indicate that the Shaphel may have been known to the West Semites as well as to the Eastern group.

<sup>30</sup> Such forms in Hebrew are largely confined to the weak verbs (Ayin Ayin and Ayin Waw).

frequent use, the Ethpeel ('ethk'thel), Ethpaal ('ethkattal) and Ettaphal ('ettaktal), derived from the Simple, Intensive and Causative stems respectively.<sup>31</sup> The *Assyrian* has four *t*-stems: the Ifteal (iktatal), Iftaal (iktattil), Ishtafal (ushtaktil) and Ittafal (ittaktil) which are formed from the Simple, Intensive, Causative and Reflexive (Niphal) stems respectively.<sup>32</sup> Of these *t*-stems the *Hebrew* has only one in frequent use, the Hithpael (hithkattel) which is derived from the Intensive (Piel) stem.<sup>33</sup>

(2) In the *n*-stem an "n" is inserted before the first radical.

The *Arabic* has one *n*-stem, the VIIth (inkatala).<sup>34</sup> The *n*-stems are not found in *Aramaic*, with the exception of the Samaritan dialect in which clear examples are quite rare.<sup>35</sup> The *Assyrian* has an *n*-stem (ikkatil < inkatil) from which as we have seen a *t*-stem (ittaktil) is formed.<sup>36</sup> The *Hebrew* has one *n*-stem which occurs quite frequently, the Niphal (niktal).

#### b. Their Use.

(1) The *t*-stems. Speaking of the *t*-stems in general, Brockelmann says, "Out of the reflexive-middle significance there very often develops the passive, as in the case of the Indo-germanic middle; consequently in the younger Semitic languages, the reflexives crowd the old passive, formed by

<sup>31</sup> Several other *t*-stems occur to some extent. Cf. the table of verbal forms given by Dr. R. D. Wilson (*op. cit.*, p. 306).

<sup>32</sup> Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, §§ 112 ff.

<sup>33</sup> Brockelmann accepts the view of Nöldeke, Kautzsch and Stade that the form יתְפַקֵּר (Judg. xx-xxi *passim*) is derived from the Kal stem (*Grundriss*, I, p. 529), but this view is opposed by Gesenius-Kautzsch (*Gram.* § 54 1; cf. espec. König, *Lehrgeb.*, I, 198f.). The Hithpô'el (cf. VIth stem in Arabic), the Hithpa'lel (cf. IXth stem in Arabic) and the Hithpalpel (cf. IInd stem of the quadriliteral verb in Arabic) also occur, especially with weak verbs. Whether there is a Taphel is a matter of dispute.

<sup>34</sup> The Arabic has also two infrequently occurring *n*-stems.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Peterman, *Grammatica Samaritana*, p. 22f.

<sup>36</sup> The Assyrian also has *n*-stems derived from two of the *t*-stems: the Iftaneal (iktanatil) and the Ittanafal (ittanaktal), both of infrequent occurrence.

vowel-change, entirely out.”<sup>37</sup> As to the *Arabic*, Wright tells us that in the case of the Vth stem (= Heb. Hithpael) the “effective” significance is “even more common” than the reflexive.<sup>38</sup> He also points out that the VIIIth stem may be used as a passive. In the *Aramaic* the three *t*-stems are all used as reflexives or passives, *i.e.*, as effectives. As to the *Assyrian* Delitzsch points out that three of the four *t*-stems may, and that the fourth (Ittafal) always does, have a passive signification.<sup>39</sup> That the same tendency appears to some extent at least in the Hebrew also is generally admitted. But there is a tendency to insist that it is a late usage. Thus Brockelmann says, “But in Hebrew the passive significance of the reflexive of the intensive stem appears first occasionally in the later language, as *tithhallal* ‘she is praised’ (Prov. xxxi. 30), *hishtakkaḥ* ‘be forgotten’ (Eccles. viii. 10).” We shall return to this in a moment.

(2) The *n*-stems. The *n*-stems which were originally reflexive have also come to be used in the passive sense. Brockelmann describes this as “very frequent.”<sup>40</sup> In the *Arabic* this stem (the VIIth) is often used according to Wright as an “effective.” In the *Aramaic* dialects the Niphal occurs apparently only in Samaritan and rarely even there. Apparently it can be used as a passive. In the *Assyrian* the Niphal is almost always passive; and this is always the case with the “*t*” form of this stem (the Ittafal). That in *Hebrew* the Niphal can be and often is used as a passive is not open to question; and according to König<sup>41</sup> there is no conclusive evidence of a development in this use in the Old Testament.

The above brief examination of the passives and reflexives in the Semitic languages shows a decided tendency, more or less marked in different languages, on the one hand to restrict the use of the passive voice, and on the other to broaden out

<sup>37</sup> *Grundriss*, I, p. 535.

<sup>38</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 38A.

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.* § 113.

<sup>40</sup> *Grundriss*, Vol. I, p. 535.

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.*, III. § 100.

the use of the reflexive to include the passive ("effective") or to use it instead of the passive. This is very important for our study of the Hithpael of "bless." Thus Lane tells us that the Arabic uses this verb in the Vth stem (Hithpael) in the sense of "*he had a blessing; and he was or became blest*" and that it very often signifies "*he looked for a blessing by means of him or it; he regarded him, or it, as a means of obtaining a blessing.*"<sup>42</sup> This is quite different from the strict reflexive sense which Dr. McFadyen seems prepared to insist on for this verb in Hebrew.

One subject still remains for us to consider before leaving this topic. It is the claim that the passive use of the reflexives is a late development in the history of the Semitic languages. It is difficult if not impossible to make any very definite statements with regard to this question since in the case of many of the Semitic languages or dialects the data are too meagre, either because the period covered is too short or because the literary remains are too scanty. Consequently we cannot do better than to turn to the Assyrio-Babylonian for a verdict on the subject. We have in the cuneiform inscriptions documents which go back as far and farther than the date which even the most conservative scholar will claim for the Penta-teuch, while the genuineness of the documents will be conceded by all parties to the debate. We have seen that the use of the Iftaal (or Hithpael) as passive is recognized by the best authorities on Babylonian grammar. The only question is then as to the antiquity of this usage. It is significant, therefore, that it is found at least as early as the Hammurabi period (2000 B.C.). The following examples will we believe establish this: "After that speech was exactly determined (*ubtirru*) in the (judicial) Assembly";<sup>43</sup> "while the grain, the sowing of the city, is being made ready" (*uktattu*);<sup>44</sup> "when the offerings of Ur shall be completed" (*uštallimu*);<sup>45</sup> "there-

<sup>42</sup> *Arabic English Dictionary, in loco.*

<sup>43</sup> Ungnad, *Bab. Briefe*, No. 238, 21.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.*, No. 88. 17.

<sup>45</sup> L. W. King, *Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*, III, p. 44;



upon . . . search was made (? *uzzenik*).<sup>46</sup> The expression "he shall take the oath by the God and *utaššar*," which occurs several times in the Code of Hammurabi, seems to mean "shall be acquitted" rather than "shall clear himself."<sup>47</sup> The expression "*ša kibizu la uttakaru*" may mean "whose command does not change itself,"<sup>48</sup> but the fact that Ungnad also renders the expression *ina pišu ša la uttakaru* by "through his unchangeable (*unwandelbar*) utterance" shows how easily the reflexive would in some instances pass over to the passive.<sup>49</sup>

This evidence is not as full as we might wish. But it shows clearly, we think, that as early as the time of Abraham, the passive use of the Hithpael was known in Babylon. This does not of course prove that it was equally early among the Hebrews. But it does show that scholars should be very cautious in asserting that the passive significance is late and in fixing some arbitrary date for its emergence in Hebrew. It may be conceded that there is a marked increase in such a use in later times. But this does not prove that the use itself is an indication of late date.

Our study of the cognate languages leads us, therefore, to two important conclusions: first that these languages show a general and in some instances a very marked tendency to use the *t*-stems as passive; second that this use may, and in the case of the best witness, the Babylonian, clearly does, occur at an early date.

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Ungnad, *Bab. Briefe*, p. 9, says of this verb "more probably passive than active; hardly 'when he has performed the sacrifices at Ur.'" Muss-Arnolt (*Assyr. Bab. Handwörterbuch*), and Bezold, *Assyr. Glossar*, give the passive sense for this verb.

<sup>46</sup> Schorr, *Altbab. Rechtsurk.*, p. 78; so Bezold, *Assyr. Glossar*, and (with some doubt) Kohler-Ungnad, *Ham. Gesetz*, III No. 700.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Kohler-Ungnad, *Ham. Ges.* II. p. 132.

<sup>48</sup> So Ungnad, *id.* p. 153.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. & Assyr. Laws, Contracts and Letters*, p. 394 "whose command is not set aside." It is interesting to note that so careful a scholar as Tallquist has in his *Maqlu* (I. 120) rendered the Iftaal of *nakāru* as reflexive in the text and passive in the glossary.

## II. THE PASSIVES AND REFLEXIVES IN HEBREW

We now pass on to examine more in detail the problem of the use of the passives and reflexives as it lies before us in the Hebrew. While the evidence cited from other Semitic languages favors the view that the Hithpael may and probably did acquire effective or passive meaning, this only constitutes a presumption, though a very valuable one, in its favor: it does not amount to proof. The question itself can only be decided by a study of the actual usage in Hebrew. But this preliminary study is of importance because it shows not only that there is no strong presumption against such a usage but on the contrary that were the Hithpael never used as a passive it would be a noteworthy example in Hebrew of a *t*-stem that had successfully resisted a tendency which is so marked in other Semitic languages. It justifies us, therefore, in maintaining that all that is required is a reasonable degree of probability, that the sense of a given passage is passive to warrant us in treating it as such. This is to be borne in mind since as has been pointed out the tendency to avoid the mention of the agent with the passive makes it difficult at times to be absolutely sure as to his identity.

## 1. The Passives.

Attention has been directed above to the preference for the active voice which is characteristic of the Semitic languages. As evidence of such a preference in Hebrew the following examples may be cited from verbs which are found only in those of the derived stems which have an inner passive: (1) Verbs which occur only in the intensive stem: "seek" ( **בָּקַשׁ** ) 225 times<sup>50</sup> in Piel, 3 times in Pual; "reject" ( **בָּאֵן** ) 41 times in Piel, wanting in Pual; "command" ( **צִוָּה** ) 476 times in Piel, 9 in Pual; "serve" ( **שָׁרַת** ) 97 times in Piel, wanting in Pual; (2) Verbs found only in the causative stem: "make known" ( **נָגַד** ) 344 times in Hiphil, 35 in Hophal; "cast"

<sup>50</sup> The figures which are given as to the frequency of the occurrence of Hebrew verbs are usually based upon the data given in Harper's *Hebrew Vocabularies*. But where they differ from those found in the Gesenius-Brown *Lexicon*, the latter figures have usually been used.

( שִׁלַּח ) 110 times in Hiphil, 13 in Hophal; cf. "smite" (נָכַח), 482 times in Hiphil, 17 in Hophal, 2 in Pual, 1 in Niphal; "bring" (Hiphil of בָּרַח) 566 times, Hophal 23 times. In such instances as these the preference for the active form is obvious and unmistakable.

As to these inner passives it has been pointed out above that in Hebrew they are chiefly confined to the Pual and Hophal stems, and to the passive participle of the Kal. But it was noted that the Hithpael (perhaps also the Niphal) is occasionally pointed as passive.<sup>51</sup> This is a matter of interest and importance. It proves that according to the Massoretes the reflexive stems were at times not only passive in *sense*, but passive in *form* as well. Since the pointing is admittedly late, the significance of the occurrence of these "passive" forms is not clear. On the one hand it is claimed that the existence of an "inner" passive of the Hithpael is a proof that this stem was originally active and reflexive. The existence of such a passive in the Arabic favors this explanation. On the other hand it may be argued that the pointing as passive is simply the result of the late tendency to use the reflexives as passives and consequently cannot be regarded as trustworthy. At any rate it shows that the Massoretic scholars recognized that the Hithpael (or Hothpaal) could be treated as a passive. And it raises the question whether, in some at least of the passages where the passive sense is probable, this is due to the tendency of which we have spoken above of the reflexives to pass over into effectives or passives, or whether perhaps some of the forms which are pointed as actives yet which the LXX renders as passives should actually be pointed as passives i.e. as Hothpaals instead of Hithpaels.

## 2. The Reflexives.

### a. The Hithpael.

This stem is primarily *reflexive* as can be seen in such expressions as "sanctify self" (Num. xi. 18, Josh. iii. 5), "defile self" (Num. vi. 7), "avenge self" (Jer. v. 9), "shake self"

<sup>51</sup> Cf. footnote 26 *supra*.

(Isa. lii. 2), "wash self" (Job ix. 30), "humble self" (Gen. xvi. 9), "strengthen self" (1 Kgs. xx. 22), "hide self" (Gen. iii. 8), etc., where the reflexive sense is either required or at least appropriate. A clear instance of its use as a reciprocal is in the case of the verb "see" (ראה) used of a hostile meeting.<sup>52</sup>

The following examples where the *passive* sense is appropriate if not necessary, may be cited:<sup>53</sup> "it (a utensil) shall be purified" (Num. xxxi. 23, P),\* "(the stones) are poured out" (Lam. iv. 1),\* "(rods) were broken" (Ezek. xix. 12) "(the iniquity) shall not be purged" (1 Sam. iii. 14)\*—where the nature of the subject does not favor the reflexive sense;<sup>54</sup> "but he refused to be comforted" (Gen. xxxvii. 35, J), where the context shows that he resisted the attempt of others to comfort him; "all their wisdom is swallowed up" (Ps. cvii. 27, AV margin)\* by fear of disaster and death; "ye shall be sold" (Deut. xxviii. 68)\*; "all the workers of iniquity shall be scattered" (Ps. xcii. 9)\*—the context implies that this is to be accomplished by the Lord; "my heart was grieved" (Ps. lxxiii. 21)\* by sad thoughts; "she shall be praised" (Prov. xxxi. 30)\* by right thinking people; "neither be polluted any more" (Ezek. xiv. 11); "and shall not be reckoned among the nations" (Num. xxiii. 9, JE ?)\*; "(fools) are afflicted" (Ps. cvii. 17)\*; "and was comforted" (Ps. cxix. 52) by the remembrance of thy judgments; "because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted" (1 Kgs. ii. 26), the reference being clearly to sufferings at the hands of enemies. Cf. also Deut. iv. 21, 1 Sam. xxx. 6, Isa. xxx. 29,\* Micah vi. 16, Ps. lxxiii. 21,\* Job xv. 28,

<sup>52</sup> It was pointed out above that the fact that Dr. McFadyen mentions the reciprocal use of the Hithpael, which Davidson did not mention and fails to mention the passive use which Davidson did mention is a clear indication that his statement that the Hithpael "can only be reflexive" is to be taken in its most comprehensive sense and not as referring merely to the verb "bless."

<sup>53</sup> The asterisk (\*) indicates that the rendering as passive is supported by LXX and Vulgate.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Job vi. 16, 1 Kgs. xviii. 45, Lam. i. 14.

xxx. 16, 19, Dan. xii. 10.\*<sup>55</sup> In Jonah iii. 8, "let man and beast be covered with sackcloth," where the verb may be reflexive as far as the men were concerned, but must be passive as regards the beasts, we have a good illustration of the broader use of this stem. In this case as in some other instances, including some of those given above, we might say that the verb is used in the "effective" sense as defined by Wright.

Closely allied to the passive use and in some instances at least practically identical with it is the idea of *getting something done to oneself*. Thus "he shall get himself shaved" (Lev. xiii. 33) or "be shaved" (AV). In this instance it is obviously improper to regard the verb as strictly reflexive ("shave himself"). For the reference is not merely to shaving the beard of a man, but also the head of a man or a woman, which means that in some instances at least recourse to a barber would have been unavoidable. Consequently the Hithpael may in such instances imply simply the availing oneself of the services of another, allowing or getting something done to oneself. We might call it the voluntary passive. Nordheimer<sup>56</sup> expresses it thus: "he makes himself the object of another's action"; and uses the above illustration, "to get shaved." Other examples would be: "to get (or, be) healed"

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<sup>55</sup> It is interesting to notice that according to the Massoretes the Hithpael participle of "be clean" (טהר) seems to be used in the sense of the Pual in Lev. xiv. This participle occurs twelve times in this chapter. In the AV it is regularly rendered by the passive "he (him, the man) that is to be cleansed." The LXX renders 7 times by the present passive participle, 4 times by the aorist passive participle and once by the perf. passive participle. Vs. 11 is especially instructive. There we read "and the priest that maketh *him* clean (Piel participle; LXX, ὁ καθαρίζων) shall present the man that is to be made clean (Hithpael participle; LXX, τὸν καθαριζόμενον)." Here the passive sense is certainly natural in view of the fact that it is the priest who performs the ceremony in which the leper merely participates. The priest is "the one who is to cleanse" and the leper is "the one who is to be cleansed." The Hithpael is equivalent to the Pual. In the expression "were numbered" (Judg. xx. 15, 17, xxi. 9), where the passive sense seems preferable, it is not certain whether the verb is to be regarded as reflexive of Qal or Piel.

<sup>56</sup> *Critical Grammar* (1842), p. 107.



(2 Kgs. viii. 29, ix. 15, 2 Chron. xxii. 6); "to get (or, be) enrolled by genealogies" (e.g. Neh. vii. 5, 64); and, perhaps, "to get (or, be) glorified" (Isa. xlv. 23, xlix. 3, lx. 21, lxi. 3), cf. Ezek. xxxviii. 23. Somewhat similar is the expression "was uncovered" (Gen. ix. 21, J) where the reference seems to be to unconscious or at least involuntary action. If these modifications of the reflexive idea are covered by Dr. McFadyen's statement "It may express action *upon* or *for oneself*," then it must be admitted that his statement in the *Key* that the Hithpael "can only be reflexive" is rather misleading. And it may be remarked that the one example which he cites under this head would not be adequate since "to go to and fro for oneself" (Hithpael of הִלָךְ) is not broad enough to include such expressions as "get healed," "get shaved" which so closely approximate the passive. Clearly between "bless themselves" in the sense used by Dr. McFadyen and "get themselves blessed" i.e. "secure for themselves a blessing" there is a great difference. And this latter meaning differs only slightly from the traditional rendering, "be blessed," and would readily pass over into it. At least it would be most hazardous to affirm that it could not.

Looking back over the examples which have just been given we feel justified in maintaining that there is adequate warrant for holding that in the case of some at least the passive meaning is required by the context; and that in the case of all of them it is certainly as probable if not more probable than the reflexive, if the reflexive is strictly construed. When we remember that the appropriateness of the passive rendering in these instances is supported in general by the tendency of the Semitic reflexives to become passives and confirmed in particular instances by the witness of the LXX and the Vulgate, it seems to us impossible to maintain with Dr. McFadyen that the Hithpael "can only be reflexive."

It will be objected, as we have seen, in favor of the reflexive use of "bless" in Genesis that the passive is a late development in the language and that therefore in an "early" document (J) the Hithpael might be expected to preserve its

original reflexive force. It may be replied, (1) that as we have seen the passive use in Babylonian is at least as early as the time of Abraham; (2) that we are not sufficiently well acquainted with the history of the Hebrew language to be able to say with certainty just when it would be proper to expect the passive usage to make its appearance; (3) that the critics are inclined to assign the passages in question to the Redactor of JE; (4) that even according to the datings adopted by the critics several of the instances we have cited above are early: Gen. xxxvii. 35\* being J; Num. xxiii. 9\* JE. Other passages (Num. xxxi. 23 and Deut. iv. 21, xxviii. 68) might be added but for the fact that the critics regard them as late.

On the other hand we observe that in Ecclesiastes which the critics regard as late, especially because of its diction, the Hithpael stem only occurs five times (vi. 2, vii. 16, viii. 10, xii. 3, 5) although the Niphal is found frequently. Of the five instances only one, "be forgotten" (viii. 10), is clearly passive. Driver comments on this passage with the words "elsewhere in Biblical Hebrew the passive is always expressed by the Nifal."<sup>57</sup> As to this it is to be noted that the Niphal of this verb appears twice in this very book (ii. 16, ix. 5) and that of the dozen remaining passages most would be regarded by the critics as late. Yet Driver includes this one passage in giving the evidence for the late date of Ecclesiastes.

#### b. The Niphal.

That this stem frequently retains its reflexive force does not require proof. A couple of examples may suffice: "I will hide myself in the field" (1 Sam. xx. 5), "he may redeem himself" (Lev. xxv. 49), "lift self up" (Isa. xxxiii. 10). But that on the other hand it has also acquired passive force is equally certain. A good example of this is furnished by the verb "create" (ברא). Since in the active stems (Kal and Piel) this verb is always used of *divine* activity it is clear that the Niphal forms must be used in the passive sense. Thus in Gen. v. 2 we read

<sup>57</sup> LOT, p. 475.

“male and female he (God) created them and called their name Adam in the day of their creating” (Niph. inf. cstr.). Here the reflexive sense is obviously excluded, the agent in creation being clearly named in the first part of the verse (cf. Gen. ii. 4, Ps. civ. 30). Another good example is the verb “eat” (אכל) the Niphil of which is clearly passive (*e.g.*, Ex. xii. 46, xiii. 3, 7, etc.). The verbs “bury” (קבר), “forgive” (סלח), “cut off” (כרת), “choose” (בחר), “find” (מצא) may also be mentioned, since in them the passive force of the Niphil is particularly obvious.

One of the clearest proofs that the Niphil may be used as a passive lies in the fact that in some instances it has apparently replaced the inner passive. Thus “destroy” (שמד) is found 69 times in Hiphil, 21 times in Niphil (cf. “divide” (בדל) and “be humble” (כנע)); but the Hophal does not occur. Furthermore the Niphil is clearly used as passive of the Kal, cf. especially: “build” (בנה) about 350 times in Kal (including 4 occurrences of the passive participle), 30 in Niphil; “give” (נתן) 1917 times in Kal, 82 in Niphil, 8 in Hophal (regarded by some as passive of Kal); “remember” (זכר) found only in Kal, Hiphil and Niphil; “carry” (נשא) used 599 times in Kal (incl. pass. part. 8 times) 13 in Piel, 2 in Hiphil, as against 32 times in Niphil and 10 in Hithpael. There are a number of verbs which occur more frequently in Niphil than in Pual and Hophal combined: “eat” (אכל), “be disturbed” (בהל), “cleave” (בקע), “uncover” (גלה), “hide” (חבא), “know” (ידע), “cut off” (כרת), “carry” (שאנ), “hide” (סתר), “hear” (שמע).

In view of such examples as these it is certainly well within bounds to say that the passive use of the Niphil is “tolerably common,”<sup>58</sup> and since, as we have seen,<sup>59</sup> it is difficult to prove that there was any increase in such a usage in later times, we feel that the fact that the LXX, Vulgate and New Testament use the passive uniformly in referring to the Abrahamic

<sup>58</sup> Gesenius-Kautzsch.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. footnote 41 *supra*.

Blessing may be regarded as constituting the "sufficient evidence against the usual meaning of the form" which Briggs would require us to produce.

### 3. The Syntax of the Passives.

It was pointed out above that there is a tendency, especially marked in the Arabic, to avoid the mention of the agent after a passive verb. A good, though extreme, illustration of the Hebrew usage is furnished us by the verb "command" (צוה). This verb which is of frequent occurrence is found only in Piel-Pual (nearly 500 times). The usual expression is "X commanded Y." Thus we frequently read the phrase "as the Lord commanded Moses." The Pual only occurs 9 times: and in eight of these the agent is not mentioned. The phrase "And they said, The LORD commanded my Lord . . . and my Lord was commanded by the LORD" (Num. xxxvi. 2) occurs only once and is so unusual that the text of the passage has been regarded as suspicious by some scholars. This is as has been said an extreme instance. But it serves to illustrate the relative infrequency of the passive as compared with the active, and the tendency not to mention the agent when the passive is used. The prepositions which are used to introduce the efficient cause or agent after the passive are: ל (e.g. 1 Sam. xxv. 7 "and not has anything been missed by (ל) them."), ב (e.g. Gen. ix. 6 "by (ב) man shall his blood be shed"),<sup>60</sup> מן (e.g. "by the waters (ממי) of the destruction"). But while the agent may be introduced in this way it must be at least admitted that it is relatively infrequent.<sup>61</sup> Where the agent is to be named the active voice would ordinarily be used.

From the above examination of the use of the passives and

<sup>60</sup> That in Deut. iv. 22, we may render by "the Lord was angered by (ב) me," seems clear (cf. LXX). At the same time, it must be recognized that "against" (Vulg., *contra*) would be a very suitable rendering for the preposition, and that the verb may be reflexive, "angered himself against (or with)."

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Hebrew Grammar* § 121f., where the word "frequently" as applied to the use of the ל seems to the writer an overstatement; also König *Lehrgebäude* III, p. 35f.

reflexives in Hebrew we may draw two conclusions. The first is that the use of the Hithpael as a passive is sufficiently frequent to constitute a presumption in favor of the possibility of such a use in the case of the verb "to bless." The other is that the mention of the agent after the passive would be infrequent to say the least.

### III. THE VERB "TO BLESS" IN HEBREW

While it is clear that a correct understanding of the use of the verb stems in Hebrew and in the cognate languages is of value for the study of the meaning and usage followed by any special word or root, it is also true that such facts as we learn from this broader study are not conclusive of themselves. We cannot substitute *a priori* reasoning for the inductive method without running the risk of establishing the theoretical correctness of a usage for the actual occurrence of which there may be no adequate evidence. Usage in language does not follow such clearly predictable lines that we can say, "This expression is theoretically correct. Therefore, it is good current usage." In fact certain peculiarities at once emerge in connection with our study of the verb "bless" which may be regarded as more or less distinctive. Thus, we observe that while the verb is used in both the active and the passive sense, the former is regularly expressed by the Piel (70% of total occurrences), while for the latter the passive participle of the Kal is usually employed (22% of total occurrences).<sup>62</sup> The Pual (13 times), Niphal (3 times), Hithpael (7 times) are all of relatively infrequent occurrence. It is to be noted also that the verb is used in two ways: to describe God's blessing as pronounced or invoked upon His creatures, and man's blessing as pronounced or invoked upon God or upon his fellowmen. This difference between the "human" and the "divine" blessing involves an important distinction in meaning which Cremer in discussing the Greek equivalent has well expressed

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<sup>62</sup> In this respect the usage of the Hebrew resembles that of the Aramaic and not of the Arabic. In the Arabic the Simple Stem is not used in the sense of "bless" (cf. Lane's *Lexicon, in loco*).



as follows: "The difference is this—the human *εὐλογεῖν* of God is an exaltation with words, the divine *εὐλογεῖν* is an exaltation by act." We shall now proceed to examine into (1) the use of the verb in the different stems in which it is found and (2) its syntax, especially the use of the preposition "in" (ב) which always follows the Niphal and Hithpaël forms.

### 1. The Forms of the Verb "To Bless."

#### a. The Piel and Pual.

The verb occurs about 225 times in the Piel stem and is usually found in the perfect, imperfect or imperative; the infinitives occur 25 times; and the participle is found 5 times. The verb nearly always has both a personal subject and object expressed. It is used of God blessing His creatures (e.g. Gen. ix. 1, cf. ii. 3), and of man blessing God (e.g. Ps. xvi. 7) or his fellowmen (e.g. Gen. xlvii. 7). It may be used in a narrative of past time (e.g. Gen. xlviii. 15), and it may express a prayer (e.g. 1 Chron. iv. 10, Gen. xxviii. 3) or a promise (e.g. Gen. xxvi. 24) for the future.

The Pual occurs 7 times in the imperfect and 6 times in the participle. It is used as a passive of the Piel. Yet it is to be noted that in two instances where the Piel participle is coupled with the passive, the form which is used is not as we might expect the Pual but the *Ḳal* participle: "and blessed (*Ḳal*) be he that blesseth (Piel) thee" (Gen. xxvii. 29, Num. xxiv. 9), which seems to indicate a tendency to avoid using Piel and Pual in the same sentence. This may be due simply to a desire to vary the expression, or to the fact of the far greater frequency of the *Ḳal* participle. But at least it shows that the *Ḳal* passive participle was practically equivalent to a passive of the Piel.<sup>63</sup>

#### b. The *Ḳal* Passive Participle.<sup>64</sup>

This form occurs quite frequently, being found, as we have

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Lev. xiv. where as we have already seen the Hithpaël participle is, according to the pointing, used a dozen times and apparently as the passive of the Piel.

<sup>64</sup> The only other forms of the *Ḳal* which occur are two imperfects (2 Chron. vi. 13, Ps. xcv. 6), in both of which the meaning is "kneel." It

seen, 71 times.<sup>65</sup> It occurs usually in the benediction or formula of blessing: "blessed be . . . !" It ascribes blessing to God about 40 times: e.g. "Blessed be the Lord God of Shem" (Gen. ix. 26). About half as frequently it invokes blessing upon men (e.g. Ruth ii. 19).<sup>66</sup> There are also about a dozen instances where the expression is more properly to be regarded as declarative (e.g. Deut. xxviii. 3ff.).<sup>67</sup>

c. The Niphal.

This stem is found as we have seen only three times in the Old Testament, and in passages all of which refer to the Abrahamic blessing (Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxviii. 14). All three are rendered in LXX and Vulgate as passive and this use of the Niphal is in general so frequent that the burden of proof clearly rests on those who insist on the reflexive sense. Since the Pual occurs so seldom there is no valid reason why the Niphal should not be used as a passive. The frequent use of the passive participle *Ḳal* might be alleged as a ground for assuming that the Niphal is to be taken in its original sense as a reflexive. But as we have seen this use of the *Ḳal* is very largely restricted to the formula of benediction.

d. The Hithpael.

This stem is used 7 times: 4 times in the perfect (Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 4, Deut. xxix. 19, Jer. iv. 2), twice in the imperfect (Ps. lxxii. 17, Isa. lxv. 16) and once as participle (Isa. lxv. 16). That this stem *may* be used as a reflexive seems to be generally admitted. Indeed it is only to be expected that this would be so. We shall look first at the passages where it is rendered by the *reflexive* in the AV.

is interesting to compare the verb "speak" (דבר) which occurs 1142 times, all but 53 times of which are Piel. Of the 53 all but 14 are in the *Ḳal* active participle.

<sup>65</sup> With the exception of the passive participles of the verbs "to write" (113 times) and "muster" (75 times) the passive participle of this verb occurs more frequently than any other in Hebrew. It is about twice as frequent as the same form from "curse" (ארר) which is found 37 times.

<sup>66</sup> The verb "to be" (jussive) is used four times (1 Kgs. x. 9, Prov. v. 18, Ruth ii. 19, 2 Chron. ix. 8).

<sup>67</sup> The verb "to be" (imperfect) is used twice (Gen. xxvii. 33, Deut. vii. 14).

(1) Deut. xxix. 18 "And it come to pass, when he heareth the words of this curse that he *bless himself* in his heart saying, I shall have peace," etc. Here the Vulgate treats the verb as reflexive (*benedicat sibi in corde suo*). The LXX renders by the middle voice which may of course be reflexive (*ἐπιφημίσηται ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ*). That such an inference may be drawn from the words which follow, "saying, I shall have peace," cannot be denied. Perhaps the meaning is "pronounce a blessing on oneself." The wicked man changes the curse which God pronounces on his disobedience into a blessing which he pronounces on himself. Still the reflexive force cannot be regarded as certainly present. The meaning may be simply that the wicked when he hears God's servant pronounce the curses will "in his heart," i.e. inaudibly, substitute the word "blessed" for "cursed" as applying to transgressors in general and not merely to himself, although he is himself most vitally concerned.

(2) Isa. lxxv. 16 "That he who *blesseth himself* in the earth shall *bless himself* in the God of truth; and he that sweareth in the earth shall swear by the God of truth," etc. Here the Vulgate renders by the passive (*qui benedictus est . . . benedicetur in Deo amen*). The LXX renders the first verb (the participle) by the passive, the other by the active voice: "(a name) which shall be blessed upon the earth; for they shall bless the true God." Here the reflexive use is not at all obvious. "Bless" stands in parallelism with "swear." The latter may involve the idea of "advantage or disadvantage," but is clearly not reflexive in the strict sense of the word. If, as seems probable, "bless by the God of truth" means pronounce a blessing in the name of the God of truth, it would be more natural to take the word as implying the pronouncing of a blessing upon *another* than upon oneself. In the formula of blessing we read frequently "Blessed be thou (he, she, etc.)," but never "Blessed be I." And while there are a few instances where the speaker invokes a blessing on himself as in 1 Chron. iv. 10 (cf. Gen. xxvii. 19, 31, 34, 38, 2 Sam. vii. 29, Ps. xxviii. 9, lviii. 2) such examples are exceptional.

Usually the blessing is invoked upon another than the speaker.

(3) Jer. iv. 2 b "And the nations shall *bless themselves* in him, and in him shall they glory." The reflexive rendering of the AV is not supported by the LXX and Vulgate which employ the future active (εὐλογήσουσιν ἐν αὐτῷ; *benedicent eum*). While the reflexive force is possible here, the same objection holds against it as in the previous instances. The expression "and thou shalt swear, The Lord liveth" with which the verse begins seems to imply at least that gentile peoples shall use the name of the *Lord* in the blessings which they invoke as well as in the oaths which they swear. Implying as it will their recognition that He is the source of blessing, the thought of advantage (middle sense) is clearly present. But that the primary thought is of naming themselves as the recipients of the blessing, is not clear.

In the three remaining passages the AV and RV, render the verb by the *passive*.

(1) In Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 4 the words "in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed" are rendered in the LXX by the passive ([ἐν] εὐλογηθήσονται) a rendering of these two Hithpals which corresponds exactly with the rendering of the three Niphals (Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxviii. 14) all five passages being rendered as passives. The Vulgate likewise renders by the passive in all of the five (Gen. xviii uses the gerundive). This seems clearly to imply that the LXX and Jerome instead of translating the Niphals in the light of the original use of the Hithpals i.e. as reflexives, preferred to render the Hithpals in accordance with a well established use of the Niphal, i.e. the passive.

(2) Ps. lxxii. 17. "All nations shall be blessed in him" seems to apply the language of the Abrahamic promise to the Messianic king. Here also the LXX and Vulgate render by the passive.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> In all the five passages in Genesis, (the Niphal as well as the Hithpael), the Samaritan, Babylonian (Onkelos) and Jerusalem (Pseudo-Jonathan) Targums render by the Ethpael. That this can be taken as a passive, can hardly be denied. That it is to be so taken seems probable. In

To prove that the passive rendering is wrong in these three passages or in any one of them, it would be necessary to show that this verb must in Hebrew have only one meaning and that this meaning must be the reflexive. This cannot be done. We have seen that the reflexives show in Hebrew as in other Semitic languages a tendency to become passives, and that this may have occurred at an early date. To support this we have in the case of the verb "bless" the evidence of the early versions.

## 2. The Syntax of "Bless."

In studying the syntax of "bless" it is well to begin with the Piel, partly because it is of such frequent occurrence, but more especially because having active force its syntax is the simplest and clearest.

### a. The Active (Piel).

Two points are especially to be noted (1) that usually the subject and object are both expressed. The subject is either God or man, the object is either man or God. Thus we read: "And God blessed Noah" (Gen. ix. 1); "and Eli blessed Elkanah" (1 Sam. ii. 20); "for there they blessed the Lord" (2 Chron. xx. 26). Or as referring to the future: "The Lord bless thee and keep thee" (Num. vi. 24); "and I will bless

all of these passages the Arabic uses the same form, the Vth stem. Lane, as we have seen, gives as the meaning of this form when occurring in the same construction as in these five passages, *i.e.*, with the preposition "in": "*He had a blessing; and he was, or became, blest; by means of him, or it.*" This corresponds very closely to the commonly accepted interpretation of these passages. Lane adds: "*but very often signifying he looked for a blessing by means of him, or it; he regarded him or it, as a means of obtaining a blessing; he augured good from him, or it.*"

In the case of the three other passages there is no such uniformity of rendering. In Ps. lxxii. 17 and Jer. iv. 2 the Targum and the Syriac use the same verb-form as in the Genesis passages. The Arabic uses the VIth stem in Ps. lxxii (cf. the Ethiopic) instead of the Vth, but the IIIrd in Jer. iv. 2. The same is true of Isa. lxx. 16 except that the Targum uses the Piel instead of the Ethpaal and the Arabic the IIIrd. In Deut. xxix. 19 the Samaritan uses the same verb form as in the Genesis passages. But the Babylonian Targum and the Syriac render by the verb "think" (חשב), one using the Piel, the other the Ethpeel. The Arabic renders by "meditate" or "determine" (קרה).



them" (Num. vi. 27); "I will bless the Lord" (Ps. xvi. 7).<sup>69</sup> (2) It is to be noted further that a phrase introduced by the preposition "in" (ב) is used a number of times with the Piel. Obviously ב cannot in these instances be used of the agent. It is possible to distinguish several different uses. It denotes: (a) the time of blessing: "at all times" (Ps. xxxiv. 2); (b) the scope of the blessing: "in everything" (Gen. xxiv. 1; cf. Job i. 5, Ps. lxviii. 26); (c) the manner of uttering it: "with his mouth" (Ps. lxii. 4), "with a loud voice" (Prov. xxvii. 14); (d) the Deity by whose authority the blessing is pronounced: "in his (the Lord's) name" (Deut. x. 8, xxi. 5, 1 Chron. xxiii. 13);<sup>70</sup> (e) the example of the blessedness desired: "in (by) thee shall Israel be blessed" (Gen. xlviii. 20), where the words "God make thee as Ephraim and as Manasseh" (cf. Ruth iv. 11, 12) seem most naturally to be interpretative of the "in thee" or "by thee" which precedes.

#### b. The Passive (Pual and Kāl)

Since the active forms of the blessing seem to be sufficiently clear the question now arises as to the construction with the passive. Turning first to the Pual we find that in it the subject is either man (e.g. Ps. cxxviii. 4) or God (i.e. His name, Job i. 21, Ps. cxiii. 2), and that in all but two of the thirteen instances the agent is not named. But in "Blessed of the Lord be his land" (Deut. xxxiii. 13) and "For such as be blessed of him" (Ps. xxxvii. 22) the personal agent is clearly expressed by the genitive of the noun and by the pronominal suffix respectively. In 2 Sam. vii. 29 "and with (בְּ) thy blessing let the house of thy servant be blessed," the prepositional clause is expressive of means or instrument. The preposition "in" (ב) does not occur after the Pual.

Turning to the passive participle Kāl we observe that while

<sup>69</sup> In the Hebrew text of Ecclesiasticus (xliv. 21) the Blessing is referred to in the following way "Therefore he assured him by an oath that he would bless the nations in his seed," etc. The Hebrew uses the Piel inf. cstr. which the LXX renders by *ἐνευλογηθῆναι*, perhaps being influenced in favor of the passive by the five passives of the LXX.

<sup>70</sup> This use of the preposition is parallel to that found with verbs of swearing (e.g. Isa. lxv. 16) and cursing (cf. 1 Sam. xvii. 43).

the subject is either the human being or God, the agent (God) is only rarely introduced: *viz.*, by the genitive (3 times)<sup>71</sup>, by the preposition ל (8 times).<sup>72</sup> In two instances where בן is used the agent is clearly not referred to: Deut. vii. 14 "Thou shalt be blessed above all people," Deut. xxxiii. 24 "Let Asher be blessed with children." In none of these unquestioned passives is the personal agent introduced by "in" (ב).

c. Turning to the Niphal and Hithpael passages we find that the data just given have important bearing upon the understanding of the use of the preposition ב, with these stems.

(1) The preposition is used in a local sense in: "in the land" (Isa. lxxv. 16), "in his heart" (Deut. xxix. 19). This is closely akin to the temporal use cited above.

(2) The Deity by whose authority the blessing is invoked or pronounced seems to be introduced in "shall bless (himself) by the God of truth" (Isa. xlv. 14); cf. the phrase "swear by the God of truth" with which it stands in parallelism. Perhaps "and the nations shall bless (themselves) by him" (Jer. iv. 2) is also an example of this usage in view of the clause which precedes, "And thou shalt swear, The Lord liveth, in truth, in judgment and in righteousness."

(3) There remain to be considered the five passages which refer to the Abrahamic Blessing and Ps. lxxii. 17. In all of these the AV renders by "in" following the LXX (ἐν) and Vulgate (*in*) which is a literal rendering of the Hebrew ב.<sup>73</sup> This preposition may be interpreted in several different senses. The promise being made *to* Abraham, the blessing was in a very real sense *in* Abraham; and it was

<sup>71</sup> Gen. xxiv. 31, xxvi. 29, Isa. lxxv. 23.

<sup>72</sup> Gen. xiv. 19, Judg. xvii. 2, Ruth ii. 20, iii. 10, 1 Sam. xv. 13, xxiii. 21, 2 Sam. ii. 5, Ps. cxv. 15.

<sup>73</sup> The Targum of Onkelos interprets by בְּרִיל apparently in the sense of "on account of." The Samaritan, the Syriac Peshitto, and the Arabic all use the ב of the Hebrew. The Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan renders in Gen. xii. 3 by the simple ב; elsewhere it varies the expression somewhat and usually refers to the "righteousness" of Abraham or his seed as the ground (?) of the Blessing.

consequently *in, through, or with*, Abraham that the nations were to be blessed. All of these meanings can be expressed by the **ב** of the Hebrew; and as Olshausen points out the meaning "with" is especially favored by Gal. iii. 9 where after the promise is quoted in vs. 8, the explanation is added "So then they which be of faith are blessed with (σύν) faithful Abraham."

The only conclusion which can be drawn from this study of the syntax seems to be that the use of the preposition "in" (**ב**) after the Hithpael and Niphal does not introduce the agent. The AV and RV translators have acted wisely in avoiding the rendering "by" which after the passive would naturally be regarded as introducing the agent. On the other hand there is no sufficient warrant for arguing that because this preposition is used after all the Niphals and Hithpael, all should be regarded as reflexives. The preposition **ב** has too many possible meanings for this argument to be valid; and the fact that the LXX and Vulgate did not render the seven Hithpael, all alike is a strong argument against such a supposition.

#### IV. THE NEW TESTAMENT CITATIONS

The Blessing of Abraham is expressly cited in the New Testament in Acts iii. 25, "And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed" (καὶ ἐν τῷ σπέρματί σου εὐλογηθήσονται πᾶσαι αἱ πατριαὶ τῆς γῆς) and in Gal. iii. 8, "in thee shall all nations be blessed" (ἐνευλογηθήσονται ἐν σοὶ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη). It is to be noted that neither of these citations is a strictly literal rendering of the original Hebrew, nor does either of them follow the LXX rendering of any one of the five passages in Genesis exactly. The three Niphal passages centre the blessing as far as this phrase is concerned all but exclusively in Abraham: "in thee" (Gen. xii. 3), "in him" (Gen. xviii. 18), "in thee" (Gen. xxviii. 14); only one of the three passages, the last, adds the words "and in thy seed." On the other hand the two Hithpael passages speak of the descendants of Abraham and not of himself, "in thy

seed" (Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 4). Consequently when Acts iii. 25 uses the phrase "in thy seed," it would be natural to think of xxii. 18 and xxvi. 4, the Hithpael passages, as referred to. Yet the reference there to "kindreds" ( *πατριάι* = *משפחות* ) points to Gen. xii. 3 or xxviii. 14, where the Niphal is used. It would be possible to think that Gen. xxviii. 14 is referred to and quoted in abbreviated form. But since the quotation is introduced as spoken to Abraham we should hardly expect to find it cited in the form in which it was renewed to Jacob. Consequently it seems probable that in Acts iii. 25 the speaker has combined the phraseology of Gen. xii. 3 with that of xxii. 18, xxvi. 4. This is favored by the citation in Gal. iii. 8 where the "in thee" points apparently to xii. 3, while the "nations" is probably taken from xviii. 18. In short the New Testament writers have apparently quoted the language of the promise with some freedom not restricting themselves to the phraseology of any one passage but using those phrases which appear in them that were best suited to their purpose. The inference would, therefore, seem to be justified that they did this because they regarded all five as saying practically the same thing. Consequently it would be arbitrary we believe to claim that the New Testament quotations are based only on the Niphal passages and that the use of the passive in the New Testament citations can have no bearing on the significance of the Hithpael. For the LXX renders all five verbs by passives; and if the correctness of this rendering be admitted for the Niphals the proposal of Dr. McFadyen himself that all be rendered alike, would militate against an attempt to draw a distinction between these passages. It seems, therefore, not only permissible but even necessary to recognize in the passive rendering of the New Testament a clear indication and proof not merely that the Niphal may be passive, as Dr. McFadyen admits, but that the Hithpael, which he declares can only be reflexive, may also be passive and is to be so interpreted in the Blessing. At all events to maintain as Dr. McFadyen does that both the Hithpael and the Niphal passages are to be treated as reflexives brings the rendering

adopted by the critics into direct conflict with the New Testament citations and their Apostolic interpretation.

### CONCLUSION

In the light of the evidence which has been presented in the foregoing discussion the conclusion is warranted we believe that the rendering of the Abrahamic Blessing adopted by the Authorized Version rests upon good authority and should be accepted. There are two principal arguments in its favor. On the one hand we have the recognized tendency of the reflexives in the Semitic languages, including Hebrew, to develop a passive significance, a tendency which is found at least as early as the time of Abraham. On the other hand we have the witness of the New Testament and of such ancient and important versions as the Septuagint and Vulgate, that this tendency did appear in the Old Testament in a number of verbs among which the verb "bless" is to be included.

In the light of the evidence, the statements of Dr. McFadyen are seen to be too sweeping. It is correct to say that the Hithpael was originally reflexive. It is not the fact that it can *only* be reflexive. It is correct to say that the Hithpael of "bless" may be, and perhaps in several instances is, reflexive. It cannot be proved that it can *only* be reflexive. It is true that the similarity between the Niphal and Hithpael references to the Abrahamic Blessing favors the rendering of the five verbs in the same way. It does not follow that this rendering must be the reflexive. Dr. McFadyen's sweeping assertions must be modified to accord with the evidence; and the evidence supports the familiar rendering of the Authorized Version.

The attention of the reader was directed at the commencement of this study to Robinson's "colloquial" rendering of Gen. xii. 3: "All the nations of the world shall regard you as a type of the prosperous man,"—a rendering which Dr. McFadyen assures us, "well brings out the meaning." In view of the appalling way in which this rendering secularizes this glorious promise and robs it of its richest meaning, it is



gratifying to find that its correctness is not established by those strictly philological considerations which Dr. McFadyen has advanced in its support. Between the Old Testament prophecy and the New Testament interpretation there is no conflict. Modern philological science supports the New Testament use of the group of Old Testament passages of which Gen. xii. 3 is the first. If the critics reject the New Testament interpretation they must do so because their rationalistic reconstruction of the Old Testament leaves no room for so striking a prediction, and because the pronounced universalism of the Blessing is out of harmony with their theory that the ancient Hebrews worshipped a "tribal god," whose domain was as restricted as his power was limited. But this god of the rationalistic critic is not the God of the Bible, the God of Christian faith. The God who called Abraham was "the God of heaven and the God of the earth" (Gen. xxiv. 3). It was the Creator of the heaven and the earth (Gen. i. 1), who chose the seed of Abraham to be to Him a peculiar people, that through them all nations might be blessed. The Blessing of Abraham assures us that the particularism of the Old Testament religion is not to be explained by the evolutionist's theory of a gradual development of the god-idea in Israel through animism, polytheism, henotheism to the ethical monotheism of the Prophets and Apostles, but that the universalism of Isaiah and of Paul was clearly present in it from the beginning, not as a mere "surmise," but as a sure promise which the eternal and unchanging God had made unto Abraham His friend, and which He fulfilled in the gift of His Son to be the Saviour of the World.

*Princeton.*

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*History of Mediaeval Philosophy.* By MAURICE DEWULF, Professor of Philosophy at Louvain and Harvard Universities. Revised edition in two vols. Vol. I, from the Beginnings to Albert, the Great. Vol. II. from Thomas Aquinas to the end of the Sixteenth Century. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. xvi. 416; xii, 336.

The last twenty-five years have witnessed a considerable revival of interest in Scholastic Philosophy. Not only have its writers been re-studied and re-valued, its texts re-edited, many obscure authors made better known, doubtful writings better authenticated, but there has been persistent and powerful effort to secure its more general acceptance or, at least, win for it a higher consideration. Able articles are written to show that its methods are still valid, its tenets capable of holding their own in the face of Modernism, Higher Criticism, Evolution,—and, that, in fact, it is the *only* philosophy which can do this. That much of this is the work of the Catholic Church is, of course, the fact. Inside its bounds, the definite re-authorization of Thomism as the accepted theology and philosophy of the Catholic Church would abundantly account for her efforts in this direction.

Among the popularizers of Scholasticism, Professor DeWulf is one of the most scholarly and persuasive. His *Civilization and Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, a series of Lectures at Princeton, published in 1922, was a readable but very one-sided and partial presentation, designed to awaken popular interest in this Age and its products. To accomplish this, in democratic America, it seems necessary not only to present whatever is truly worth our praise in the society and philosophy of the Middle Ages, but above all, to prove its freedom of thought, and to do this, means to minimize to the extreme, the dominating influence of the Papacy. This was largely done by the policy of silence in the work just mentioned. In the present history, this is not so evident.

For Professor DeWulf the thirteenth century is the culmination of social happiness, so far: its philosophy and theology are the culminating effort of human thought, its principles of social structure are the definitely developed lines along which all true progress must hereafter run. To prove this, is the aim both of the work mentioned above, and of the one now under review. But inasmuch as scholastic thought culminated in Thomism, it is the definite aim of both works to exalt the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, around whose system both works truly if not avowedly center. Of course, also, as far as successful, it means the bulwarking of the Papacy, and both works are undoubtedly written with this intention.

As regards the *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, the two volumes are

a mine of the latest information. The bibliography is especially complete,—almost one tenth of both volumes being given to it. At the same time, this work does not supplant the great *History* of Ueberweg, whose latest edition, revised by Baumgartner, still remains the indispensable source for all students of the History of Philosophy. DeWulf is no more complete in dealing with matters of fact than Ueberweg.

The important features of DeWulf's work, aside from the fact that it is a history, and, as such, a very complete one, are its aims and "tendencies." It is history written for a purpose,—that purpose, to exalt Scholasticism. Professor DeWulf, therefore, at once discusses the definitions of Scholasticism, the chronological (the philosophy of certain years), the Aristotelian, etc.,—rejects all, and especially strenuously rejects the idea that it is philosophy in the service of Catholic dogma. Instead, he declares that Scholasticism is a system of philosophic thought, slowly wrought out by the patient labor of several centuries, more or less completely expressed by all of its exponents, but finding its completest formulation in the thirteenth century, and especially in the system of Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, this leaves the matter in the air, unless this system is at least summarized. Therefore when Dr. DeWulf reaches the thirteenth century, he interrupts the course of his history to give a "Scholastic synthesis," which is his endeavor so to state these doctrines as to recommend them to modern thought. This is not to say that Dr. DeWulf has incorrectly summarized them, or purposely modified them. The large place this holds in his mind,—the evident anxiety which he has to impress this view on his readers, is partly indicated by the completeness of his effort. He gives as parts of the "scholastic synthesis," the Classification of the Sciences, (a matter of large importance to all mediaeval thinkers), Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Physics and Psychology, Moral Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Logic, Aesthetics, Doctrinal Characteristics, and lastly, the Relation between Civilization and Philosophy,—in all, fifty pages. It is really of great value, even if written with purpose. One is tempted to summarize the summary, but it would probably be so brief as to be misleading, if kept in the limits of a review. But we note the theory of actuality and potency, carried far beyond the use made of it by Aristotle,—the theory of "prime matters," a point of central importance, but an abstraction which should rouse the fiercest scorn of John Dewey—the principle of individuation [DeWulf holds that true scholasticism teaches that only the individual exists]—the rhythmic evolution of forms in Nature, and the unalienable specific character of every natural body,—the doctrine of the active intellect, in psychology,—and the almost universal effort to frame a philosophy which should be universal in its scope, that is, which should include all known sciences.

The next aim, apparently, of the history is to emphasize freedom of thought, evidently with the hope of correcting the wide-spread conviction that it was hardly safe in the Middle Ages for any one to teach anything contrary to the dogmas of the Church. DeWulf, of course, can not avoid frequent mention of writers whose doctrines

fell under papal displeasure, but the general tone of the history is to minimize this as far as possible. As part of this, (though, here, again, he is true to the actual facts) he emphasizes the continued existence of a thought which he calls "anti-scholasticism." Much of this had its origin in the Neo-Platonism of Boethius,—a large body drew their inspiration from Averrhoes, and later on, from the rise of the Humanities and the new science of the fifteenth century. Scotus Erigena, contrary to the usual lists, is ruled from the scholastics, and placed among the anti-scholastics; and the study of the chief opponents of Thomas,—notably Duns Scotus and William of Occam,—while neither is classified as anti-scholastic, shows clearly that their keen criticisms of Thomism contributed powerfully to weaken its influence, and to hasten the decline and practical downfall of Scholasticism in the sixteenth century. "William of Occam was the real founder of Terminism (DeWulf's name for Nominalism). It was he who opened up the *via moderna*, and the extraordinary success of the new Philosophy was really due to him." The study of Averrhoism is peculiarly interesting,—its doctrine of the double truth,—that a doctrine could be wholly false for philosophy and reason, and yet true for faith—enabling its adherents to deny totally the central dogmas of the Church in their philosophy, yet to retain their ecclesiastical orthodoxy by believing them as matters of faith. Dr. DeWulf, it may be remarked, has doubts, at times, of their sincerity.

Going back in time,—Dr. DeWulf beginning his work with the eighth or ninth century, finds it necessary to study the fore-runners of Scholasticism,—a very fruitful and valuable portion of the work. Here, large space is given to Augustine, nearly always with approval of his doctrines. And one cannot help but notice his gigantic ability as compared with all who followed, although Professor DeWulf seems hardly to be attempting to draw attention to this.

Lastly, and most interesting to the reviewer, are the chapters of the second volume, in which Professor DeWulf mournfully describes the decline of Scholasticism before the attacks of the Humanists, the Reformers, the new men of Science, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The definite aim of the work being to defend the thesis that Scholasticism is a true philosophy,—that, if true, it should be and is able to hold its own against present-day Evolution and Modernism in all its forms, and if widely studied and adopted would furnish the corrective for the wide-spread irreligion of today,—one is curious to find how he explains its fall before opponents of apparently far less dangerous power. Professor DeWulf holds that its defeat was not due to any inherent weakness in the metaphysical systems of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. They were, and still are, sound, still able to interpret modern science and psychology, and furnish a secure metaphysics for our own times, if not for all future ages. Aristotelianism declined because "The abuse of dialectical discussion increased. The vital doctrines of scholasticism were neglected or corrupted." (This was by the scholastics themselves.) "The scholastics defended themselves badly or else not at



all against the philosophers of the Renaissance and in such matters not to defend was to acknowledge defeat." "Equally damaging to Scholasticism was the ignorance of those who undertook to serve it. William of Occam and his first followers and opponents knew the philosophic systems of the past, but the subsequent generations were increasingly ignorant of them. Among the numerous promoters of novelties we find young men who had not had time to study." (How accurately this fits the present day situation!) "The scholastics kept themselves apart from the sciences and the revolutionary discoveries which led to the ruin of mediaeval conceptions." "All these faults are imputable to the Aristotelians and not to Aristotelianism." Speaking of the short-lived but brilliant revival of Scholasticism in Spain, he says, "What a pity the Spanish thinkers confined their researches to natural law! They would have been a match for the anti-scholastics of their time. Their failure to adapt themselves to the new mental attitude arrested the influence of the Spanish movement." "In presence of the attacks against them, the Aristotelians made a poor show: they did not know how to vindicate the value of their essential doctrines: they persisted in their faults of form and thus exposed their philosophy to the ridicule of their opponents by reason of its outward expression." Particularly, in face of the new science of Newton, Descartes, Galileo, Copernicus, and others, the scholastics were guilty of a capital error. "These astronomical, chemical and physical doctrines (of Aristotle, he means) were linked up by age long connections with the principles of general metaphysics. Was not the fate of the latter bound up with that of the former and did not the collapse of the older science involve that of philosophy? No, for in the midst of the ruin of mediaeval science there remained sufficient observations to serve as a basis for the essential doctrines of philosophy. The value of the great scholastic doctrines does not depend on the postulate of the perfection of the heavenly bodies, nor on the theory of natural place, or the conjunction of contrary qualities." (These are essential Aristotelian theories in what we would call Mechanical Physics. If the earth were really the center of the universe, it is probable that these mechanico-physical doctrines would still be held. It was the discovery that the earth was *not* the center, which at once made necessary the discarding of all these theories.) DeWulf continues, "The duty of the scholastics was to sacrifice their superannuated science and defend their psychology and metaphysics. The princes of thirteenth century scholasticism would have certainly done so if they had lived at the time of this turning point in the history of the sciences. Well known texts of St. Thomas show that he did not regard all scientific ideas as theses but rather as hypotheses." "Instead the Peripatetics of the seventeenth century defended *en bloc* the science and philosophy of the Middle Ages as a monument from which not one stone could be detached without ruining the whole edifice. Many turned away, for fear they should witness the collapse of their superannuated astronomy, and it is narrated of Melancthon and Cremonini that they refused to look at the sky through a telescope." A number of absurd and futile efforts to arrest the progress of



science are described, and DeWulf continues, "In presence of so strange an attitude, the scientists found an easy task; they made the philosophy of the scholastics responsible for the vagaries of their science and threw scorn on both." And the whole sad story is summed up thus: "Scholasticism was vanquished for want of men, not for want of ideas." But the last pages are a hopeful glance at the future. "Scholasticism is an adaptation of Greek thought to the needs of the Western mind. If it is true that we are still Greeks in our way of philosophizing, Scholasticism will remain as long as the civilization formed in the West by neo-Latins, Germans and Anglo-Celts."

On the whole Dr. DeWulf's *History* is one of very great value. There was a great work done in those Ages, which had solid, enduring worth, which should not be lost to the world through prejudice against the Church whose corruptions undermined its influence, nor through scorn of the later feebleness of the degenerated form of the scholastic system. Yet one can not but be profoundly impressed, as he reads page after page of elaborated systems, with the lack of progress, the repetition of often barren discussions, the endless time spent on distinctions of no real importance. Two explanations seem to offer themselves. One, that the major part of their effort was the interpretation of Aristotle, as if his works represented the end of search for Truth. The other, that vital contact with the Spirit of God, as found in His Word, had far too often been lost, and that instead of Philosophy being an effort to understand the mind of Christ, it was an effort to frame a logical system.

Professor DeWulf's style is admirable. Not often is so dry a theme as Scholastic Philosophy as readable as it is in these important volumes.

*Fulton, Mo.*

D. S. GAGE.

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## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Le Culte.* Etude d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse. Par ROBERT WILL, Docteur en Theologie, Maitre de Conferences a la Faculte de Theologie protestante de l'Universite de Strasbourg. Librairie Istra, Strasbourg. Tome premier. Pp. xiii, 459. 60 Fr.

"Cult" is the accepted term for all outward expressions of religion. It includes not only the coarser manifestations, such as dancing, sacrifices, magical ceremonies, etc., but prayer, meditation, mystical contemplation, visions. In this volume, Dr. Will has classified the various forms of cult practices, and studied their effect on religion itself. In a letter to the reviewer, Dr. Will indicates his hope of completing his work by a second volume, which will study the phenomenology of cult, including here, not merely a study of cult phenomena, but the use of the Husserlian phenomenology,—a study by pure intuition of the essence of cult, itself: and in a third volume he will study the sociological problems of cult. It is to be hoped that this ambitious and difficult task will be completed. Few men are more capable of accomplishing it than Dr. Will.

Obviously, one's opinion as to the effect of cultual practices on the religious life, which is the subject of this volume, will depend wholly on his belief as to the nature of religion. Dr. Will accepts the view of M. Wobbermin (in his recent book, *Das Wesen der Religion*): "It will suffice to note the opinion of M. Wobbermin, to which we assent. It is a synthesis of the views of Schleiermacher and Wm. James. It reaches the conclusion that the sense of *dependence* of man in relation to a superior world, which he believes in and foresees by faith, is the fundamental conception of religion, but it differentiates itself into the feelings of security and desire." At the other end, the *aim* of cult practices is held to be the attainment of divine communion. "Religion is the *feeling* which attaches the soul to the principle of life; cult being the vital *act* which places the individual soul first, the collective soul later, in contact with the transcendent reality which appears to them not only as a supraterritorial and supreme power, but also as an infinitely desirable good. In giving satisfaction to their need of life, the cult will permit souls to attain their religious aim. In a word: "*Communion with God, supreme end of religion, is also the true raison d'être of the cult.*" These are weighty words, requiring careful thought on the part of every pastor.

It is no part of Dr. Will's purpose to present an array of cult practices. These have been gathered up by a host of books on Anthropology, Comparative Religion, Sociology, etc. Instead, he presents a profoundly thoughtful classification of cult activities, which surprises by both its simplicity and its comprehensiveness. When the reader recalls the endless list of savage rites, the host of forms in Hindu, Chinese, Greek, Roman, and other religions, including the varying practices of Christian communions, he is at first startled to find all collected under "sacrifice, mystery and prayer." Yet conviction grows that these three forms really do comprehend the totality of all outward acts by which the soul tries to express its religious life and attain its religious aim,—communion with God. This being our author's aim, his classification is not based on the outward material of cult practice. He has not tried to classify the endless ceremonies of Australian Blacks, of Zuni and Hopi Indians, of Cheyennes and Blackfeet, of Baluba and Zulu, or of Buddhist and Christian, as to their forms. Rather has he shown that under this infinite variety, these seeking souls were following but three ways of attaining their goal and gaining what they wished from the gods or God. Only a study far too long for a "review" could even summarize the learned, interesting, and profoundly practical course of Dr. Will's investigations. But there are three important features deserving notice, in his study of all three.

The above simple classification turns out not to be so simple after all, for each of these great forms of cult is elaborately and keenly analysed. Again, this analysis is not based on outward forms, but on the inner spiritual effect of these varying forms on the goal of all cult,—divine communion. Here, his comments are suggestive, profound and well worth careful study.

While the book reveals vast knowledge of cult practices of all forms

of religions, Dr. Will's interest is in Christianity, and specially in Protestantism. By far the greater part of the work is given to a study of the effect of Catholic and Protestant rituals on the spiritual life of their adherents. On this point, Dr. Will gives considerable space to the forms of Protestant worship,—to the question whether its services are not lacking in aids to the growth of the spiritual life, whether the sermon has not usurped too large a place, whether its service is not too intellectual, failing to give enough place to worship and adoration. He strongly supports these criticisms, argues for a worship which shall more effectively lead the soul to communion with God; yet his views as to the nature of divine communion are loftily spiritual and the cult forms which he thinks would more powerfully lift the soul to communion than the present general Protestant service are the furthest possible removed from all material forms, from incense, genuflections, robes, masses, bead telling, rote prayers, and all that farrago of Catholic rites which he cordially hates. His suggested service is of music, prayer, Scripture, silence, confession of sins (not to a priest, but to God), spontaneous efforts of the soul to communion with God, sacred song, etc. His quite elaborate form of service almost eliminates the ordinary sermon. He recognizes the value of certain sermons meant for practical purposes, such as those on missions, those discussing some purely doctrinal theme, etc. But these he regards as entirely outside "cult" forms,—cult being for him a means of bringing the soul into divine communion. To the question, "In what measure shall preaching as such enter into the category of cultuelle prayer?" he replies "In the measure that it transmits to the congregation the sense of the divine presence and communicates to the faithful the desire to surrender to it." This can be accomplished, he holds, only by preaching which has a considerable measure of "prophetic prayer" in its spirit. But he adds "The majority of preachers are not prophets." He quotes with approval Laboulaye's rather contemptuous description of "the gentleman dressed in black who says good moral things" and Wm. James' assertion that he could never endure a sermon. (Though why any one need worry over an expression of this sort from a man of the type of Wm. James is a mystery to the reviewer.) That all this is quite unjust to the power of the sermon, that it fails to give any due appreciation to the immense moral strength infused everywhere into Protestantism by the sermon in its best forms, or even in its present greatly weakened forms, seems clear. A further reason for Dr. Will's position, however, will appear later.

The third notable feature of Dr. Will's study is his treatment of magic in cult. Here, a digression is perhaps advisable to make his attitude clear. The vast majority of those who have collected data on the cults of lower races have mingled their magic and religion indiscriminately,—indeed, in many cases apparently without the shadow of a suspicion that there was any real difference between the two. And the great majority of writers on the development of religion, its origins, etc., have also jumbled the two species of phenomena in hopeless confusion. Further, the very great majority of writers on savage religions have really no knowledge

whatever of what the savage really believes and this, because of several almost irremovable obstacles. First, the gulf between the mental operations of the savage and those of modern civilized man is so deep and broad that very few white men have either the time or the facility needed for "thinking black," in the pregnant phrase of Dan Crawford, or to find how to get "at the back of the black man's mind," in the equally suggestive title of Dennett. And what is true of the black is equally true of all savage peoples. Next, the savage is afraid of the superior powers, the stronger "medicine," of the white man and fears to reveal his inner beliefs to him. And, lastly, nearly all savage magic and religion is inextricably tied up with *tabus* and dangerous magical secret rites, and the savage admits no outsider to these fearsome realms for fear of the vengeance of the spirits and gods whom he is in deadly and constant need of placating. Consequently, the white men who have really succeeded in penetrating into these forms of thought are so few that they may almost be numbered on one's finger-tips. It requires years of intimacy with the savage, the winning of his confidence, and the very rare ability to put oneself in the place of one whose modes of thought are so utterly different, to enable one to understand even dimly what the savage *really* believes.

Further, the majority of writers, on the origin and evolution of religions have assumed that most higher forms of religion have evolved from earlier magical beliefs and practices. Some French thinkers, however, are definitely challenging this whole position. The reviewer is not, of course, acquainted with any large portion of this vast literature, but the first writer to assert the contrary with whom he is acquainted is Le Roy, whose extraordinary book, *La Religion des Primitifs* appeared about eighteen years ago. Mgr. Le Roy was a Catholic missionary to the tribes of Central Africa. His work shows every indication of a real insight into the beliefs of not only the more advanced tribes of that region but of the lowest, the pygmies. Le Roy asserts that all these races clearly distinguish between their magic and their religion, that it is a vital error to confuse them, or endeavor to explain the development of religion by evolution from magic. More recently, Levy-Bruhl in his epoch-making work, *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*, has given the clue so long and vainly sought to the mental operation of these races which make magic (medicine) with all its (to us) absurd, monstrous, illogical, impossible beliefs seem so wholly reasonable and readily acceptable to them. It is not too much to say, that no one can possibly understand lower mentalities or correctly apprehend the problems of their religious beliefs who has not gained the viewpoint of this remarkable study. Dr. Will is thoroughly acquainted with it and accepts its position, apparently, without question,—his own wide acquaintance with the literature of the subject having no doubt prepared him for agreement. Further basis for the distinction between the two is given by quotations from many other sources, Dr. Will showing immense information on the whole vast field. And Dr. Will asserts with utmost emphasis that magic and religion are two absolutely different attitudes



toward the unseen world of spiritual powers. He speaks of "the primordial heterogeneity of magic and religion." He declares that "not a single interior tie binds magical rites and religious cult." He calls emphatic attention to the fact, to the study of which a large portion of this book is devoted, that "magic often impregnates religion, but religion is never developed from magic."

"Dr. Will's entire study of cult in its three forms, sacrifice, mystery, prayer, keenly analyses out those practices whose nature is really, though not always consciously, magical. Under this general head, he includes, as do other writers, all beliefs that by the performance of this or that ceremony, by the repetition of this or that magical formula, by the use of this or that hidden name, by the weaving of this or that "spell," etc., one can gain some mysterious power over the spirits of men or animals, or over the gods or forces of nature, and thereby secure one's ends. As, for example, the ownership by Aladdin of his wonderful lamp, which he had but to rub and repeat a name, and the genii had to come and obey his orders; and other examples without number. That these beliefs linger far on up into many Christian practices has been well known. Dr. Will exposes them in the practices of the Catholic Church with unsparing hand. The doctrine of the "opus operatum" he declares to be the culmination of their absurdity (*"l'observance absurde, l'opus operatum."*). Dr. Will's keen analysis of hidden errors in the minds of many Christians would be of untold value to many a pastor, anxiously desirous of truly bringing his people closer to God in a genuinely spiritual union without trace of reliance on "works" or forms of words,—but in pure reliance on faith. "Sacrifice" specially is full of magical practices, often in the special form of "theurgy,"—and notably including the Roman idea, *Do ut des*, a bargaining with God. The only truly spiritual sacrifice, according to Dr. Will, is that of a surrender of one's life to God in faithful reliance on His promises.

"Mystery" includes, in Dr. Will's classification, all beliefs in some form of "mystic union" with God. Lower religions held this in many forms, often thinking that by some mystic ceremony, generally some mysterious "initiation," the initiate became united with the deity. At times, it was by eating the flesh of the god. At times, by some blood bath, as in Mithraism, or other magical participation in the life of the god. And so in phases without number. In Christianity, there are two "mysteries," Baptism and the Holy Communion. Here, magic has long lingered to greater or less degree. All beliefs in baptismal regeneration, in holy water, in transsubstantiation, the idea of a union with Christ by virtue of eating the mere bread, etc., are magical in Dr. Will's opinion. Only that union which comes by pure faith, and uses these ceremonies as mere forms to quicken faith, are of any spiritual value. He holds that Luther did not free himself here entirely from the magical notion, that Calvin, perhaps, did.

"Prayer" is used in an unusually wide sense, perhaps too wide. Dr. Will includes under it not merely prayer in the ordinary meaning, but song, silent meditation, preaching of the "prophetic type," which as in-



dedicated above, is the only truly "cult" preaching he recognizes. Here, magical practices and beliefs linger in "much speaking," in ideas that certain forms of prayer have special power, in the recitation of special formulas and other manifestations without number.

Time fails, however, to attempt to enumerate Dr. Will's elaborate analyses of all these cult forms and his study of their effect on divine communion. We will add, that in his view all cult practices have for their aim two great spiritual effects, whose common aim in turn, is so to elevate the soul that its final religious goal, divine communion, may be the more completely attained,—and these great aims of all cult are adoration and edification.

In his study of adoration, Dr. Will feels that the ordinary Protestant service is specially lacking in spiritual power. This is largely explained when in his study of this topic,—a study, characterized by the same elaborate, profound and keen analysis to which we have already alluded, of all the phases and forms of adoration, as found in the spiritual writings of the Church in all ages,—Dr. Will reveals himself as a mystic of an advanced type. He quotes with entire acceptance the assertions of the well known mystics of the Church, as to their visions of God, their high flights into the upper realms of spiritual existence, and the creating of that degree of mysticism which he calls "le ravissement," the spiritual ravishing of the soul. He concludes this portion of his study with the following remarkable words: "This is not an intellectual function, but a supernatural mode of knowing, a state of exaltation, where the consciousness realises itself by mysterious means, by the reception of waves flowing from the divine mystery. It is *ὁρᾶν νῶ καὶ καρδίᾳ* (seeing by mind and heart), it is a *νόησις*, (noetic act) that is, a perception of the transcendent world, all discursive operations being suspended. The soul dwells in an intense waiting for successive degrees of silence. The notion of time disappears from consciousness. The body which is only *ὑφασμα τῆς ἀγνωσίας* (a web of ignorance) is abandoned by the soul which is transported into depths into which no reasoning reason (or, reason by reasoning) is able to penetrate. It is then that the contemplative have the intuition of metaphysical secrets: "they see God loving Himself. They have the vision of the secret of the Trinity. They grasp the realities of existence, the depths of their own individual souls. They discover the spiritual sense of Scripture. They see the particular organically bound to the universality of beings, and of the supreme being, as the Spirit, for example, enabled St. Paul to know the profundities of God (1 Cor. ii. 14)."

It is doubtless quite true that the ordinary Protestant service does not aim to lift the soul to these ecstatic experiences. But as, for Dr. Will, this mystic adoration is an end which should be sought for by all, according to their several capacities, it is hardly to be wondered that he says "The Churches of the Reformation have neglected an essential attitude of the cultuelle life."

The second great aim of all cult, that is, of all outward worship, is edification. This means to Dr. Will that spiritual strengthening of the soul which comes in response to the revelation of Himself given to us

by God, especially in our acts of adoration. It is the only true impulse toward, and the only power for realizing a truly moral life.

That in all this there is much that is profoundly true needs no demonstration. And we may close by saying that while we do not follow Dr. Will in his acceptance of Schleiermacher's definition of the "essence of religion," while we note with regret that he is probably quite "liberal" in his theology, (we say probably because definite statements on fundamental points are not made) and cannot follow him in his mysticism, yet we believe that no one interested in building up the truly spiritual faith life of his congregation can fail to be greatly helped by this study of *Forms of Worship*. The vast learning of the author, his keen criticism of all remnants of magic, of reliance on "works," of all forms of sacramentarianism, his complete reliance on faith as the only true organ for spiritual growth and communion with God, his keen comments on many often unthought of elements in faith and worship, his thorough analysis and study of all forms of cult, or, worship, the fact that all are studied not merely in their forms, but especially with a view to their effect on the inner spiritual life,—all contribute to make this a most suggestive volume and one of unusual value even if like the reviewer one cannot agree with all positions held by the author. And we would fail to do justice to the ability and worth of the work, if we did not again call attention to the thorough analysis and keen study of all phases, degrees and elements of the religious life. To all this, a brief review can merely call a reader's notice. And one of the most valuable elements is his clear exposure of the fact that much of Catholic cult is essentially a perpetuation and development of magic. And another hardly less worth while conclusion is his able demonstration of the fallacy of all evolutionary theories endeavoring to explain religion as an outgrowth of savage magic. To have shown this so clearly, with such wealth of illustration, is a work of inestimable importance to the Church.

*Fulton, Mo.*

D. S. GAGE.

*Evolution and Creation.* By SIR OLIVER LODGE, F.R.S. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926. Pp. 160. Price \$1.50.

As a believer in God-revealed Christianity, there are two points of view from which one can view this exceedingly interesting and intellectually stimulating book. We might look at it from the point of view of its approximation to Evangelical Christianity, or from the point of view of its divergence from the anti-Christian infidelity of the present day.

From the first point of view, the book is not only woefully inadequate, but to our mind, erroneous in many of its positions. Were Sir Oliver Lodge writing from the point of view of an outside critic of Christianity, one would be forced to condemn many features of the book in no uncertain terms. For example, he apparently regards the Bible as a record of the religious aspirations of man, rather than as the record of the revelation of God's will for man and the history of God's dealings with his people (p. 38). His idea of the inspiration of the Bible is that it is of the same kind as that in all great literature, and that this inspiration

depends upon its "underlying essence, which gives these documents their supreme value" (p. 30). He apparently has no conception whatever of the orthodox view that the Bible is inspired not because of its supreme value (which, of course, we recognize), but because the Holy Spirit kept the original documents **free from errors**, and rendered their contents the very truth which God wanted his people to have. Then Sir Oliver's view of sin (pp. 137ff.), atonement (p. 142), and other Christian doctrines is unquestionably erroneous, to say nothing of his spiritistic beliefs which creep into the book in several places, and of his naïve acceptance of the truth of organic evolution, around which the book is written.

But merely to point out these errors and defects would give a wrong impression of this book, for it is to be remembered that Sir Oliver Lodge is neither a theologian nor a biologist, but a renowned physicist, and that he writes this book not as an enemy of God and Christ and the Bible, but as a lay believer in all three. He is not seeking to propagate the errors of his theology because he is opposed to the orthodox views on those points, but on the contrary is honestly seeking to show that, from a scientific standpoint, the theistic and Christian view of the universe is the only rational one. The errors in his book come from a lack of comprehension of, and lack of training in evangelical Christianity rather than from a knowledge of, and antagonism to them. We can, therefore, forgive and overlook much that we could never excuse in the writing of a trained antagonist of Christianity.

Sir Oliver's statements in regard to organic evolution are of course neither original nor convincing. He does not pretend to be speaking from first-hand knowledge in either biology or geology, and only repeats the familiar arguments in favor of evolution. As these arguments have been refuted again and again, they need not be treated here.

Two things, however, render the book well worth while. In the first place, this testimony in behalf of theism, coming from a man who is at the very top of the scientific world in the realm of physics, offers one of the strongest and most convincing proofs that it is not necessary to cast overboard the Christian's God if one is to be up-to-date in the scientific realm. This of itself should silence those shallow opponents of Christianity who loudly boast that God is out of date among modern scientists. The book abounds with really epic passages like the following: "What evidence is there that there is mind acting at all, that there is any planning, any conceiving, any purpose: how do we know that everything is not automatic, haphazard, mechanical? I shall not argue against this; the only philosophers who can think in this wise are the philosophers of Laputa, who sought to make books by throwing together letters at random. It is quite evident that there is nothing random in the Universe" (p. 42).

It is to be noted in the second place that this book serves to show that if the evolutionary hypothesis in some form were proved to be true, it would not therefore be necessary to abandon belief in a personal God. It might be possible, even from an evolutionary point of view, to reconcile the findings of physics, chemistry and astronomy, with

the teachings of the Bible. It is, however, quite evident we believe that almost no evolutionists today believe in the kind of evolution that can be reconciled with orthodox Christianity. Even in his endeavor to show the harmony between evolution and the Bible, Sir Oliver Lodge unconsciously makes this plain, for the kind of Christianity which Sir Oliver is seeking to reconcile with evolution, leaves out the very things which to orthodox believers in the Bible, are the very essentials of Christianity. I believe such a reconciliation *could* be made, were it demanded by the facts of science, but the kind of evolution widely held today, which denies the original sinless innocence of man and believes that sin is only the shadow of the good that will be sluffed off with the evolution of the race, is absolutely incompatible with Evangelical Christianity.

Aside from the two points mentioned above, the book is well worth while because of its lucid treatment of the latest theories of astronomical physics with relation to the origin of the cosmos. Sir Oliver Lodge is an unquestioned authority in such realms, and his treatment of the subject is instructive and intensely interesting.

As a thought provoking and intellectually stimulating book, this book is to be heartily recommended, but as a reconciliation between evolution and Evangelical Christianity it would be an utter failure.

*Pyeongyang, Korea.*

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

*Evolution in the Balances.* By FRANK E. ALLEN, Minister of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, Winnipeg, Canada. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1926. Pp. 191. Price \$1.50.

The material in this volume for the most part appeared simultaneously in *The Presbyterian and Herald and Presbyter*, and in *The Christian Nation*, as a series of articles on the timely subject of Evolution. These articles have been enlarged somewhat and revised, so that as it now appears in book form, it makes a very interesting and readable volume.

While the author has done no first hand research work in the subject, he is thoroughly familiar with the literature on Evolution, and has presented the arguments against it in a clear and forceful manner. This book should be of great service in enlightening those who think that the subject is a closed issue and that evolution is a proven fact. Those who are familiar with the works of O'Toole, Price, Morton, *et al*, in this field, will find little that is new in this volume, but it is all gathered up in such a convincing manner, that it well repays detailed examination.

In criticism of the book there are only a few points to be noted. In the first place there is a tendency to make claims slightly beyond what the evidence warrants. For example, in speaking about the argument for the existence of God from design, among arguments which are perfectly sound we find the following: "The shoulder and muscles of the horse, the endurance of the camel, the docility of the sheep, the production of the hen, the abundant milk supply of the cow, all indicate the preparation which a wonderful Designer made for man, the chief object of His creation" (p. 30). Most of these things are the result of selective breeding and training by man himself, so that while we can speak of the *capacity*



for such training as indicating design on the part of their Creator, it is hardly a valid argument to point to that which has been developed by man himself as proof that the developed quality was designed by God for the use of man. In a number of other instances throughout the book, the author is led by his enthusiasm to make greater claims for his arguments than the facts warrant, though on the whole the reasoning is remarkably cogent.

In the second place the author has not always given proper credit to the source from which some of his arguments are taken. While it is true that most of the arguments against evolution have become "current coin," among writers, in the case of those arguments which have been developed exclusively by certain writers, credit should invariably be given to the proper source.

A few inaccuracies are to be noted. On page 67, in speaking of the fact that the breathing organs of the insects and the arachnids were formerly thought to have been homologous, and so classed together under the general name, tracheata, apparently a number of words have been dropped from proof, for the statement is made that these organs "were supposed to have had a separate origin, and to have descended from different ancestors." Obviously what is meant is just the opposite.

A more serious error occurs in the chapter on "Similarity of Blood." The author has confused blood transfusion with the precipitin blood tests made by Prof. Nuttall of Cambridge. "When the results of blood transfusion are tabulated, however, nothing definite is proved, and classes of animals which were formerly thought to be closely related are indicated by these tests to be distantly related, and others which were thought to be very distantly related seem to bear a closer relationship. Professor Nuttall, of Cambridge, has made extensive experiments along this line" (p. 70). Of course evolutionists make no argument in regard to blood transfusion. Their whole argument concerns the precipitin blood tests made by Nuttall. In these tests no blood is transfused at all. The blood *serum*, of man, for example, is injected intravenously into a rabbit, and after several injections over a period of days, the rabbit is killed and the blood serum of the rabbit used in the precipitin tests. From that point on during all the tests, there is nothing that resembles blood transfusion. Apparently the source of our author's error on this point is a pamphlet by Dr. Arthur I. Brown, *Evolution and the Blood-Precipitin Test*, if he has quoted correctly, for in quoting from this pamphlet, we find the following erroneous statement. "When this 'serum' is injected into rabbits, horses, apes, monkeys, man, etc. . . ." (p. 78). The impression given in this and the following paragraphs is that human blood serum is directly injected into all these animals in order to determine the degree of relationship, or that rabbit serum or the serum of other animals is injected into man for the same purpose. This of course is not the case as was stated above.

The geological evidence against evolution is summed up in a remarkably clear and convincing manner, and though the brevity of the arguments has tended to eliminate much of the necessary proof, nevertheless



the bald statement of the arguments themselves makes a very impressive appeal against evolution. As Professor Keyser has already said in regard to this book, one would like to see the evolutionists take up the arguments one by one and try to answer them.

*Pyongyang, Korea.*

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

*The Evolution of Man Scientifically Disproved.* By REV. WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS, D.D., ex-President of Franklin College, O. Published by Rev. William A. Williams, 1202 Atlantic Ave., Camden, N.J. Price \$1.00. 125 pages.

The author of this little book attempts the refutation of the evolution theory, particularly the Darwinian theory, in fifty arguments, most of which deal with mathematical proof. He takes the position that a theory such as this can be proved or disproved by the acid test of mathematics, and proceeds to apply this test to the evolution theory. As an example of his method let us take the following: "If the Jews doubled their numbers every 161.251 years since Jacob's marriage (3850 years ago), how many Jews would there have been in 1922? Ans. 15,393,815, just the number reported" (p. 118). The author shows that if the first human pair lived 100,000 years ago, and the rate of increase be taken as only one-tenth of that of the Jewish rate of increase, the race doubling itself only once in 1612.51 years, the population of the globe today would be 4,660,210,253,138,204,000, which is over two million and a half times as many as are living now. This shows the improbability of the great lengths of time claimed by the evolutionists for the history of the human race. Similar arguments are made in regard to life in general and various phases of evolution.

In reading the book one is impressed by the tremendous amount of labor it must have taken to work out the various mathematical formulae and arguments, and we hesitate to criticise a book with whose purpose we are in such hearty sympathy and accord. Certainly we agree with our author that the God-less type of evolution taught in many schools and colleges and universities, is the cause of much of the atheism and infidelity of the present day. The arguments in the latter part of this little book are for the most part particularly good, especially when the author deals with the relation of evolution and theology.

Nevertheless, in spite of the many good points of the book, we feel forced to call attention to some of its weaknesses and errors of reasoning. If the theory of evolution is to be overthrown, it must be done by sound arguments and scientifically valid evidence. We regretfully believe that many of the author's arguments are not valid. While the author shows his acquaintance with the older books on evolution, and with much of the popular literature on the subject today, there is nothing to indicate that he is familiar with modern genetics, cytology or embryology. As a result, many of his arguments are out-of-date, since evolutionists no longer believe the points he attempts to refute. In other instances his arguments are rendered invalid because of his superficial grasp of the problems involved. The author has not grasped the real heart of the

Mendelian Law (p. 19), or comprehended the strong evidence against evolution which it offers. The real difficulty which evolutionists have with Mendel's Law, is that this law demands that characteristics must be present in the ancestry in order to appear in the descendants. Hence all the factors capable of producing man must have been present in the ancestry of man in order for man to appear. The evolutionist faces the problem of explaining the origin of the original unit characters, and Mendel's Law shows that they could not originate *de novo* anywhere along the line of man's development from lower animals! It is this fact that renders Mendelism the nightmare of the evolutionist, but our author does not get at the heart of the problem at all.

The difficulty with the mathematical arguments which our author uses so copiously, is that they do not consider all the factors involved, and thus the evolutionist can charge them with the fallacy of *non sequitur*. Take, for example, the one quoted at the beginning of this review. It would certainly offer striking confirmation of the Biblical account of the origin of man were it not for the unrecognized factors which enter into the problem. As far as we can see there is no reason why the total numbers of the race might not have remained stationary for long periods of time, due to the ravages of war, disease, and catastrophes of nature. For example, the death rate in Korea has been so high that the population has not materially increased for centuries until the last few decades with the introduction of modern medicine. Might not the whole race have remained in a like condition over long periods of time? The same would be true of the other kinds of life and their rate of increase. No valid argument of a mathematical kind can be made as to the time of the origin of man, for there are too many variable and unknown factors in the problem.

There is much in many of the author's arguments that may well give the evolutionist cause for serious consideration. His argument against the hypothesis of a self-running nature is especially good (p. 36). In fact there is so much about the little book that is admirable that we feel it should do much good in spite of the faults to which we have called attention.

*Pyongyang, Korea.*

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

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## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Jesus a Myth.* By GEORGE BRANDES. Translated from the Danish by Edwin Björkman. New York: A. & C. Boni, 1926. Pp. 190.

Dr. Georg Brandes, whose death at the advanced age of eighty-five took place but a few months ago, was by nationality a Dane, but by parentage a Jew. He was generally reputed an atheist. He certainly had lost faith in any supernatural revelation of God. Jew though he was, he professed serious doubts as to whether such a man as Moses ever existed. He however had quite a reputation as a literary critic both in this country, and on the continent of Europe, and that gives a specious weight to his

pronouncement regarding Jesus. His volume on Jesus is important only because it is the most recent representative voice that has been heard from within a particular school whose sentiments have of late, in certain quarters, been a good deal canvassed.

This heresy, and, indeed, worse than heresy, according to which Jesus is regarded as a myth, is a form of error that was unknown to the Early Church. It is a thing of comparatively recent growth. For the last one hundred and fifty years, pantheistically minded scholars, mainly Germans, have been in search of a purely human Jesus, a Jesus that should remain within the limits of humanity. It is only within the last few decades that it has been dawning upon those men that it is simply impossible to discover such a Jesus as they have been in search of within the New Testament; not certainly in Mark, no, not even if they postulate a more primitive form of Mark than that we now possess. As the outcome of many searching investigations, the conviction has been growing that as Phidias wrought his own image so deeply into the shield of Minerva that it was impossible to obliterate that image without reducing the shield to powder, even so men cannot eliminate the supernatural element from the New Testament portraiture of Jesus without dealing in like fashion with the New Testament itself. The really remarkable thing about the New Testament portraiture of Jesus is that it presents us with a perfect man who yet never appears as a mere man, never appears without the supernatural halo.

It was out of the situation that had thus emerged that the extreme form of unbelief, with which we are now dealing, issued. Certain men have preferred the irrational to the supernatural. The names with which this extreme form of unbelief was principally associated two or three decades ago—for I pass over Bruno Bauer as abnormal—were those of J. M. Robertson, a Scotchman; Andrew Drews, a German; W. B. Smith, an American. All these men have held that Jesus never existed as a man. Their proposition is, of course, an absurd one. Islam without Mahomet or Lutheranism without Luther would not be more inexplicable than Christianity without Jesus. Much of course is made of the meagreness of the testimony of non-Christian writers, in the early Christian ages, to the existence of Jesus as a man. But that circumstance is easily explicable. Christianity may be said to be comparable now to a great tree; but its figure, in the first century, and even the early parts of the second, was the grain of mustard seed. The non-Christian writers did not then realize its significance, and naturally they paid it little respect. That is the reason for the meagreness of the references to Jesus, on the part of the non-Christian writers of the first one hundred and fifty years of our era. At the same time, one may unhesitatingly say, and now, with one's eyes on the recent examination to which the subject was recently submitted by Dr. Maurice Goguel and Dr. Joseph Klausner, say with less hesitation than ever, that Josephus and the Talmud, Pliny, Tacitus, and Suetonius, even if their references are meagre, bear solid testimony to the historicity of Jesus. Add to that the testimony of Paul, who, whether, as is most likely, he saw Jesus in the days of His flesh, or not, was, in a matter in which he

could not be mistaken—for did he not associate with Peter and with John and with James the Lord's brother?—as convinced of the historicity of Jesus as he was of his own existence, yea, in a word, add the testimony of all the New Testament writers to the historicity of Jesus, and you must admit that for one to imagine that Jesus never existed, as a man, is to give oneself up to the belief of the absurd.

The untenableness of the choice, in a dilemma made by J. M. Robertson and others, was shown so convincingly by theological writers of various schools, that, for years, little was written in that particular interest, and one had begun to hope that this extreme form of unbelief had received its *quietus* for all time, when, to our surprise, the last twelve-month witnessed the recrudescence of this council of despair.

The principal names associated with this recrudescence had been those of M. R. Stahl and of M. P. L. Couchoud, against whom M. M. Goguel, although himself holding the *principium* of the Reformed Faith very loosely, has written very successfully. To these names has now to be added that of Georg Brandes.

It is difficult, in a sentence or two, to give an outline of Brandes' argument, for the reason that his brochure is anything but a logically concatenated unit. It consists of a series of paragraphs, the relative positions of which might be justified on the principle of the association of ideas, loosely applied. His theme, of course, is that the Jesus of our Gospels never existed. His account of the rise of the figure of Jesus in actual literature is: that, for some reason, the Jews of that period were expectant of a Messiah: that that expectation materialized as a deposit in the form, first of the heavenly Jesus of whom we read in the Apocalypse, and, later on, in the form of a carpenter and a carpenter's son, as the figure meets us in Mark: then the epileptic Paul, towards whom Brandes cherished a dislike worthy of the Ghetto in its most unenlightened days, made his contribution: finally the figure was rounded off through the help of elements derived from the mystery religions of the period.

In what way would Brandes commend his thesis to his readers? It is largely through the service of statements that are either reckless or prejudiced. Let me illustrate: Brandes' argument presupposes that the book of Revelation was the earliest written of all the books of the New Testament. Some scholars, absolutely under the spell of Hegelianism, might have made a similar statement forty years ago, but no sane and intelligent man in this department could commit himself to such a statement as that today.

Another argument, of an analogical character, of which Brandes serves himself, is equally worthless. The argument runs thus: The story of William Tell's skill in shooting at and striking the apple which had been placed on the head of his little son, is regarded by many as authentic to the present hour. Yet the common conviction among historians is that William Tell was a mythical personage. Brandes suggests that Jesus is an analogous case. But if William Tell is a mythical character that does not prove Jesus to be mythical any more than it proves that the battle of Waterloo was never fought. The cases of Tell and Jesus differ by the



whole diameter of being. I note only one circumstance of difference, but it is a difference which, in a matter of this kind, is radical. The story of Tell is first met with in a ballad which is 200 years later than the reputed date of Tell's feat. On the other hand, the Apostle Paul, in a letter (First Thessalonians) which was written twenty-one years after our Lord was crucified, charges the Jews with killing the Lord Jesus. What room was there for the creation of a mythical story about the Founder of Christianity in that short period? None at all.

And Brandes must have been too prejudiced to read the sources with care. How otherwise could he say on p. 172 of his *Jesus* that the Fourth Gospel makes no mention of a superscription over the cross of Jesus? Yet that is not the only instance of a glaring error to which even his sympathetic translator calls attention. How otherwise than apocryphal can we describe the kind of information which our author supplies us with in the form: that at Philippi Paul had news brought him of the founding of a church at Thessalonica by means generously furnished by the inhabitants of Philippi?

Dr. Brandes' loose way of dealing with the facts of the case is sufficient proof of the tinselly character of the entire book entitled *Jesus, a Myth*.

Edinburgh, Scotland.

JOHN R. MACKAY.

*Jesus of Nazareth: His Life, Times and Teaching.* By JOSEPH KLAUSNER, PH.D., (Heidelberg) Jerusalem. Translated from the original Hebrew by Herbert Danby, D.D. (Oxford) Resident Canon, St. George's Cathedral Church, Jerusalem. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1926. 8 vo. pp. 434.

Brandes' *Jesus, a Myth* was written by a Jew, but it might, except for some antipathies, have been written by any infidel. It is quite different with *Jesus of Nazareth* by Joseph Klausner. This book is Jewish, through and through, and could only have been written by a Jew. Its author Dr. Klausner, is one of the Professors of the new Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and he is reckoned as at once orthodox and learned.

The significance of the appearance of this *Life of Jesus* by Klausner does not seem to me exaggerated by Dean Doumergue when he writes: "During well nigh nineteen hundred years the name of Jesus was not uttered in the Ghetto (that is in the common Jewish orthodox world). No Jew of mark in the course of the fifteen first centuries, wrote anything at all concerning Jesus. If a Jew did speak about Jesus, it was a heretical Jew like Spinoza, or, a cynic, like Heine. That old mentality has undergone a change. Jesus is spoken of not only among the Liberal Jews, but among the Orthodox Jews as well. Eminent Jewish scholars now publish books about Jesus. . . . Thus, from a Jewish scholar, there appeared lately a book entitled: *Jesus as Others saw Him*. And now at length, an eminent Hebrew scholar, Dr. Joseph Klausner, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has published a work of an erudition of the first rank, on the Life of Jesus, and that work has been translated into English."



I am personally bound to say that in reading this book I received the impression first of all that its author is a man of great native sanity of mind. Thus, one welcomes the ease with which he brushes aside the absolute scepticism of the extreme forms of unbelief, with which we have been dealing under Brandes, asserting not only the historicity of Jesus, but the comparatively early date of the Christian sources: "It follows" says he "that the accounts in the first three Gospels are fairly early, and that it is unreasonable to question the existence of Jesus (as certain scholars have done both in the 18th century and in our own time) or his general character as it is depicted in the Gospels" (p. 20). With an equally sane outlook, he says of Paul: "Whoever reads the bulk of the letters attributed to Paul will feel at once that here we have documents dating from the earliest days of Christianity" (p. 63). The orderly way in which he distributes his material is also a witness to the sanity of which we speak. The principal divisions are: The sources for a life of Jesus; The conditions, political, economic, religious and intellectual, which form a background against which a description of the Life must be set up; The early life of Jesus; The beginning of Jesus' ministry; Jesus' self-revelation as Messiah; Jesus in Jerusalem; The Trial and Crucifixion of Jesus (this division supplying, as a sub-division, Klausner's thoughts respecting the resurrection of Christ); The teaching of Jesus. That distribution, it is at once seen, offers a fair field for a discussion of all the material.

A second impression is that the author's erudition is ample. This appears perhaps most evidently in two regions. On the one hand, Klausner has the ambition to do for his Hebrew readers, what Schweitzer did, in the first instance at least, for his German readers, in his *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, when he gave a very learned and readable account of the efforts that for the last one hundred and fifty years New Testament scholars, but principally Germans of the naturalistic school, had put forth in order to come to an understanding of Jesus. Klausner goes practically over the same ground, and, although he doubtless owes much to Schweitzer, he is himself well seen in this historical survey. The fact is that he has allowed himself to be, to a surprising degree, influenced by the German mentality not only in what concerns the Gospels, which is less strange, but in what concerns Old Testament Literature, which is more strange. But it is chiefly in the field of Talmudic studies that Klausner shows himself to the greatest advantage of all. His investigation of the nature of the witness which the Talmud bears to Jesus is masterly, and it is possible that, in after years, scholars will look to this chapter bearing on the Talmud as the most valuable contribution the volume contains for the science of theology, *quâ* science.

A third impression is that within certain limitations the author desires to be fair. He, of course, thinks of Jesus as a mere man. Also the aim of his book is to explain to the world why the Jews as a people rejected Jesus as the Messiah, while myriads of Gentiles accepted Him as the Messiah, and, upon the whole, he tries to justify his people at the bar of history. These are his limitations. But, on the other hand, he is evidently

proud of Jesus as a Jew; he will hear nothing derogatory said of Joseph or of Mary; he describes the crucifixion as a tragedy that came upon Jesus wrongly, albeit that he tries to put the major part of the blame on Pilate and the character of the times. In fact one of the most realistic, and, in some ways, impressive descriptions that has been written, of the cruelty of the death to which Jesus was subjected, occurs in this book.

On the other hand, Klausner's volume has not a few decidedly unsatisfactory features. I mention only two or three: First while he acknowledges the generally good character of the Gospel narrative, Klausner rejects with disconcerting ease, anything that does not tally with his own prepossessions. Thus not only does he reject the nature miracles ascribed to Jesus, but in regard to any other circumstance that does not approve itself to him it would seem to be a sufficient reason for rejection if any one of the Synoptists has failed to record it. Again, Klausner's doctrine of human sinfulness does not seem worthy of a Jew, and a devout student of the Law. He makes the sweeping assertion that Judaism knows nothing of an Intercessor between God and man. That surely is not the spirit in which Deut. v. 27 is written. But most profoundly of all would one be disposed to join issue with Klausner when he gives his philosophy of history under the form that the Fatherly God whom Jesus set forth is not the God of history. I do not deny that the Jews have served humanity to better purpose by owning the obligations of the Law of Moses than had happened if they had simply rejected Moses, and had not gone on to anything better. But the Jews have not served humanity to the extent to which the Christian nations have done, and particularly those nations that have sought to learn directly from the New Testament what they ought to do, nor have the Jews, in any way, borne the mark of having upon them the approbation of God as those Christian nations have experienced it. The God of Jesus is the God of history.

But while Klausner's volume has its unsatisfactory features, there are in it elements that may presage great good in the long run. Thus, the personality of Jesus has attraction for Klausner. Hear what he says: "The contradictory traits in his character, its positive and negative aspects, his harshness and his gentleness, his clear vision combined with his cloudy visionariness—all these united to make him a force and an influence, for which history has never yet afforded a parallel" (p. 411). The teaching of Jesus also has attraction for him: "In the ethical code of Jesus there is a sublimity, distinctiveness and originality in form unparalleled in any other Hebrew ethical code; neither is there any parallel to the remarkable art of his parables" (p. 414). Klausner is confident that the earliest Sages, whom the Talmud recognizes as such, held Jesus in respect similar to that in which he himself holds Him.

On the other hand, it must surely be plain to Klausner that he has failed to account for the conviction which was the great possession of the Apostles, and their followers in the form, that Jesus had risen from the dead; and that he has egregiously failed to account for Christianity. This situation, created by unsolved problems, together with an evident

pride in Jesus, may issue in Christian faith, if not for Klausner himself, yet at length for the Jewish nation.

*Edinburgh, Scotland.*

JOHN R. MACKAY.

*The Life of Jesus.* By J. MIDDLETON MURRY. London: Jonathan Cape. 1926. Pp. 317.

The amount of attention which this volume has received in our local Press shows that Mr. Murry voices the sentiments of at least a few. There do occur some fine passages concerning Jesus in this volume. That is not to be wondered at, when one considers that Mr. Murry has great admiration for Jesus as a teacher and as a genius, and that Mr. Murry, who is Editor of the *Atheneum*, is not himself without literary and even poetic gifts. But the book is decidedly disappointing. Jesus is to Murry a mere man, and a mere man can never be a Saviour. Worse still, Jesus is to Murry, although the best of men, a sinful man. This he asserts, giving no reason worthy the name, but merely reechoing certain German Rationalists, in the face of Jesus' own challenge, and in the face of the positive denial of sinfulness on the part of both Paul and Peter and John. But this volume will seem particularly unsatisfactory to theologians, for it is primarily in his doctrine of God that Murry offends most. Sometimes he writes as though he were an Agnostic. Thus he says: "There are many to whom Jesus was above all else a supernatural being—a God . . . I cannot share that belief, because I do not know what it means" (p. 8). At other times he writes as though he were a Pantheist. Thus he says: "God does not exist, save in all the particularity of creation" (p. 209). Murry claims to write with a certain independence of writers of the *Life of Jesus* who have travelled this road before him. But he is an eclectic, and, although the combination which he achieves, may have the merit of a certain novelty, yet the parts making up that combination are all borrowed. Murry will not accept Matthew's or Luke's narrative of the infancy and childhood of Jesus. He has therefore to frame an account of his own. That account is in all essential points in agreement with the account which the Jew, Klausner, gives of that period of our Lord's life. As one reads the tremendous emphasis with which Murry maintains, that the one truth which Jesus, when simply a teacher, taught, was the universal Fatherhood of God, one might imagine oneself reading Harnack's *What is Christianity?* As one reads Murry's account of the way in which Jesus accepted the rôle of Messiah, and how the eschatological hopes that were, for a season, associated with that Messiahship came to grief on the cross, one might imagine oneself reading Schweitzer's—must we not say?—blasphemous language on the same theme. And in what appears as in some respects the most shocking passage in Murry's volume, that in which he suggests that there was a compact and an understanding between Jesus and Judas Iscariot in the affairs of the betrayal, Murry has not even the doubtful merit of originality.

*Edinburgh, Scotland.*

JOHN R. MACKAY.

*A Short Introduction to the Gospels.* By ERNEST DEWITT BURTON, revised by Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

In 1904 Dr. Burton published *A Short Introduction to the Gospels*. When in the course of the years his views were modified to such a degree that a revision was desirable, he made preparations for the task. However he was not permitted, and when he realized that his end was near, he commissioned Dr. Willoughby to complete what he had begun.

Two parts in the revised edition are new and these alone deserve mention. One deals with "The Dates of the Synoptic Gospels," and the other with "The Johannine Question."

Of the former we read in the preface that it is by Dr. Burton, and gives his "ultimate conclusions concerning a nexus of problems that he did not discuss in his first edition"; also that "the judgments expressed are distinctive and were formulated at almost the very close of his career."

The determination of the dates of the Synoptics rests fundamentally upon a theory. This theory is none other than that of the Tübingen School. Dr. Burton admits that this school has undoubtedly overstated the antagonism between Peter and Paul, yet he thinks there is sufficient evidence that different parties and attitudes existed and are responsible for the Synoptic Gospels as we have them. The development of thought in the early church was, he believed, in brief, as follows. The original teaching of Jesus was essentially, though not aggressively, anti-legalistic. However the seed had been sown and there grew up in the church two distinct and opposing parties: the legalistic and the anti-legalistic or liberal party. In the course of time, thanks largely to the genius and spirit of Paul, the liberal party gained the supremacy and the legalistic party in the church died out. If a Gospel from the legalistic party was ever written, it has been lost. The Synoptics reflect the liberal attitude, and more particularly each represents a definite stage in the development of liberalism. It must even be said that each Gospel was written with the purpose of furthering liberal principles and representing the teachings of Jesus as liberal. On this theory Mark is assigned to circa 70, Luke to 80, and Matthew to 90, A.D.

We do not deem it unfair to say that Dr. Burton's theory has in no small degree influenced him in fixing upon these dates. He himself allows possibilities and probabilities of interpretation which conflict with his theory. Suppose there are no sudden leaps in the material world, are there none in the spiritual world? Is there no prophet, no genius, who discerns truth long before the masses appreciate it? We are today told on every hand that we are just beginning to understand the teachings of Christ. May not Peter and Paul have been reconciled, so that on the one hand a Gospel could have been written on this assumption, while, on the other hand, later, Paul might have alluded to the controversy historically? Were the theory true evidence to support it might be found, but the evidence cited is scarcely sufficient to establish the theory.

"Dr. Burton's latest work on the Johannine question," we read in the



preface, "was carried on by a method entirely different from the technique he earlier employed, and his conclusions were at the opposite pole of opinion from those stated in the original edition of this book." This complete change of front is significant, especially since we are not told why he discarded his former method. The question naturally arises, what assurance have we that this method is correct?

The method now employed is that of source criticism. Proceeding on the principle "from the known to the unknown," the passages paralleled in the Synoptics are set aside as one of the primary sources. Most of what remains can be subsumed under two distinct sources: a "second narrative source, or group of sources, and a Christological essay." With these three primary sources on his desk, and with his Jewish religious background, and under the influence of the Alexandrian or Judeo-Hellenistic type of thought, the author sat down to compose his Gospel. He modified, added to, and commented upon, these sources to suit his convictions and purpose. Whatever disturbance in logical order there may be in our present Gospel, is perhaps due to the carelessness of a copyist who disarranged the sheets.

All this is very ingenious. However, it is difficult to see that the facts require so complicated a theory for their explanation. Despite the advances made in the study of psychology, there is nothing that more baffles our understanding than the human soul. No one can predict with precision what a man is going to say or do; and we often stand amazed at the words and deeds of even our most intimate friends. Herein may lie the reason for many a to us irregular and inexplicable phenomenon in the Gospels considered only from the human side. As to the divine side we should humbly confess that God's judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out. Our theories as to what may have been the course of Biblical history must be constantly tested by the express teachings of the Word as to what actually was that course.

*Holland, Mich.*

THOS. E. WELMERS.

*The Psalmists*: Essays on their religious experience and teaching, their social background, and their place in the development of Hebrew Psalmody. By HUGO GRESSMANN, W. WHEELER ROBINSON, T. H. ROBINSON, G. R. DRIVER, A. M. BLACKMAN. Edited with an Introduction by D. C. SIMPSON, D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford. Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1926. Price \$2.50.

A series of lectures delivered in Oxford during the Lent Term of 1926 is here reproduced, with a brief introduction by Canon Simpson and a very welcome extension by Mr. G. R. Driver (son of the late Canon Driver) whose paper, for breadth of knowledge and balance of judgment, far outdistances the others.

As one would expect, the Editor intimates his adhesion to the forms of Biblical Criticism which we associate chiefly with the name of Julius Wellhausen. He commits himself unreservedly to the "theory of the gradual growth of the Hebrew religion from lowly origins at Sinai into the



strong and vigorous system of the post-exilic Judaism," and is quite certain that "to Moses there was apparent at the most only a faint glimmer of the light of God's self-revelation." And yet this very book is a fresh proof that the tide of radical criticism which at one time threatened to inundate the whole land of Immanuel is withdrawing rapidly. The flow of a few years ago has now begun to ebb. All the essayists repudiate the extreme views of Duhm and Cheyne, and maintain that the extant Hebrew Psalms were "in their origin pre-exilic," although, as the Psalter was in constant use as the Temple hymn-book, we may suppose it to have been subject to occasional revision.

Dr. Gressmann attempts to give in broad outline "a scientific investigation of the origins, history, and evolution of Hebrew Psalmody." Some of his conclusions are interesting. He maintains, for example, that the imitations of Psalmody found in the Prophets "presuppose the existence of genuine psalms"; and adds: "The religious festivals, the sacrifices and rites, the whole of the public and private sacrificial worship, are inconceivable if the sacred ceremonial was not accompanied by psalms." He accepts the assurance of Amos that David was a psalmist; of the Song of Deborah he says, that, though it is not from beginning to end a hymn, "it begins as a hymn"; and he believes that the Song of Miriam (Ex. xv. 21) is still more ancient and may have been composed "amid the stirring events by the Red Sea."

There is much in this Essay that is worthy of note, although, with the perverted ingenuity which so often attaches to negative criticism, the writer sees lines of connection drawn in the oddest places. Of Hosea vi. 1-3, for instance, he says: "In the background we see the picture of a man sick unto death, even one whose life has left him; but 'after two days,' or 'on the third day' God awakes him from the dead. This is an allusion to the dying and rising of Adonis; it is, as it happens, an allusion which in its obviousness and directness is unparalleled in the whole Old Testament." Would Dr. Gressmann say that we have an obvious and direct allusion to the dying and rising of Adonis in the words of our Lord recorded in Luke xiii. 32—"Behold, I cast out demons, and I perform cures today and tomorrow, and the third day I am perfected?"

The chapters which follow—The God of the Psalmists, The Inner Life of the Psalmists, The Social Life of the Psalmists, and The Eschatology of the Psalmists, are for the most part careful and workmanlike groupings of Biblical evidence, although the underlying critical hypothesis frequently obtrudes itself.

The question that is of the greatest interest, however, is that which is touched upon by Mr. Blackman and exhaustively considered by Mr. Driver—as to the indebtedness of the Hebrew Psalmists to the religious thought of Egypt and Babylonia.

The debt to Egypt is small: it is only the Semitism which had penetrated the Valley of the Nile that finds an echo in the Psalter. The Hymn of Ikhnaton (c. 1400 B.C.), for example, has often been compared with Psalm civ. But Ikhnaton was of a Semitic strain, and we do not need to think of actual imitation. Of other points of resemblance we may safely

say that they are "the outcome of thoughts common to the greater part of mankind."

The inter-relations of Israel with Babylonia are much closer and far more intricate. Abram left Ur of the Chaldees; he sojourned in Padan-aram; he brought with him to Canaan the modes of thought and turns of speech to which he had been bred. In the days of the Exodus the Babylonian script was the political medium of intercourse throughout Syria. At various times afterwards the Eastern monarchies deeply influenced the Hebrew people. And all this before the Chaldean Captivity befell.

The features of resemblance between the Hebrew and the Babylonian psalms are numerous and striking: the parallelisms, the rhythm, the idiomatic forms, the cast of metaphor, etc. But the affinity is indirect, not immediate: it is the Semitic mind in both—the Semitic modes of thought, the Semitic forms of speech.

While he points out, with a great wealth of illustration, a general likeness in phrasing and in literary structure, Mr. Driver draws a broad distinction between Babylonian and Hebrew Psalmody in three particulars: Babylonian hymnists have no true sense of sin, no clear conception of the aloneness of the Living God, no recognition of His lovingkindness. And he concludes: "We cannot therefore believe that Babylonian hymns and psalms exercised any real influence on the work of the Hebrew Psalmists."

Glasgow, Scotland.

D. M. MCINTYRE.

*A Beginner's Grammar of the Hebrew Old Testament.* By KYLE M. YATES, M.A., TH.D., Professor in Old Testament Interpretation, in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. xii, 158.

Professor Sampey in his introduction to Dr. Yates' *Grammar* tells us that the author has succeeded in making the study of Hebrew intensely interesting to his students in his classroom. And he remarks: "One explanation of the enthusiasm on the part of the student is the fact that the teacher imposes on them no task that is not essential to the acquisition of a working knowledge of Biblical Hebrew. He requires a minimum of work for a maximum of success in the acquisition of the language. . . . He omits everything which does not lend itself directly to this end." Brevity in an elementary text-book as in many other matters is a great virtue. And Dr. Yates' book is certainly very brief. But it is to be noted that Dr. Sampey adds, "The 'Beginner's Grammar of the Hebrew Old Testament' is best suited for use by a capable teacher in the classroom. Had the author been thinking primarily of pupils, who might wish to take up the study of the language without the aid of the living teacher, he no doubt would have made quite a different book."

The discerning reader will perhaps gather from the above statement with which Dr. Sampey commends the work of a former pupil that the *Grammar* is too brief to contain all that the beginner really needs to enable him to master in a satisfactory way the elements of Hebrew. Such

an impression is speedily confirmed by an examination of the volume itself. There is an unfortunate tendency to state rules either inaccurately or inadequately. Thus in describing the *daghesh-lene* and the *daghesh-forte* (p. 13), Dr. Yates states that the former is used in the *Beghadh-kephath* letters "when they do not immediately follow a vowel sound." Here "vowel sound" must clearly include both *full* and *half*-vowels. Of the *daghesh-forte* he says that it "is always preceded by a vowel sound." Here "vowel sound" can only mean *full* vowel. Consequently it is apparent that in these two rules Dr. Yates is using the words "vowel sound" in different senses. The easiest way for the beginner to distinguish between these two dagheshes is to observe that the *daghesh-forte* must be immediately preceded by a *full* vowel. Dr. Yates' statement of the rule is ambiguous to say the least. Further in stating the rule of the *daghesh-forte* Dr. Yates makes no mention of two important facts: (1) that it must always be followed by a vowel sound, i.e., a full or half vowel; (2) that when it is followed by a half vowel the doubling may be lost and the sharpened syllable become a half open syllable. Consequently when the student comes to the first rule for "The Article" and reads that "the usual way of writing the article is to prefix ה to the substantive and put daghesh-forte in the first consonant" (p. 16), he is likely to misunderstand the word "usually" and to think that it refers to the instances where the substantive does not begin with a guttural or resh, instead of to the instances where the doubling is lost because the following consonant has only a vocal shewa. Again we note that the treatment of the noun is very meagre as compared with the verb. Aside from the familiar paradigm of "horse" (כֶּסֶד) in which strangely enough the "construct" forms are omitted in the full paradigms, there is only one other paradigm given. Even more remarkable is the fact that this second paradigm is given as fully as the first, and that so little is said about the important difference between the light and the grave suffixes. No attempt is made to classify the nouns. The student is left to guess at the differences in declension between the segholate nouns, for example, and those which have two short vowels. Clearly the student will need much help from his teacher if he is really to master the difficulties of the Hebrew.

It needs to be added that the book is very badly printed. In many instances the pointings which cause the beginner so much trouble are so blurred as to be illegible. In a book for beginners, this is particularly regrettable.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

*Babylonian Life and History.* By Sir E. A. WALLIS BUDGE, KT., M.A., Litt.D. (Cambridge), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), D.Litt. (Durham), F.S.A. Sometime Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, Lisbon. With 11 plates and 22 illustrations in the text. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. xxi, 296.

This volume, which is dedicated by the author to the veteran Assyriologist, Professor A. H. Sayce "in memory of our unbroken friendship

of fifty years," is designed to take the place of a little volume bearing the same title which was first published in 1883 and has passed through many editions. The aim of the book is well indicated in the title; and the distinguished author who was for many years Keeper of the Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum is particularly well qualified to speak with authority and from first-hand information of the subjects of which it treats.

It is interesting to note that Sir Wallis does not share the view which has been strongly advocated by a good many scholars, e.g., Delitzsch, Winckler, Jeremias and Jensen, that the customs and religious ideas of the Hebrews were largely influenced by and in many instances directly taken from the Babylonian. In his preface, the author takes very definite issue with this theory and especially with Professor Delitzsch:

"A popular work of this kind is no place for the discussion of matters which are still the subjects of animated disputes between Assyriologists and theologians. But a reference must here be permitted to the attempts that have been made by the late Prof. F. Delitzsch and his followers to belittle the Religion and Literature of the Hebrews and to prove that they were derived from the Babylonians. It is admitted by all that the Hebrews, together with other Semitic peoples, inherited some of their legends, folk-lore, mythology, customs, laws, etc., from the Babylonians. But he who seeks to find in the Babylonian religious texts any expression of the conception of God Almighty as the great, unchanging, just and eternal God, or as the loving, merciful Father; or any expression of the consciousness of sin, coupled with repentance, or of an intimate personal relationship to God, will seek in vain. The Hebrew's sublime conception of Yahweh was wholly different from the Babylonian's conception of Bel-Marduk, or Shamash, or Ashur, and the difference was fundamental. Yahweh was One (Deut. vi. 4); to the Hebrew there was no other; Bel-Marduk, or Shamash, or Ashur, was only "Lord of the Gods," just as in Egypt Ra or Amen was "King of the gods." The Babylonians may have developed a monotheism comparable to that of the Hebrews, but there is no evidence that they did, and there is no expression of it in their religious texts. And the Accounts of the Creation given in Genesis and the Story of the Flood are not derived from any Babylonian Versions of them known to us. There are many points of resemblance between the cuneiform and the Hebrew Versions, and these often illustrate each other, but the fundamental conceptions are essentially different. The Babylonian God was a development from devils and horrible monsters of foul form, but the God of the Hebrews was a Being who existed in and from the beginning, Almighty and Alone, and the devils of chaos and evil were from the beginning His servants" (p. ix).

The Panbabylonists are not as influential today as they were several decades ago; and the students of comparative religion are inclined to recognize other influences upon the religion of Israel as well as that of Babylon. But the tendency to ignore the distinctive claims of the religion of Israel is just as great. Consequently it is refreshing to find so strong a statement of the distinctiveness both as to the nature and the source of the Old Testament teaching, coming from one who as an archaeologist has enjoyed opportunities second to none for the study of the history, literature and religion of the Babylonians.

Regarding the alleged monotheism of the Babylonians, we are told: "At a comparatively late period the powers and attributes of all the



gods were assigned to Marduk, the son of Ea, and some have thought in consequence that the Babylonians were Monotheists, but such was not the case. The monotheism of the Babylonians and Assyrians (for the national god Ashur was in Assyria what Marduk was in Babylonia) entirely lacked the sublime, spiritual conception of God that the Israelites possessed, and was wholly different from the monotheism of Christian nations" (p. 101).

The distinctive character of Old Testament religion is further illustrated by the following statement:

"Offences against any law could only be atoned for by offerings of various kinds and prayers to the gods made under the direction of a priest. The sinner suffering under the punishment of disease or sickness or loss of property, which he believed to have come upon him for his sin, no doubt prayed with groans and tears; but there is no text containing any suggestion that the Babylonian prayed for the change of mind that would prevent him from repeating his sin. He prayed that his god would change his wrath to compassion or mercy, but he never asked him to create in him a 'clean heart' and a 'steadfast spirit' (Psalm li. 10). The Babylonians in general, like the Egyptians, did not understand the importance of repentance in our sense of the word. The inscrutability of the will of the gods was recognized by the thinking and philosophical class, and some of them no doubt believed, like the Christian ascetics of the Scete Desert, in the immortality of the soul and the possibility of its union with the Divine Being. But ordinary folks in Babylonia cared little for theorizing on such matters, and knowing that the gods created man to die they endeavoured to enjoy life to the fullest extent. To eat one's fill, to make every day a day of pleasure, to dance and sing by day and by night, to wash the head and body and to wear clean apparel were the aim of most people. Though man must die, the day of his death is unknown to him, therefore pray to the gods to lengthen thy life, and forget that death must come one day. The life of a man is cut off like a reed, and the man who is alive and well in the evening may be dead in the morning" (p. 112).

A few comments may be made in conclusion. In view of the fact that the book is meant rather for the information of the general reader than as a textbook for the student of Assyriology we are inclined to doubt the wisdom of adding to so many proper names the cuneiform manner of writing them. But this is of course a matter as to which opinions may differ. On page 23, there is a slip in describing the cut which is spoken of as an "inscription on a mace-head dedicated to Shamash the Sun-god in the city of Sippar, by Sargon of Agade." The king is not *Sargon* but *Shar-gali-sharri*. It is to be regretted that Dr. Budge speaks of "two versions" of the Story of Creation found "in the cuneiform texts, as in the Book of Genesis" (p. 76). For while he at once proceeds to qualify the statement as to the cuneiform by adding "and various passages in the Legends that have come down to us show that other versions existed"—a qualification which apparently brings the statement into accord with the facts—the reference to "two versions" in the Babylonian will be used as a confirmation of the two version (J and P) theory for Genesis—Dr. Budge apparently so regards it—despite the fact that the correctness of this theory of the higher critics has not and, we believe, cannot be established.

The book is finely illustrated and will give the reader a clear under-



standing of the most important of the results of a hundred years of excavation in Babylonia and of many of the customs and beliefs, both secular and religious, of this ancient people.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*John Wyclif: A Study of the English Mediaeval Church.* By H. B. WORKMAN, D.LITT., D.D., Oxford, 1926, 2 vols., 30s.

Students of the Mediaeval Church and particularly those whose interest is centered in the pre-Reformation period have long been awaiting a definitive biography of John Wyclif, based on the vast amount of research that has been devoted to the Reformer in the past half century. Dr. Lechler's excellent work was published in German in 1873 and translated (and unfortunately abridged in translation) in 1878. It laboured under the difficulty, however, of quoting from Mss. lying inaccessible in Vienna and Prague libraries. The Wyclif Society has laboured faithfully and well since its founding in 1881 until its recent dissolution in 1924, and almost all of the Reformer's works are now available to the student. If we add to this the great amount of work done in editing and publishing Registers, Chartularies and Rolls, it is clear that the student has materials at hand that are very nearly satisfactory.

This work of Dr. Workman's fairly takes one's breath with its detail. In his preface he modestly claims but twelve years of work on these two volumes, but it is well to remember that over a quarter of a century ago Dr. Workman published a small volume on Wyclif, vol. 1 of *The Dawn of the Reformation*, which, for its size and claims was the best up to that time. It is hardly too much to say that there is no one better prepared to use the available data for a study of the life and times of Wyclif than Dr. Workman.

The author has laid all students of mediaeval English history under a great debt by the thoroughness with which he has ransacked the contemporary literature and the work of the great number of modern scholars for facts concerning men and events which have, at least in some cases, remained heretofore confused and incoherent. He has weighed with a fine sense of balance contradictory statements of contemporary chroniclers, as well as the conclusions of subsequent scholars who have tried to reconstruct the order and logic of events. Not only has Dr. Workman made many welcome contributions of a purely technical and factual nature, but he has done something which historical students do not always succeed in doing. He has written an exceedingly readable book. The style is smooth and free; the choice of coloring details is admirable; the balance between legitimate interpretation and personal opinion is finely maintained; and the reader is always aware of the sincere desire of the writer to present the whole truth.

The first volume is divided into two Books: I. The Schoolman, II. The Politician. The second volume is entirely devoted to a study of Wyclif as Reformer. The first volume is preceded by a fairly complete bibliography

of nine pages and a very convenient chronological table. At the end of each volume there is a series of Appendices, treating points that require more space than could be spared in the footnotes. The footnotes are in general copious.

Wyclif's first participation in public life, as a member of the mission to Bruges in 1374 is well handled. The effect that the obvious and cynical futility of the papal system, as shown in the intentionally protracted and ineffective negotiations at Bruges must have had upon the earnest schoolman, is clearly brought out. The alliance with John of Gaunt is fairly ably treated, though the author does fall into difficulties in following the work of the Good Parliament, and contradicts himself concerning the ending of the partnership of Wyclif and Lancaster (*cf.* ii. 145, 236, 247 and 297), in one case assigning the Peasants' Revolt as the cause and in another clearly implying that they had come to a parting of the ways some months previously. Dr. Workman adopts the welcome method of summarizing the principal works of the Reformer. Particularly is this desirable in the case of the books *On Divine and Civil Dominion*, *On the Church*, *On the Office of the King*, *On the Power of the Pope*, *On Blasphemy* and *On the Eucharist*. It is, however, unfortunate that the author has not seen fit to give a like summary of the treatise *On the Truth of Sacred Scripture*. He calls it 'loose' in construction and 'rambling.' But here Dr. Workman is hardly fair to Wyclif. To Wyclif this theme of the absolute validity of Scripture—*lex Christi*—is the central doctrine of the Christian life. This treatise is more carefully worked out than any other of the Reformer's works except the *Triologus* and furnishes us a clearer insight into the mind and heart of its author than his more polemic *ad hoc* works. It was, so to say, an *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, whence his title of *Doctor Evangelicus*.

The chapters on Wyclif's friends and foes, the translation of the Bible into English, and the nature of the work and motives of the poor preachers are among the finest in the whole work. Dr. Workman has collected evidence from every conceivable source for conclusions concerning the antecedent conditions on preaching, on the use of the vernacular among the gentry and the peasant classes in such a way as to present a new and valuable addition to our knowledge of these matters. He has also followed out in great detail, sometimes perhaps in too great detail, the fortunes of those who had once been followers of Wyclif.

The painstaking care with which Dr. Workman has labored, the wealth of his references, the wide extent of his first-hand information will certainly make his work the standard biography of Wyclif and the authority for the period for many years to come. But by that it is not meant that the work is without defects, for that it certainly is not. And its very excellence demands that these defects be pointed out. If the book were not so nearly authoritative, it would not merit having its shortcomings indicated. As it is, its generally accurate workmanship will lend weight to everything in it, and it is for that reason that the following criticisms are offered, not in any captious manner, but in a desire to have the truth as nearly known as is possible.

Books II and III have been spoken of and given their meed of praise, but of Book I it is difficult to speak in such high terms. In treating the scholastic background of the Reformer, Dr. Workman does not appear to be thoroughly at home. He proceeds on the assumption that "Wyclif, judged as a schoolman, does little more than gyrate on a well-beaten path, often concealing with a cloud of dust and digressions that he is but moving in a circle. His philosophical works contain little that can claim to be strictly original, with the partial exception of his political doctrine of 'dominion'" (i. 143). He goes on: "Theology, too, in the latter part of the fourteenth century became sterile." In view of the fact that Dr. Workman has read but four out of the twelve tractates in Wyclif's *Summa Intellectualium* and has not read at all his *Commentarius in Novum Testamentum preter Apokalipsin*, where Wyclif advances the doctrine of salvation by faith in words as definite as words can be, it seems that Dr. Workman has drawn conclusions that are, to say the least, hasty. In a letter which the present reviewer wrote to Dr. Workman while he was correcting proof (printed as Addenda, ii. 423-4), it was pointed out that eight out of the ten tractates printed by the Wyclif Society in *Miscellanea Philosophica* were *not* by Wyclif, but by Czech Wycliffites. It is perfectly evident that Dr. Workman could not be supposed to have read all these lengthy tractates, but at the same time it is contended that this judgment on the part of the author was a hasty one.

Dr. Workman has not used carefully either Shirley's 'Catalogue of the Original Works of John Wyclif' (1865) or Dr. Loserth's 'Revision' (1924) or he would have avoided some glaring mistakes in nomenclature and dating. He says: "In his earlier *de Ente*, written as we hold shortly after the time of his Canterbury controversy, Wyclif makes vague reference . . ." etc. (i. 194). The inference is that the *de Ente* was written at some definite and limited time. As a matter of fact these twelve tractates which would fill eight or nine sizable octavo printed volumes were the work of probably eight to ten years. The author makes a similar mistake when he says (i. 205) ". . . and in July 1373, or whenever the *de Ente* was published, Wyclif's enemies at Oxford . . ." etc. implying that this *Summa* was a unit, when the various tractates were written and published as separate works, and spoken of by his pupils and opponents by their respective names. (cf. *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, p. 4.) Again he misunderstands the nature of this title *de Ente* when he speaks of it as "standing at the head of his philosophical writings" (i. 259) when, to all intents and purposes, it *was* his philosophical writings. Appendix D, i. 332-5 is open to the same criticism. It displays an inadequate knowledge of the matter it treats.

In several cases Dr. Workman has misunderstood or misconstrued Wyclif's argument. He quotes (ii. 29) from *de Officio Regis*, 143, but his quotation is rather from the English side-note than from the Latin. Dr. Workman translates: "One thing I dare boldly assert, that the pope cannot be greater than the kaiser either in that which pertains to the world or that which pertains to God." It purports to be a translation of the following passage: "*sed unum audenter assero, quod nec clamor cleri*

*nostri nec scriptura faciunt quod* (italics mine) *papa iste sit maior cesare, vel quo ad seculum vel quo ad deum.*" The omission of the *nec clamor* . . ., it is submitted, makes a substantial difference. Dr. Workman also asserts (ii. 20) that "Wyclif neither raised nor answered the question who is to decide the interpretation of Scripture. . . ." But in Wyclif's *de Veritate Sacre Scripture* (iii. 159) we read: "ex istis patet corellarie, quod necesse est, sanctam matrem ecclesiam per theologos regulari. oportet enim, quod reguletur secundum vitam Cristi et scripturam sacram. sed hoc, propter evitandas hereses, necesse est theologum explanare." That is clear enough.

Exception could certainly be taken to Dr. Workman's summary dismissal of Wyclif's doctrine of the Eucharist as Consubstantiation, which, in addition to being an anachronism, makes a nominalist like Luther and a thorough-going realist like Wyclif teach the same thing. But as this misunderstanding arises from Dr. Workman's disparagement of Wyclif's philosophy, and consequent failure to grasp its complete domination of the Reformer's thought, it is only necessary to mention it. There are several slips that Dr. Workman has let pass by in regard to the end of the Captivity of the Church at Avignon. He speaks of it (ii. 86 and 119) as the Schism. He has St. Catherine hope that "all would be well if the papacy could be brought back to Rome and the Schism ended." This may be faulty sentence structure but as it stands it is surely misleading. But in the second case (ii. 119) it is surely a mistake. "His attack upon the papacy might have been passed by for political reasons, especially during the Schism," when the time-relation is that of the beginning of his Eucharistic controversy, 1379, and the Schism had just begun.

The author relegates to an Appendix (App. K, i. 342) the very important matter of Wyclif's dependence on Gulielmus Paraldus. Dr. Loserth has shown this debt to be really considerable. Wyclif at times mentions a certain "Parisiensis" but he uses the subject matter of Paraldus' *Summa Virtutum et Vitiorum* much more than his scanty references would indicate. Another study of Dr. Loserth's of a similar nature which has evidently escaped Dr. Workman's notice is his "Johann von Wiclif und Robert Grosseteste" (Kais. Ak. Wiss. in Wein, Phil.-hist. Kl. 186. Bd. 2 Abh. 1918). Wyclif's indebtedness to Grosseteste is even greater than Dr. Loserth was able to point out. Wyclif's *de Mandatis Divinis* is largely a re-working of the work of Grosseteste bearing a similar title, as yet unprinted and extant in two Mss. in the Bodleian Library, which the reviewer has used to ascertain this dependence.

There is one further matter which is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of this painstaking work. It is the unfortunate carelessness with which Dr. Workman has treated almost all matters concerning the relation of Wyclif and his doctrines and writings to the Czech reform party of the time of Hus. This carelessness is the more surprising in that Dr. Workman's work on Hus, in his two volumes on *The Dawn of the Reformation* was a promising bit of historical work. In referring to Wyclif's *de Ecclesia*, (i. 321, n. 4) he speaks of "six chapters omitted by



Hus when he copied Wyclif's work." Just what does the author mean? I take it he refers to Hus' use of subject-matter found in Wyclif's *de Ecclesia*. But the word 'copy' can hardly be used inasmuch as Hus used also material from Wyclif's *de Potestate Pape* and *de Officio Regis* to say nothing of his own commentary on the Sentences of the Lombard and others of his own previous compositions. Hus' treatise *de Ecclesia* is, furthermore, a readable and convincing piece of work compared with Wyclif's heavy and wearying conglomeration of repetitions. This error is repeated in a more elaborate form later on (ii. 7). Here Dr. Workman is relying in large part on the judgment of Dr. Loserth. But he would have done better if he had put the whole paragraph in question in quotation marks. To make such a statement as this: 'Niem did not know that Hus' abridgement, in spite of the stir it made in the world, contains hardly a line, local colouring apart, "which does not proceed from Wyclif",' is to out-Loserth Loserth. Loserth, bitter as he was against Hus, qualified the statement thus: "contains in its dogmatic portions hardly a line which does not proceed from Wyclif, . . ." Dr. Workman, in view of the fact that he does not know the modern Czech literature on this debated question would not care to assert such a thing on his own authority. The author has again fallen into an inconsistency (ii. 291) when he infers that immediately after 1388 "a new market was found for them (*sc.* Wyclif's works) in Bohemia." For this statement there is not the slightest bit of evidence. We do not know of any of Wyclif's philosophical writings in Bohemia before 1395 or 1396. His theological writings were not there until four or five years later at the very earliest. Later on (ii. 313) we find this statement: "Hus when he copied the treatise (*Opus Evangelicum*) with but slight alterations, gave it the title *de Sufficientia Legis Dei*, under which it passes in his works." Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum* fills about 800 octavo pages in the printed edition (1895-6); Hus' *de Sufficientia Legis Dei* fills four and a half folio pages in the 1558 edition of his works, or the equivalent of 14 or 15 octavo pages. To identify one work of fifteen pages with a compendious tome of 800 pages with the qualification "slight alteration" is rather hard on the imagination. Throughout Dr. Workman's book his Czech orthography is open to question. "Faulfiss" does not represent the sound of the name, which was, very evidently, a German name. The 'ss' before Hus reformed the spelling was pronounced as the present Czech 'š,' that is, as the German 'sch.' There was more than one spelling for the name of the companion of Faulfisch, but the one Dr. Workman gives, viz. 'Knychnicz' (ii. 348) was not one of them. The more common spelling in use today is 'Knehnice' or for English readers 'Knehnitz.' Dr. Workman is again in error when he asserts (ii. 207) that Wyclif's *Quadragesima Sermones* and *XXIV Sermones Mixti* were burned at Prague. If they were, nothing was ever recorded to that effect. The sermons that were burned were the *Sermones super evangelia per circulum anni*. Dr. Workman's own reference to Loserth's *Hus and Wiclif* makes this clear.

If the reviewer has gone more into detail on these points, which might



conceivably be regarded as mere *minutiae* it is only with the aim of rendering homage to a work that represents so much labour and gives such a fine appreciation of the character and work of the personalities involved. From now on Dr. Workman's study of the life and work of John Wyclif will be the starting point for students of the great Reformer's time.

Princeton.

S. H. THOMSON.

## SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

*Systematic Theology (Dogmatik)*. By WILHELM HERRMANN. Translated by Nathaniel Micklem, M.A., of the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, and Kenneth A. Saunders, M.A., B.LITT., of Solihull. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1927. Pp. 152.

The posthumously published *Dogmatik* of Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg appeared in 1925, with a memorial address by Martin Rade. It was reviewed somewhat extensively by the present writer in this REVIEW (Vol. XXIV. pp. 149 ff.). Hence it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of Herrmann's theological views in this notice, but simply to call attention to the fact that his Dogmatics is now made accessible to English readers in this translation. The book by which Herrmann is best known is probably his *Communion of the Christian with God*, and this book was also translated into English, giving its author considerable influence on British and American theological thought.

Herrmann was probably the most influential of the systematic theologians of the School of Ritschl, and, by reason of the translation of his large book, the best known in England and America. He was professor at Marburg from 1879 until his death in 1922.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*The Facts and Mysteries of the Christian Faith*. A Brief Statement of the Things Christians Believe, and the Reasons why They Believe Them. By ALBERTUS PIETERS, D.D., Dosker-Hulswit Professor of English Bible and Missions in the Western Theological Seminary, Reformed Church in America. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. The Reformed Press. 1926. Pp. 198.

This book is a brief and popular statement of the nature of Christianity and the grounds of belief in its truth. The author seeks to answer the two questions: What is Christianity, and why it is a reasonable faith?

It is historical Christianity, that is the supernatural Christianity of the New Testament which Dr. Pieters summarizes, and the grounds of belief in which he seeks to state. Each topic is treated with exceeding brevity, as can be seen from the fact that the book contains only one hundred and ninety-eight pages in the compass of which there are forty-four chapters each of which, with three exceptions, deals with a distinct subject.

In spite, however, of the many subjects treated, and the consequent brevity of treatment in each case, the author has, we think, succeeded

quite well in his endeavor "to set forth as clearly and plainly as possible, what the Christian religion is, and why it is worthy to be believed." The book is a summary not only of Christian evidences, but also of Christian doctrine.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube.* Von Lic. EMIL BRUNNER. Zweite und dritte neubearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1923. Pp. viii, 132.

Emil Brunner is professor of systematic theology at the University of Zürich. With Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, and Eduard Thurneysen, he expounds and defends the "Theology of Crisis," as the most recent movement in German religious thought is termed. The theologians of this school differ from the *Kulturprotestantismus* of such men as Harnack, Troeltsch, Bousset and Wernle, mainly in the doctrine of God. For the latter God is immanent; for the former He is transcendent. For the latter God is a datum of experience like any other datum, to be investigated, described, explained, and formulated by approved scientific methods; for the former God is unique, and inaccessible until He wills to reveal Himself. The latter offer to men for their worship a God reconstructed and guaranteed by religious science; the former hold that before either construction or worship is possible men must humbly submit to an awful and majestic Deity.

*Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube* was printed first in September, 1921, and a second and third edition in July, 1923. It was followed in 1924 by *Die Mystik und das Wort*, a brilliant criticism of the theology of Schleiermacher and his school. Brunner's reputation was made *modo Germanico* by the latter volume, but his manner of thought and his positive conclusions may be profitably studied in the shorter treatise before us. The Introduction states briefly the points at issue: the present time is characterised by religious subjectivity; theology has become anthropological; and subjectivism with its slogan of "Experience" is all prevailing. The task therefore is to close out our account with Romanticism and Pragmatism, and set up in business for ourselves with the objectivity of faith as our working capital. Part I, Current Half-Truths, contains two chapters entitled respectively, Religion as Experience, and Religion as Knowledge, and is an exceedingly clever exposition in "indirect discourse" of tendencies in theological thinking with which Brunner does not in the least agree. Part II is devoted to the closing out of accounts with the smooth-spoken and cultured traffickers in the religious half-truths described in Part I. The first chapter considers the Psychologists who derive all religion from experience and explain it by experience. For them it is not important what a man believes, but how strongly he believes. Brunner holds that this psychologism is a colossal misunderstanding of the spiritual life. It cannot support its claims by appealing to Luther's "justification by faith alone," because this places the emphasis not on faith as such but on faith's object. It originated rather in the genial romanticism of Schleiermacher who made it his program to

derive faith content from faith experience. Here was a danger that Ritschl in truth recognized, but to which he himself fell a victim when in order to define faith he introduced the biological concept of worth. But, argues Brunner, faith is not concerned with value but with validity. Close upon Ritschl follows the imposing procession of the religious psychologists with their assumptions: the whole is to be explained by its parts, the subsequent entity by the precedent components. This method is fruitful in Physics and its allied sciences of mass and movement, but fruitless in all the sciences of life, where parts emerge from wholes according to some organizing principle. Here Brunner classes the American religious psychologists, Starbuck, Coe, James, Pratt, Leuba, King, and Ames, whose service aside from shedding light on a few "peripheral questions" consists in so evidently reducing empirical religious psychology to an absurdity that no inquiring spirit who really reflects cares to study it any longer. Heiler's work on prayer is then dismissed as similar to a cinema of the Agony in Gethsemane, which the more exquisitely its realism is carried through, the more painful is the impression it produces upon us. Religious psychology is a religious short circuit. It may by its peculiar means evoke in us pious excitement, but if it believes that thereby God is brought near, it but repeats in modern terms the old superstitions of magic. Intellectualism, considered in chapter two, is no better off. Its failure is partially proved by the anti-intellectualism of the day, which, also initiated by Schleiermacher, has become a system in Nietzsche and Bergson. The latter has in Brunner's opinion clearly proved that a reason that is satisfied with goals attained is a reason motionless, petrified, dead, because the thought that is done is the thought that is done for. The world by wisdom cannot know God, if by wisdom is meant a finished system in which God is reduced to formula and assigned a place. True wisdom on the contrary never ends in a system complete and finished, but rather is always beginning from the living God Himself, the content of all being and of all good, the inexhaustible fountain which our feeble measures can neither contain nor retain.

After these vigorous and striking criticisms we turn with eager expectation to the constructive portion of the treatise in Part III, the general topic of which is Faith. Brunner aims to reverse the Apologetic method which proceeds from consciousness of the world as the certainty to consciousness of God as the hypothesis, but the reversal is possible only when there is Faith. What is Faith? Never an experience as such describable apart from its object, any more than the impression has meaning apart from the seal that made it. Faith is not a vessel to be filled with any sort of content, but it is itself produced by its content. It is as Brunner here views it "the being directed by God alone." Since God is pure reality, Faith and pure reality are one and the same. With this as the notion of Faith Brunner describes what Justification by Faith alone means for the theologian—that he repent of his peculiar sin of putting a system of thought in the place of God and inviting men to fall down and worship it. Let them throw away their idols,

says Brunner, and seek justification by faith in the living God. The analysis is then pushed a step further. If Faith is definable in terms of the Divine contact with the spirit of man, and if God is transcendent to space and time, then Faith is the point where the spiritual life is outside the fields of space and above the river of time. This indeed puts it beyond both history and psychology, but it at once raises the question that plagues all such thinking, what to do with the "this side." Is there no meaning, we ask, to space and time as creatures of God, nor to the beings that live in them? What of our revelation that terminated in Jesus Christ, born in the fulness of time in Bethlehem, the one mediator between God and men, Himself man? What of His death and resurrection? We do not believe that the relation between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, the divine and the human, can be satisfactorily expressed by annulling one of the terms. Nor can a God who is the everlasting dissatisfier of our longings be of genuine religious value. The book is a brave attempt to rise above the all engulfing waves of present subjectivism, and to gain new insight by a realization of the Divine presence, but the destructive part is more than the constructive. We wait for a more satisfying statement of the problem proposed.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Religion in the Making.* Lowell Lectures, 1926. By ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, F.R.S., Sc.D. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester), Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), Hon. D.Sc. (Univ. of Wisconsin), Hon. Sc.D. (Harvard), Fellow of Trinity College in the University of Cambridge and Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. Pp. 160.

In this little book we have the reflections on religion of a man of deserved reputation in science and philosophy. Naturally, he seeks to apply the scientific method to religion. Experience and the history of experience is his starting point. In this case it is our religious experience that is important. Tracing the religious experience from its origination in ritual through its development in emotion and belief, Dr. Whitehead finds that rationalized religion consists in an intuitive insight into fundamental rightness as an aspect of the universe. We see a unified purpose or harmony in the whole of reality that at once demands our ethical approval. Religion itself is not necessarily good; morality is the test of religion, and aesthetics the test of morality.

The universe itself is a moving whole. "In analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation individuating itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. This concrete fact is process" (Lowell Lectures for 1925, p. 102). This "actual world passing in time," needs for its explanation "those elements which go to its formation." It is these formative elements that are important for it is from them that we can learn about our author's conception of God. The first of these elements is a "creativity whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty" (p. 90). Professor Whitehead here shows his close affinity to such thinkers as L. Alexander, and even Lloyd



Morgan and Bergson. Time is taken as a necessary aspect of reality as a whole. This at one stroke dethrones the theistic conception of a God in no way subject to the time process. Nor is there room for a temporal creation; the great line of distinction between God and man is effaced.

Secondly, there is "the realm of ideal entities, or forms, which are in themselves not actual, but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is actual according to some proportion of relevance" (p. 90). In this formative element we have a further delimitation of Dr. Whitehead's idea of God. There is a world of ideal possibilities or patterns which God must take into account in fashioning the world. This conception is essentially Platonic. Not as though our author would attribute to these "ideal entities" an ontological status. None the less, God is dependent upon them in the sense that He can create according to their pattern, but in no other way. The Good is higher than God; principle more important than personality. This accords strictly with his starting point which regards the moral consciousness as the judge of religion. The moral consciousness ejects its conception of the Good, and then inquires what remains for God to do in order that the universe may present an aesthetic whole.

We find that God has to transmute the "indetermination of mere creativity" into a "determinate freedom." The protean character of abstract possibility forbids us to regard creativity as such as being actuality. God is one of the three elements that must be brought into unity in order that there may be a real temporal world as we know it. The other two are "creativity" and "the other creatures." These three elements are mutually indispensable. God can even be said to be the ground of the world since He accounts for the order in it. The world could not be without order. Plato appealed to his God when he wanted to bring his world of Ideas closer to the moving and seething reality of time; this appeal to God was a "second best," a confession of failure to rationalize. Essentially the same thing happens in Dr. Whitehead's thinking. In his case it is not movement that must be accounted for, since that has been assumed to be ultimate, but it is "determination," and "purpose" that need explanation. Pythagoras himself would feel justified in raising his philosophy of the "tuned string" to the dignity of a religious cult if he could see this modern philosopher thus making aesthetics the basis of morality and religion. Philosophy such as this forms an admirable "scientific" and even "mathematical" basis for the type of preaching that makes its appeal to young men to live a beautiful life rather than a good life. God is the source of harmony and symmetry in the world. Do not seek beauty in holiness but rather holiness in beauty!

But there is another point that is noteworthy here. The picture our author begins with is a moving whole. This moving whole implies the possibility of new beginnings and unlimited developments in every direction. To get order and system out of this moving whole is no easy task; it is above human power. Hence it is given to God to perform. But God, if He is to accomplish the task assigned to Him must Himself be above time; He is called a "non-temporal actual entity" (p. 90). The



transcendence of God is felt to be a necessity and is sincerely sought. But we have before noted that in his first formative element Dr. Whitehead made time an aspect of all reality. This implies that God is subject to the conditions of the world, and a genuine transcendence is then impossible.

We have then in Whitehead's thinking what we find in much of modern philosophy, namely, an ambiguity in the conception of God. In so far as He is conceived to be transcendent He may be personal but is finite; in so far as He is immanent He becomes the depersonalized universal realised in the historic particulars. Among idealistic thinkers this ambiguity is so persistent and so carefully concealed that at one time the Absolute or God is portrayed as a Moloch who devours both space and time, reducing all our experience to "appearances"; while at another time He is represented as needing the space-time world, and being subject to its conditions. More realistic thinkers such as Dr. Whitehead, who hate all acosmism cannot consistently hold that God is a "non-temporal actual entity." The logic of their position must bring down the transcendent God till He becomes a "function" in the world, an "element" in life. "He is the binding element in the world" (p. 158).

For Theism it is important that God be not thus conceived as a universal realising Himself in historic particulars; Theism's God is the self-sufficient creator of the "epochal occasions," or historic particulars. Our conclusion is that Dr. Whitehead's thought underneath its scintillating and even cryptical expression, conceals a strongly antitheistic tendency. When he made time and change a necessary aspect of all reality he gave possibility an independent metaphysical status; God could be no more than an aspect, an "element" or a "function" in reality as a whole. Theism makes God the source of possibility; only thus can the transcendence as well as the immanence of God be maintained; only thus is God qualitatively distinct from man; only thus is He personal; only thus is He God.

*Princeton.*

C. VAN TIL.

*Progressive Christianity.* By WILLIAM A. VROOMAN. New York: The Macmillan Co.

The author begins by separating the religion of Christ from doctrine about Christ. But he too has his doctrine about Christ, namely that Christ is only a man, human, errant, faulty, and that all the record is to be understood from this approach. The first chapter castigates the Catholic for making his doctrines essential to salvation; also P. T. Forsythe for making orthodox belief, e.g. in Christ's Deity, essential to Christianity, asserting that Peter's confession meant no such thing to the Galileans as theologians assume. Semitic faith began in polytheism, evolved into monotheism, and in the Christian church came to trinitarianism in or after the second century A.D. Orthodox doctrine has been interpolated into the New Testament by speculative and designing theologians who scrupled at no falsification to attain their ends. Thus, the Trinity and the Deity of Christ were unknown doctrines in the simple beliefs of the primitive church. Christ's words "the glory I had

with thee before the world was," or "when he the Spirit of truth is come," or "my blood shed for the remission of sins" are late interpolations or do not mean what they say. The author quotes with approval the late G. B. Foster: "We have learned at length that to have faith does not mean to hold a set of opinions; does not mean to think what Jesus thought. If it is true that every man is a unique miracle in the world, then it is true, for psychological reasons, that one cannot confess what another man has believed, were this other man even Jesus himself." The author adds: "Jesus did not question the opinions of his time, the world was flat, roofed by a starry firmament, above which lived God, while below was the kingdom of the dead. He expressed no doubt about the literal accuracy of the Old Testament. To him even the story of Jonah was true history. He was a Jew of the first century, and did not know Plato, nor indulge in philosophical speculations." At other points the author thinks that Christ differed a great deal from the beliefs and attitudes of his times.

The author affirms that the religion of Christ is a Way of Life, i.e. a way of living, and discounts dogmatic Christianity which he thinks may become a great impediment to true ethical religion. The emphasis of the modernist upon *life* as against *doctrine* has some drawbacks. Since *The Leaven of the Sadducees* has torn away the mask from modernistic ethics and revealed its intrigue, deceit and dishonesty, the boast has lost its credibility. We are convinced that a belief in the seventh and eighth commandments is essential to a practice of them. Faith and life are inseparable. What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.

Christ's death, according to the author, was a mere political episode, and had no such content of substitution and expiation as the church has taught. "There is no atonement in the sense of expiation," he quotes from D. C. Macintosh. Yet Christ said: "my blood, shed for the remission of sins." But, that is only "interpolation" or "mistranslation." Vicarious atonement is not only denied; it is excoriated in the strongest language. The following is quoted from Martineau: "Here is the verdict against sin: 'the soul that sinneth it shall die.' And how is that verdict executed? The soul that has sinned does *not* die, and one that 'knew no sin' dies instead. And this is called a divine union of truth and mercy; being the most precise negation of both. First to hang the destinies of men on a solitary volition of their first parents, and then let loose a diabolical power on that volition to break it down; to vitiate the human constitution in punishment for the Fall, and yet to continue to demand obedience to the original and perfect moral law; to assert the absolute inflexibility of that holy law, and yet all the while to have a view for the offenders a method of escape which violates every one of its provisions and makes it a solemn pretence; to forgive that which is in itself unpardonable on the condition of the suicide of God,—is to shock and confound all notions of rectitude, without affording even the sublimity of savage grandeur. This will be called blasphemy; and so it is; but the blasphemy is not in the words but in the *thing*." The "thing" he calls blasphemy is the plan of salvation wrought out by Christ as a vicarious

sacrifice. Since it is God's plan of redemption, the charge of blasphemy may rest where it belongs. The only solid basis of satisfaction is a *real satisfaction* for sin. Better to rest on a perfect atonement than on an imperfect character.

The author quotes 252 writers, most of them Unitarians and extreme modernists.

*Philadelphia, Pa.*

DAVID S. CLARK.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*Psychological Foundations of Religious Education.* By WALTER ALBION SQUIRES. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1926. Pp. 153. Price, \$1.25.

Dr. Squires divides contemporary psychology into two schools which he calls the mechanistic and the purposive respectively. The former describes and accounts for all the phenomena of which psychology treats in terms of physical mechanism; the latter introduces the concept of final cause or purpose. Then in successive chapters he shows how mechanistic psychology destroys and how purposive psychology conserves the "mystical reality" of religion, and such necessary religious beliefs as those in individual immortality, a personal God, justification by faith, the authority of the Holy Scriptures, the reality of sin, and the person and work of Jesus Christ. Professor A. Duncan Yocum of the School of Education of the University of Pennsylvania, contributes an interesting introduction.

The book fills a real need. Many teachers in our Sunday Schools, and others who are interested in the cause of religious education, are bewildered when they attempt to apply to their Christian educational efforts the principles of a psychology that, under the influence of a false metaphysical system or because of the lack of a true one, ignores the very facts which make Christian training possible and necessary. How can one appeal to the soul if there is no soul? How can one try to direct the will if there is no such state as will? For all such the volume before us provides the information needed. The style is clear, the presentation interesting, and if anyone imagines that the sort of psychology one uses in his Christian educational effort is a matter of indifference, the careful reading of Dr. Squires' book will soon show him the contrary.

At the same time we feel that more advantage might have been taken of the claim so emphatically made by contemporary psychologists that their science has nothing to do with metaphysical assumptions, and to a certain degree this claim is justified if psychology is to be treated as a positive science, or one that is elaborated by carefully controlled observation and experiment. All that the Christian man can ask of science is that it be true, for if true, it cannot be false to Scripture teaching. But this is not the same thing as asking science to accept *in advance* certain metaphysical postulates. A good bit of present psychology, however, is dominated by just such metaphysical principles. Dr. Squires thinks that bad metaphysical principles should be replaced by good ones, and in this we agree with him. But there is another alternative—why introduce metaphysics at the beginning at all? Why not weigh the facts carefully to see what metaphysics they imply?

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*With Christ Through Lent.* By the Rev. JOHN M. G. DARMS, D.D.,  
Cleveland, Ohio. Central Publishing House. Cloth. 12 mo. p. 201.  
Price \$2.00 net.

Not only for those who usually observe the Church Year but for all Christians who desire a guide for daily devotions, this admirable handbook will be found to be of great interest and of real inspiration. For forty-six consecutive days such devotional guidance is given by the selection of Scripture passages followed by meditations, prayers and hymns. The collection is such as should be heartily commended and widely used.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Lay Thoughts of a Dean.* By WILLIAM RALPH INGE, Dean of St. Paul's, Author of "Outspoken Essays," etc. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1926. Pp. vii, 366. Price \$2.50.

Dean Inge is well known to many American Christians. The present book is a composite of forty-five delightfully brief essays under four heads: literary, political, social, and religious. We find in these essays many very commendable things and some things not so commendable. The Dean is quite "outspoken," like his *Essays*; so outspoken, in fact, that occasionally he is almost blunt. Few readers will go with him in some of his extreme utterances, however much they may admire the courage which they evince.

It is probably true, for example, that Socialism will not work, but we have to wonder why he should add: "and democracy is not in a much better case" (p. 34), especially when no reason for such a venturesome statement is given. Again, we are told (pp. 113-114) that Ex-President Wilson was an unfriendly President to England, that there is no doubt that he disliked England:—this, too, is a mere *ipse dixit*. The Dean has also some novel ideas on the treatment of criminals convicted of murder (pp. 152-155). His explanation of prohibition legislation in America as fundamentally commercial (pp. 191-192) is a misrepresentation which no self-respecting American will fail to resent. Dean Inge must imagine that all Americans are hopelessly money-crazed. Again, just where did Darwin and his fellow-workers *prove* that "all life in the world springs from one root, and that the lower animals are literally our distant cousins"? It is interesting to see our author going farther and supposing that the vegetables may be our cousins, too! (pp. 198-199). In the first essay on "Modernism" (pp. 340-341) we learn that the Protestant theory of Inspiration was a strategy on the part of the Reformers to set off against the Roman Church's papal authority. It is quite the fashion to make this statement just now; but the evidence for it is never given. It is always just the bare unsupported allegation. Let some who make this assertion come forward with exact quotations giving book and page, from the works of the Reformers, proving that they set up this formal principle merely to buttress themselves against papal authority. The Reformers did defend this principle but they were not the first to appeal to Scripture as



authority, and they accepted the authority of the Scriptures because the Scriptures themselves made such a claim. Dean Inge says that this Protestant theory of Inspiration is "quite untenable, and it is doing great harm to the cause of religion." It would reassure us a little to have more detail on the real mischief that this theory has done! It is scarcely enough to make flatfooted denial of the historicity of parts of the Bible and bluntly assert that "Generations of English people have been made to believe that their hopes in Christ stand or fall with the historical accuracy of the patriotic legend of a tribe of Bedouins." Nor is the case fairly stated by saying that a clergyman is expected to believe or profess what all educated men know to be absurd (p. 344). Yet even as a self-professed "Liberal theologian" (p. 350), the Dean cannot tolerate Professor Loisy's Christ, says "Christianity means belief in the historical Christ," and is convinced that an honest and reverent study of the New Testament will lead to the orthodox view that in Christ "dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (pp. 350-351).

Finally, many, many Christians will not agree with the Dean "that the nation must be the main object of loyalty" (p. 359). We pass over some scarcely complimentary observations about Calvinism (pp. 136-137), even though the author holds a high position in a Church which historically *ex professo* at least belongs to the Calvinistic branch of Protestantism. Notwithstanding, it is some comfort to hear him say plainly that he does not regret the Reformation (p. 295). Calling President Coolidge "the least loquacious of American Presidents" (p. 22), may possibly be overlooked in the admission that the Dean has never heard English spoken more purely than at Boston, Mass. (p. 80), or that America is now "by far the most interesting country in the world" (p. 134). This is to restore some of the years that the locusts have eaten.

The two articles on the Lambeth Conference display the author's views of that body's decisions. Very clearly Dean Inge takes issue with many in his own Church on the place of episcopacy as a condition of Christian reunion. He speaks of "apostolic succession" as "a mere legend," and feels confident that the Presbyterians would never submit to episcopal ordination. "The whole history of Presbyterianism forbids us to expect any other attitude." It looks to us as if the Dean were unquestionably right this time!

In his literary essays some sane warning is given. We owe too much to the intellectual treasures of the Greek and Latin classics to ignore or neglect them. Modern "cubist" art, and "free verse," distinguishable from "sloppy prose" by its uneven lengths, are alike disparaged. M. Coué's irrational philosophy is speedily disposed of (pp. 232-234); his patients have just "been lying to themselves every morning and evening." "This epidemic of irrationalism," continues the analysis, "has given us pragmatism in philosophy, magic and superstition in religion, antinomianism in morals, post-impressionism in art, and Bolshevism in politics." Here is the mountain-top of all these essays. Call him "the gloomy Dean" if you wish. But listen to this: "Well, for my part, I will have nothing to do with this world of make-believe. It is an abomination to me. I believe



that my reason was given to me that I may know things as they are, and my will that I may bring my refractory disposition into harmony with the laws of my Creator. I will neither twist up the corners of my mouth when I am in the dumps, nor tell myself that in all respects I am getting better and younger and handsomer every day. If I can help it, I will play no tricks with my soul, in the faith that though bluff may sometimes pay very well in this world, it will cut a very poor figure in the next" (p. 236). Such plain talking ought to do a lot of good. We are also grateful for this sentence in the second chapter on "Psychotherapy": "The unexplored borderlands of science are the favourite breeding-grounds of superstition and quackery of all kinds" (p. 242).

All in all, these essays provide easy and pleasurable and profitable reading on a variety of subjects at once up-to-date and helpful. You do not accept all they espouse. Dean Inge is the kind of a writer who says what he thinks and provokes thoughtfulness, and while he may not always be convincing, he is never dull or uninviting. To read one of his essays is anxiously to want another. Certainly this is a gift all writers will do well to cultivate.

*Lancaster, Ohio.*

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

*Think Out Your Faith.* By PHILIP MERCER RHINELANDER, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D. Sometime Bishop of Pennsylvania. New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1926. Pp. xi, 110. Price \$1.25.

As was said of a certain unpublished address, there is in this book "much sense and no nonsense." It will do anybody some good to read it, and there are a few "loudspeakers" of our time who really ought to read it. Most of it has to do with creeds, their proper place, legitimate use, and permanent value in the Christianity of every age. If Bishop Rhinelanders is right, the wholesale scrapping of creeds as outdated and useless, as the custom of some is, is a colossal error with fatal consequences. We think he is right, and we presume that an unbiassed reading of his argument will fully justify his position in this matter.

Dr. Rhinelanders well says: "Every religion is known by its creed" (p. 23). "Without the creed, Christianity would have become an unmeaning, hopeless impulse: . . . a fleeting spiritual emotion" (p. 26). The office of the creed is to make disciples. "Nothing less than the sincere confession of the Christian creed can bring the life of the confessor under the complete dominion of the Lord" (p. 51). "For if the Church disown her Creed, she cuts off the very lifeblood from her heart: she severs the arteries through which the grace of God flows in" (p. 62). The Church without its creed would be as bad off as the physician without his science (p. 99). Furthermore, the Creed is not something to be cut up and hewn off. "If the Church disown one part of it, in the end she will find herself disowning all." "The Church has no reason for existence in this world except to propagate her faith and to persuade men to accept her Creed" (pp. 70, 71). The creeds have ever supplied two needs in the Church: that of worship and that of teaching (p. 56). Creeds are not ends in

themselves, they are means; but they are the *only* means to certain ends. They are means of access. They help us to arrive (pp. 22, 100).

These citations are sufficient to show the nature of the author's contention. And the argument is surely a sound one. There may be some positions taken that are open to debate, as when Bishop Rhinelander finds in the episcopate "an *unbroken* line" of certified and competent trustees set over the Church's spiritual treasury (pp. 80-81). But in this brief presentation there is so much to admire and so little to question, that the reviewer's task is a happy one.

We gain the impression that if we will only do a little serious and orderly thinking, that is, *think out* our faith, we shall find orthodox Christianity both true and necessary. But we must give up our compromising and cheap talk about being liberal. We must think *straight* about Christian verities. Nowhere, we observe, does the author disguise his own theological attitude. He is clearly an out and out conservative, and one capable of clear thinking and definite, well-rooted convictions.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

*The Sorrows of God. And Other Poems.* By G. A. STUDDERT KENNEDY. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1924. Pages 176. Price \$1.75 net.

If there is any modern book of religious poetry which the pastor or religious teacher would do well to read, this is it. Seventy-four poems are here gathered together, a few of them in English dialect, and some recalling the Great War. The author is somewhat enamored of Patripasianism, as in "The Suffering God," "The Sorrow of God," and as evinced by such expressions as "The Agony of God," "Though I share the grief of God" (pp. 72, 99). Also

"See the wounded God go walking down the world's eternal way,"  
and

"But why don't ye bust the show to bits,  
And force us to do your will?  
Why ever should God be suffering so  
And man be sinning still?"

and

"So the Father God goes sorrowing still,"

etc. (pp. 109, 124, 125).

The poem on "Eternal Hope" (p. 89) is very evidently less a sane defining of that hope than a fervid rejection of the doctrine of eternal punishment. Yet in the horrors of war and in the tragedies of life the author sees an overruling providence (p. 40):

"He has some hidden purpose sure  
For all this blood and tears,  
It is His will—be still—be still,  
He is the Lord of years."

Of these poems we would especially recommend: "The Suffering God," "Humility," "Good Friday Falls on Lady Day," "The Sorrow of

God," "Well?", while the one on "Indifference" is a gem. Both in theme and meter there is an interesting variety. The thought is often original and most suggestive, and the command of poetical English and appropriate and enticing rhythm is delightful.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

*The Local Color of the Bible.* By CHARLES W. BUDDEN, M.D. and the Rev. EDWARD HASTINGS, M.A. Volume III, Matthew-Revelation. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925. Pp. 355. Price \$3.00.

Space forbids a full and complete description of this book. It is neither a dictionary of, nor a commentary on, the New Testament; though it partakes more of the former than the latter.

The main divisions of the book correspond with the names of the New Testament books, with the exception of the Gospels. Since the Gospels traverse the same ground as far as the purpose of the authors is concerned, they are viewed as a unit. Almost one-half of the book deals with the background of the Gospels; one-fifth with that of Acts; and almost one-fourth with Paul's letters.

In the choice of the topics and the brevity and fulness of treatment, the authors are responsible. Under The Gospels, subdivision: "The Romans in Palestine," such subjects as "Roman Administration," "The Herod Family," "The Publicans," and "The Coins of the Gospels" are dealt with. Under Acts, subdivision: "The Conversion of Saul," we find "Tarsus" and "A Rabbinical College." Under Paul's letter to Titus, the authors give a description and history of "The Island of Crete" and its inhabitants. By far the largest part of the book consists of a description of the scenes, customs, personages, history and government of the cities and provinces prominent in the New Testament.

The authors do not commit themselves upon philosophical and theological views. It may not be just to say that there is studied avoidance of these, rather the purpose of the authors excludes them. However, where an expression of opinion might be expected, we meet with a coldly impersonal statement. On the whole a spirit reverential to Scripture pervades the work. At times, however, the importance attached to ancient Greek and Roman legends and customs appears greater than in our judgment the writers of the New Testament had in mind when they wrote. One is led to question whether the background is to be regarded as determinative of the narrative. Certainly, Scripture can not be understood or appreciated except in the light of the background; however, the Gospel story is not a narrative of the natural development of the past, but of the workings of a new and unprecedented force injected into the lives of men.

Two indexes are appended to the text of the book; one of Biblical References, and the other of the subjects treated. When we see the list of about 800 subjects, the book appears quite pretentious; but in a 339 page book, with 275 words on a page, many of the subjects must necessarily receive but slight consideration. No picture adorns the pages of the book, nor can we find a map to help us on our way. The reader, to

appreciate the work, must know his geography; and even the mind of an adult would not rail against a picture to illustrate a scene which beggars description in words.

What impression the reading of the book has made on another, we do not know. We were not gripped, and we found no difficulty in laying the book down. The style is good but lacks charm and picturesqueness. There are other books which tell the story with a fascination that is irresistible, for the writer lives in the description. The book under discussion is a cold and prosaic setting forth of facts, with none of the fire of an enthusiastic interest in the facts. On the other hand, the student looking for a thorough treatment of a subject, will take recourse to the Bible dictionaries. It is a question whether the book is a real contribution to the literature on the subject. Some fifty quotations, and some a page long, indicate that others have gone over the same field. A careful and attentive reading of Scripture supplies considerable of the matter. The amount of original material, we are constrained to fear, is comparatively small.

In closing attention must be called to what appears an unfortunate oversight. In describing the synagogue service (p. 65), we read, "The passages from the law were prescribed on a system by which the five so-called Mosaic books were gone through completely in three and a half years, that is, half a Sabbatic period." On page 71 the authors quote without comment from *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, by W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box (p. 351) the following, "For reading purposes the Pentateuch has been divided into fifty-four sections, to cover a year." To those who know that the Pentateuch has been divided into two distinct divisions corresponding to the two statements above, this will be intelligible, though a word of explanation would not have been out of place. To the uninitiated the two statements will appear contradictory.

Holland, Mich.

THOS. E. WELMERS.

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## GENERAL LITERATURE

*A Sumerian Reading Book.* By C. J. GADD, M.A., Assistant in the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, The British Museum. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1924. Pp. vii, 197.

The object of this book, the author tells us, is "to present, in a single volume, and in a form adapted to the learner, all the material which he will need in his earlier studies, and to indicate from the beginning that Sumerian differs nothing from any other language in the point that it can be intelligible only as a grammatical structure." The author devotes about forty pages to orthography and grammar, one hundred and thirty to reading passages, and twenty to vocabulary and index. In the reading passages, the Sumerian text is given in the cuneiform character on the left hand page, while the right hand page gives a line for line transliteration accompanied by an interlinear translation. This translation is

very literal, following the order of the Sumerian words regardless of the English idiom. Explanatory footnotes are frequently added, usually at the bottom of the page.

In view of the intricacies of the Sumerian idiom, the question which naturally suggests itself at once is whether it is possible to treat the grammar at all adequately in such brief compass as Mr. Gadd has allowed himself. Thus he devotes scarcely a dozen pages to that *crux interpretum*, the verb. When it is observed that Poebel in his *Sumerische Grammatik* has devoted a hundred and fifty pages (about half of the book) to it, while Delitzsch in his *Grammatik* has allotted it about seventy pages, it is obvious that the discussion offered us by Mr. Gadd cannot enter at all deeply into its consideration. However, the best test of the adequacy of an elementary textbook is the practical one. Should experience in the use of this "Reading Book" show that the grammatical treatment does not meet the requirements of the beginner, Mr. Gadd will doubtless add to it in the next edition. We welcome this able and admirable attempt to make the Sumerian idiom more accessible to students of Semitics; and believe that it is calculated to fill a real need. On its mechanical side, the book is excellent and could hardly be improved upon.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Church Monthly*, New York, March: BERNARD I. BELL, Faith and Fear; SHIRLEY C. HUGHSON, The Catholic Congress Movement; The Problem of the Older Clergy; GEORGE L. RICHARDSON, The Episcopal Church and Theological Education.

*American Journal of Philology*, Baltimore, December: PAUL HAUPT, Etymological Notes; KEMP MALONE, Agelmund and Lamicho; GERTRUDE HIRST, Significance of *Augustior* as applied to Hercules and Romulus; W. A. OLDFATHER, Alleged Avarice of Sophocles; HELEN H. LAW, Hyperbole in Mythological Comparisons.

*Anglican Theological Review*, Lancaster, January: JOHN LOWE, Early Roman Episcopal Lists; FRANK GAVIN, *Shaliach* and *Apostolos*; DONALD W. RIDDLE, From Apocalypse to Martyrology; ERIC MONTIZAMBERT, Theological Treatment of the Problems of Philosophy.

*Biblical Review*, New York, January: EDWIN M. POTEAT, Scandal of the Cross; A. McCAIG, The Title "Son of Man" in its Lofty Associations; J. E. CRAWFORD, Inspirational Ideals of the Lay Movement; G. LUVERNO BICKERSTAPH, Use of Images in Worship; HERMAN H. HORNE, Fifty Points of a Good Church School.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, St. Louis, January: JOHN KUIZENGA, Religion: Echo or Answer; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, Story of the Nativity; C. NORMAN BARTLETT, Romance of the Invisible; W. T. McCONNELL, Social Teachings of Our Lord; GEORGE L. YOUNG, Final Fate of the Wicked, ii.

*Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, Toronto, January-February:



J. B. REYNOLDS, Readjustments Needed in the Rural Church; C. B. SISSONS, Martyrdom of McCarty—Fact or Myth; A. R. GORDON, Ethics of Jewish Apocalypse; F. LOUIS BARBER, Wesley, an Evolutionist; JAMES SMYTH, Problem of the Resurrection Narratives; A. O. PATERSON, Work of the Holy Spirit Today.

*Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, January: ALFRED H. SWEET, Control of English Episcopal Elections in the Thirteenth Century; JOHN LAFARGE, Rural Environment as a Background for Religion.

*Congregational Quarterly*, London, January: H. J. FLOWERS, The Second Coming in the Synoptic Gospels; S. H. MOORE, Re-making Men; J. ARTHUR HILL, Spiritualism and Psychic Research; IGNATIUS JONES, Youth and the Church; H. G. NEWSHAM, What is Christian Education?; W. BLACKSHAW, Religion in the Schools.

*Crozer Quarterly*, Philadelphia, January: LUTHER D. REED, Preparing for Leadership in Worship; FRANK G. LEWIS, Theological Curricula and Degrees; STEWART G. COLE, Place of "Religious Education" in Preparing for Church Administration; BERTHA W. CLARK, An Anabaptist Poet and Dreamer.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, January: C. J. WRIGHT, Some Tendencies and Problems in Modern Theology; NATHANIEL MICKLEM, Present-Day Faiths—Congregationalism; CAMPBELL N. MOODY, Spiritual Power in Pagan Religions and in the Old Testament. *The Same*, February: F. C. BURKITT, The Baptism of Jesus; EDWARD GRUBB, Present-Day Faiths—Society of Friends; H. J. FLOWERS, Paul's Prayer for the Ephesians; A. E. GARVIE, Social Problem on the Continent.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, October: ROBERT P. BLAKE, The Georgian Version of Fourth Esdras from the Jerusalem Manuscript; WILLIAM P. HATCH, Fragment of the lost work on Dioscorus.

*Homiletic Review*, January: J. B. REEVES, Good Hymns; HENRY A. REED, The Fundamentalism of Jesus; ROBERT C. FRANCIS, What to Do with the Down-and-Outer; WALTER BARLOW, When is Preaching Practical?; GUY M. CHASE, Publicity for the Church. *The Same*, February: E. M. CHAPMAN, The Preacher and His Books; BURTON S. EASTON, The New History of the Church; ANDREW C. ZENOS, Studies in the Christian Life; A. J. W. MYERS, Books on Religious Education. *The Same*, March: E. M. CHAPMAN, The Preacher and His Books (con.); EVA R. BAIRD, Chinese Missions at the Cross Roads; R. T. HENRY, An Institutional Church in a Non-Christian Community; W. L. STIDGER, Angling for Automobilists; W. B. FORBUSH, Letters to my Son in the Ministry; ANDREW C. ZENOS, Studies in the Christian Life.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, January: ABRAHAM DANON, Documents Relating to the History of the Karaites in European Turkey; ISRAEL EFROS, Studies in Pre-Tibbonian Philosophical Terminology.

*Journal of Negro History*, Washington, January: RUFUS E. CLEMENT, The Church School as a Factor in Negro Life; C. W. BIRNIE, Education of the Negro in Charleston, S. C., before the War; WILLIAM R. RIDDELL, Encouragement of the Slave Trade.

*Journal of Religion*, Chicago, January: W. W. SWEET, Some Signifi-

cant Factors in American Church History; WALLACE K. FERGUSON, Place of Jansenism in French History; ANGUS S. WOODBURN, The Indian Appreciation of Jesus; WALTER E. BUNDY, Meaning of Jesus' Baptism; JOHN R. SCOTFORD, A New Approach to the Teaching of Homiletics; A. T. BOISEN, Evangelism in the Light of Psychiatry. *The Same*, March: The Definition of Religion; D. E. THOMAS, The Experience Underlying the Social Philosophy of Amos; DONALD W. RIDDLE, Environment as a Factor in the Achievement of Self-Consciousness in Early Christianity; L. A. BOETTIGER, Missions and Mores.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, January: A. WILMART, Easter Sermons of St. Augustine; C. H. TURNER, A Textual Commentary on Mark 1: W. TELFER, "Bees" in Clement of Alexandria; E. BURROWS, Cuneiform and Old Testament; E. BURROWS, Oxyrhynchus Logion (1907)v.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, January: LYNN H. HOUGH, Dr. Babbitt and Vital Control; G. G. COULTON, "John Wyclif: A Story of the English Medieval Church"; JOHN BERESFORD, Wesley and Judith Beresford, 1734-1756; E. S. WATERHOUSE, Rudolph Eucken, the Man and the Thinker; W. F. HOWARD, The Fourth Gospel and Mandaean Gnosticism; CLEMENT A. WEST, Early Church Government in Britain.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, January: LUTHER D. REED, The Liturgical Principle; PAUL H. HEISEY, Story of Lutheran Theological Education in America; L. H. LARIMER, Students for the Ministry; JOHN C. MATTES, English Translation of Luther's Small Catechism.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, January: S. G. YOUNGERT, Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken and Its Relation to Christianity; W. ERNST ROHNERT, Of Faith and Good Works; C. F. SANDERS, The Psychological Nature of Faith; EARL S. RUDISILL, What is Christian Education?; JOEL LAKRA, Devolution of Missions in India; ABDEL R. WENTZ, Work of Samuel Simon Schmucker.

*Missionary Review of the World*, New York, January: J. CAMPBELL WHITE, Challenge of the Non-Christian World; SADHU SUNDAR SINGH, The East and the West; ROBERT A. HUME, Appeal of Jesus Christ to India; SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Persia Faces the Future; MURRAY T. TITUS, Christian Literature for Moslems. *The Same*, February: LOUIS P. DAME, Results of Medical Missions in Arabia; COE HAYNE, Studying Mexican Relations at El Paso; ALBERT D. HELSER, Why I like My Missionary Job; HABIB YUSIFJI, From Mohammed to Christ; Effect of China's Turmoil on Missions. *The Same*, March: ROBERT E. SPEER, Fresh Impressions of Japan; NORMAN W. TAYLOR, Mexico from Within; RUSSELL W. ABEL, A Story of Changes in New Guinea; HARLAN P. BEACH, "The Quest for God in China."

*Monist*, Chicago, January: S. FRANK, Contemporary Russian Philosophy; EMMANUEL LEROUX, Philosophy of Religion in French-Speaking Countries from 1914-1925; W. P. BLEVIN, Theory of Sensa; D. LUTHER EVANS, Religious Relevancy of Recent Realism; JAMES B. SHAW, Mathematical Reality.

*Moslem World*, New York, January: E. E. ELDER, Universality of

Early Islam; SAEED KHAN, The Sect of the Ahl-i-haqq; The Approach to Shiah Islam; E. M. WRIGHT, Fall of the House of Mohammed; MRS. ARTHUR C. BOYCE, Christian Literature in Persian.

*New Church Life*, Lancaster, January: SIGRID C. ODHNER, The Swedenborg Documents; VICTOR COOPER, Swedenborg—the Apostle of the New Church; HUGO L.J. ODHNER, Morality and Tolerance. *The Same*, February: N. D. PENDLETON, Ancient Rituals and the Modern Faith; HOMER SYNNESTVEDT, Morality Without Religion; RICHARD ROSCHMAN, How I Was Brought to the Light. *The Same*, March: N. D. PENDLETON, The Slain Lamb.

*Open Court*, Chicago, January: WILLIAM F. CLARKE, The Scientific Method and Religion; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Culture-Epochs and the Cosmic Order; CHARLES C. CLARK, Has Christianity a Future? *The Same*, February: VICTOR S. YARROS, A Singular, Inadequate Conception of Philosophy; THEODORE SCHROEDER, Deterministic Presupposition of Psycho-Analysis; FLETCHER H. SWIFT, What is Religion? *The Same*, March; ERNEST T. PAINE, A Post-Kantian Antinomy; HOMER H. DUBS, Conflict of Authority and Freedom in Ancient Chinese Classics; MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN, The Supernatural in French Literature.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, October: JOHN A. HOLLINGER, Church's Educational Program as Proposing Coördination with that of the State; E. H. WESSLER, Mysticism; KARL J. ERNST, The Objective of Exegetical Theology; CHARLES PETERS, United Sunday and Week-day Religious Education in the Local Church; PAUL J. DUNDORE, Psychology of Religious Experience.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, January: H. W. TRIBBLE, Place of Christian Experience in Theology; PHILIP W. CRANNELL, Tolerance and Company; W. E. ENTZMINGER, The Contribution of Southern Baptists to the Spiritual Uplift of Brazil.

*Union Seminary Review*, Richmond, January: G. A. WAUCHOPE, Henry Alexander White; HENRY C. VEDDER, Origin of the New Testament; J. GRESHAM MACHEN, What is the Gospel?; GEORGE L. PETRIE, Greater than the Temple; FRAZER HOOD, The New Psychology; HENRY K. PASMA, Sowers of the Wind; J. LAYTON MAUZE, Building an Efficient Church.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, January: C. R. NOYES, Financing Prosperity on Next Year's Income; ROBERT MILLIKAN, The Evolution of Religion; JAGADIS CHANDRA BOSE, Unity of Life; WILBUR CROSS, The Mind of H. G. Wells.

*Biblica*, Roma, Januario: A. MALLON, La "sagesse de l'égyptien Amen-em-opé et les "Proverbes de Salomon"; L. G. DA FONSECA, Διαθήκη foedus an testamentum? P. JOÛON, Notes de lexicographie hébraïque; J. SONNEN, Landwirtschaftliches vom See Genesareth.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Dicembre: G. SEMPRINI, Le idee morali di L. B. Alberti; G. PIOLI, Il giornale di G. Fox fondatore delle Società degli amici; M. PUGLISI, Cristianesimo moderno e contemporaneo. *The Same*, Gennaio: M. PUCCINI, Fogazzaro; G. RENSI, Idee. *The Same*, Febbraio: D. CIAMPOLI, Pietro Tagliatela; H. FABER, Il regno di Dio: quando e come?

*Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique*, Toulouse, Janvier-Fevrier: GERMAIN BRETON, Le droit divin de la souveraineté politique selon Joseph de Maistre; LOUIS DESNOYERS, La Religion sous les trois premiers Rois d'Israel; C. F. JEAN, Le Milieu Biblique avant Jésus-Christ. *The Same*, Mars-Avril: GERMAIN BRETON, Le droit divin de la souveraineté politique selon Joseph de Maistre; JEAN RIVIERE, Sur l'origine des formules "de condigno" "de congruo."

*Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: VINCENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, El padre Domingo Báñez y Felipe ii; ALBERTO COLUNGA, El método histórico en el estudio de la Sagrada Escritura, según Santo Tomás; ANTONIO PELÁEZ, La sanción penal en la moral tomista. *The Same*, Marzo-Abril: VENANCIO D. CARRO, El maestro fray Pedro de Soto; JOSÉ D. GAFO, La situación religiosa de España; PETRUS M. BORDOY-TORRENTS, De "secunda via" divi Thomae.

*Estudis Franciscans*, Barcelona, Gener: VENANCE GRUMEL, La Papauté à Byzance; RAFAEL DE MATARÓ, L'idea de Déu en la prehistoria de la filosofia; AMÉDÉE TEETAERT, La confession aux laïques chez les théologiens franciscains du xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle.

*Etudes Théologiques et Religieuses*, Montpellier, Janvier: EDOUARD BRUSTON, Israël était-il un peuple civilisé?; JACQUES BOIS, Sur une récente critique du théisme neocriticiste d'Hamelin; ANDRÉ ARNAL, Le problème de la prière; HENRY LEENHARDT, Sur la portée de la loi du nombre.

*Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Aalten, Jan.: S. GREIJLDANUS, Professor Cramer's boek over Calvijn's Schriftbeschouwing en behandeling; G. CH. AALDERS, Wereldbeeld en Paradijsverhaal. *The Same*, Febr.; J. RIDDERBOS, God en Zijne verhouding tot Israel naar Hosea's profetie; H. W. VAN DER VAART SMIT, Eenige opmerkingen over de leer der organische inspiratie.

*Kirjath Zepher*, Jerusalem, November: D. SASOON, Saadia ben Joseph the Second; J. RIVKIND, Salonica prints; J. SONNE, Two editions of the Mahzor Sabionetta-Cremona 1557-1561.

*Journal Asiatique*, Paris, Janvier: M. J. PRZYLUKI, Un ancien peuple du Punjab: les Udumbara; M. M. CANARD, Les expéditions des Arabes contre Constantinople dans l'histoire et dans la légende; M. R. SCHWAB, Le Zend-Avesta l'exemplaire personnel d'Anquetil-Duperron.

*Logos*, Naopli, Luglio: N. ABBAGNANO, L'idealismo inglese contemporaneo; P. GATTI, Filosofia del linguaggio; F. ALBEGGIANI, Il naturalismo di G. M. Guyau.

*Nieuwe Theologische Studien*, Wageningen, Januari: JULIUS BOEHMER, Amos nach Gedankengang und Grundgedanken.

*Nouvelle Revue Theologique*, Tournai, Janvier: R. BROUILLARD, La Doctrine Catholique de l'aumône; E. MERSCH, L'obéissance fière; E. HOCEDEZ, Une conversion récente aux Indes. *The Same*, Fevrier: ED. BRISBOIS, Désir naturel et Vision de Dieu; ÉMILE MERSCH, La Raison d'être de l'Obeissance religieuse; FR. JANSEN, Le Coeur Eucharistique; P. CHARLES, L'Épiscopat indigène.

*Onder Eigen Vaandel*, Wageningen, Januari: J. J. HOMBURG, Schoonheid; P. SCHUMACHER, De Overwinning van de Partijchap; L. J. VAN



LEEUVEN, Over het georganiseerd gebruik van hulpkrachten bij den wetenschappelijken arbeid.

*Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Paris, Février: ÉMILE JANOT, L'Eucharistie dans les Sacramentaires occidentaux; JEAN CALÈS, Les Psaumes d'Asaph; ANTOINE MALVY, Les Dissidents de bonne foi sont-ils membres du corps de l'Eglise?

*Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*. Toulouse, Janvier: JEAN GOBERT, De la spiritualité des faits mystiques; ANDRÉ BREMOND, Le Moine et le Stoicien; P. GALTIER, Temples du Saint-Esprit.

*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Louvain, Janvier: J. LEBON, Une ancienne opinion sur la condition du corps du Christ dans le mort; M. DUBRUEL, Les Congregations des affaires de France sous Innocent XI.

*Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, Strasbourg: S. MOWINCKEL, L'origine du décalogue; J. PANNIER, Calvinisme et épiscopat; R. WILL, Le mouvement de réforme culturelle.

*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, Lausanne, Aout-Novembre: ROBERT WILL, Les principes essentiels de la vie culturelle; AUGUSTE GAMPERT, Le Décalogue; JULES PÉTREMAND, Le protestantisme suisse au xviii<sup>e</sup> siècle. *The Same*, Décembre: PAUL G. CHAPPUS, La pensée et la conduite de la vie; ALOYS BERTHOUD, L'unité du royaume de Dieu et la question doctrinale; ALFRED BOISSIER, Patriarches et rois antédiluviens.

*Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Paris, Octobre: P. MANDONNET, Saint Thomas d'Aquin créateur de la dispute quodlibétique; M.-D. CHENU, Le "De spiritu imaginativo" de R. Kilwardby. *The Same*, Janvier: P. MANDONNET, Saint Thomas d'Aquin créateur de la dispute quodlibétique (*fin*); FR. LOUIS DE LA TRINITÉ, Le procès de Béatification de Saint Jean de la Croix et le "Cantique spirituel"; P. SYNAVE, L'universalisme dans le Psaume 68.

*Scholastik*, Freiburg, 2: 2: JOSEPH STIGLMAYR, Ascese und Mystik des sog. Dioysius Areopagita; VIKTOR CATHREIN, Der Kampf um das Naturrecht; HERMANN DIECKMANN, "Der Sohn des Menschen,, im Johannesevangelium.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, 51:1: L. FUETSCHER, Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis bei Tertullian; J. STUFLE, Molinismus und neutrale Vernunfttheologie.

*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, Tübingen, 8:1: ARTHUR TITUS, Julius Kaftan; KARL BORNHAUSEN, Martin Luther und die evangelische Religions-philosophie der Gegenwart; THEOPHIL STEINMANN, Glaubensgewissheit und Wirklichkeitsforschung; GEORG WOBBERMIN, Pneumatische oder religionspsychologie Methode der systematische Theologie?

*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Gotha, 45:3: E. HENNECKE, Zur christlichen Apokryphenliteratur; L. v. SYBEL, Wer hat die Kirchenmalerei eingeführt?; Th. Hermann, Zur Chronologie des Kyrill von Skythopolis; F. FLASKAMP, Das Geburtsjahr des Wynfrith-Bonifatius; M. FLORIN, Innocenz III als Schriftsteller und als Papst, ein Vergleich; A. BAUMHAUER, Die Gründung des französischen Bistums Pamiers in Zusammenhang mit dem Streite zwischen Philipp dem Schönen und Papst Bonifaz VIII; P. BARTH, Zu meiner Calvin-Ausgabe.



## THE WORK OF THE PASTOR

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D., LL.D. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. 1924, 8vo, pp. vii. 257.

"This volume is intended to serve as a handbook to pastors and as a textbook for students of theology. It should be found helpful, however, to many others who are concerned with the organization and activities of the Christian Church. . . . Large portions of the last five chapters have been furnished by other writers, who are recognized as specially trained and qualified for their tasks."

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## WHAT IS FAITH?

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 263. Price \$1.75. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Price 7sh.6d.

"If we had the resources we should provide a copy to every minister and lay preacher in the British Isles"—*The British Weekly*.

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## CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM

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## FUNDAMENTAL CHRISTIANITY

By FRANCIS L. PATTON, President of Princeton University 1888-1902, President of Princeton Theological Seminary 1902-1913. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

"This volume is the outcome of five familiar lectures delivered in 1924 on the James Sprunt Foundation in Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. Though since expanded far beyond the limits allowed to lectures, the author prefers to keep the personal form of address; and ventures to hope that the additional matter may make the book more useful to ministers and laymen in various churches who by reason of contemporary controversy feel called upon to consider anew the meaning of Christianity."

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*The Modern Debate about the Messianic Consciousness.* By GEERHARDUS VOS, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Biblical Theology in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.

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*Devotional Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit.* By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, Professor of Practical Theology, Princeton Theological Seminary, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton, New Jersey. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.

This little volume discusses the following topics: "The Abiding Presence," "Another Comforter," "Filled with the Spirit," "Pentecost," "The Inspired Scriptures," "The Spirit and the Church," "The Spirit and the World."